Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Finland

D3.1 Country Report April 2021

Abstract

This report presents the Finnish situation regarding terrorism, radicalisation and de-radicalisation during past 20 years. Based on a desk study, the report’s sources include scientific literature, publications of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) and other public authorities, nationally relevant news media, and party programmes. By outlining the Finnish context and structures concerning radicalisation, the report shows that terrorism has been rare in the 21st century in Finland, but threat for both far-right and radical-Islamist violent extremism is elevated. The country has no extensive de-radicalisation programmes but relies on cross-sectoral collaboration including public authorities and civil society organisations, often on project funding.

In 2017, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) lifted the terrorist threat rating to level two of a four-level scale in 2017, and in March 2021 it noted a growing threat of far-right terrorism and increased international connections of radical Islamist operators in Finland (SUPO 2017, 2021). Indeed, our report presents signs of polarisation in terms of appeal to extremist ideas and ideology in Finnish society, and maps actors and channels of radicalisation as well as stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation.

The two main threats identified by SUPO—far right and radical Islamism—are introduced more specifically. All radical actors are rather marginal in Finnish society, and the minor actors are only briefly discussed in this report. There has been a relatively low amount of serious violence from the far right, especially when compared to violent material online. Far right and anti-immigration mobilisation blossomed in 2015-16, as many organisations and movements emerged, some of which have a more structured ideology (e.g., neo-Nazism or counter-jihad), but others generally positioned themselves against Islam, immigration, multiculturalism, the EU, the political elite or globalism (Sallamaa 2018, p. 5). Violent behaviour led to the first killing in a demonstration action in circa 70 years in one of the main squares of the capital city, Helsinki. Significant other events include school attacks that had some ideological motivation, and a radical Islamist terrorist attack in the former capital city Turku in 2017 that shook the country. Radical Islamist activity consists for the most part of non-violent action such as recruitment or financing, but travel to the conflict zone and back has been increasing (Malkki & Saarinen 2019, p. 11). The report seeks to identify networks of radicalisation that are mostly loosely organised in Finland, but for the far right also have connections to one of the country’s main political parties.

Among the Finnish political elite, consensual politics condemns violence and seeks to prevent it, even though extremism has not been at the centre of the political agenda and has been largely ignored in party manifestos and campaigning. While the Finnish political elite opposes violence, in the Finns Party (FP) there are some connections between parliamentary actors and far-right groups. FP caused a populist landslide in the Finnish political scene in 2011 and has been among the most popular parties ever since, with members of the far-right Suomen Sisu elected to parliament in 2015 under FP colours. In 2017 the party split under its new anti-immigration radical right-wing leadership, and the more traditional populist wing established a new party, which remained in government with each of the party’s ministers (Palonen 2018). The relationship between the parliamentary party and the far right is nevertheless complex and unstable.

The report shows that the common view in Finland is that the services of the welfare state play a key role in ‘implicit’ de-radicalisation policies. The focus of Finnish ’explicit’ de-radicalisation policies is on prevention and multi-professional cooperation between different public authorities and civil society. A significant part of the Finnish de-radicalisation policies has concentrated on youth and different generations in penitentiary institutions. The CSOs play a central role in de-radicalisation, which strengthens interaction with the grassroots level but simultaneously poses problems in terms of continuity, as their funding is mostly based on fixed-term projects. We conclude that while ‘implicit de-radicalisation’ in terms of welfare services that prevent exclusion have a solid position in Finland, ‘explicit de-radicalisation programmes’ have not yet reached an established form in the social system but are mainly project-based. The report highlights multi-sectoral co-operation and the need to develop de-radicalisation work and programmes and shortly assesses future developments.