Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Serbia

D3.1 Country Report April 2021

Abstract

This report aims to depict and analyze the context of radicalisation in Republic of Serbia in the period from 2000 to 2021 as a part of the Work Package “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation” of the D.Rad project. It puts emphasis on the most important acts of violence that indicate current and future trends of radicalisation and de-radicalisation; provides insight into how the political elite and general public perceive extremism, radicalisation and violent threats; and maps out the agents and channels of radicalisation and de-radicalisation.

After a turbulent decade of the 1990's and the fall of Slobodan Milosević regime in 2000, Serbia entered a period of relative stability, marked, on the one hand by the beginning of democratization, and on the other by deep divisions within its society. Ethnic tensions between the majority Serbs and the Albanian minority, religious divisions among the local Muslim population and ideologically motivated intolerance between right-wing and left-wing groups, as well as the hatred of extreme right-wingers towards members of the LGBT community, Roma and migrants, has over the past twenty years erupted into multiple cases of violence. Some of these cases may be labelled as acts of terrorism, while others may be marked as violent incidents. During the first decade of the 21st century, all four types of radicalisation have risen in Serbia: ethno-nationalism/separatism, Islamic extremism, right-wing and left-wing radicalism, with the latter remaining on the margins of socio-political turmoil to this day. This report analyses the activities of four collective agents that have been responsible for the major terrorist attacks or other violent incidents in Serbia: “Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa” (LAPBM), Wahhabi movement, Serbian national movement -1389/Serbian Right (SNM1389/SR) and “Leviathan” (Levijatan).

Due to the lack of detailed and systemic publicly available data on political violence from the national resources, the report relies mainly on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This database keeps records for Serbia, but also for the state entities it inherited, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) and Yugoslavia (2000-2002). The GTD shows that major terrorist attacks took place between 2000 and 2010 and were committed exclusively by the ethnonationalist/separatist and radical Islamists. It is noteworthy that GTD does not mention any Serb right-wing group and that this database recorded only one terrorist attack perpetrated by extreme leftists. This paper consults a number of other reports such as State Department's Country Report on Terrorism or Country Report on Terrorism of the U.S. Embassy in Serbia, as well as numerous NGO reports. Reports and analysis of Serbian NGOs show that far-right groups are responsible for the largest number of violent attacks on LGBT activists, political opponents, members of the Roma minority and migrants from Middle East.

Regarding State-led radicalisation, it is noticeable that members of the Serbian ruling elites generally denounce all forms of terrorism but refuse to publicly distance themselves from extreme Right ideologies and their values, avoiding public condemnation of activities and "actions" of right-wing extremist organisations. Therefore, public stigmatization of extremism is absent. On the contrary, in their public speeches, officials of the ruling SPP (Serbian Progressive Party) frequently equate radical right-wing groups and civil society NGOs, and on the other hand they openly “flirt” with football hooligans and extreme nationalist groups. In that way, not only do they not condemn extremism, but they also indirectly legitimize it. Quiet support of the state towards radicalism, especially when it comes to the radical Right, also occurs in the form of slow, lengthy judicial processes and acquittals, as well through the permissive legislation that allows representatives of banned extremist groups to legitimately re-register new organisations.

As a consequence of this negative practice, the Government of Serbia adopted the National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism and Terrorism, for the period 2017-2021, as the last country in the region. However, it is important that this strategy recognizes the prevention of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism as a state priority, which is certainly a big step towards the de-radicalisation of society.

Nevertheless, there is a room for further promotion of policies that implement models of intercultural interactions and communications, as well as identity strategies that affirm multidimensional identities. In this regard, it is necessary to reform existing political, economic, educational, and cultural programmes, in order to create favourable conditions for the coexistence of groups that obviously have different needs and interests, encourage new de-radicalisation programmes, and correct/improve old ones based on identified weaknesses and potential inefficiencies. This report highlights several programmes and projects which were realized, partially realized or are currently being realized in the Republic of Serbia, which may serve as a model of good de-radicalisation practice.