Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Italy

D3.1 Country Report April 2021

Abstract

This report contributes to Work Package 3 “Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation” and aims at drawing a general overview of radicalisation agents and de-radicalisation stakeholders in the context of Italy since 2001. We focus on religious, political and ethnonationalist/separatist cases of radicalisation, looking at jihadist; right-wing; left-wing; and ethnonationalist/separatist movements in Italy.

The first part of the report maps the current Italian context and violent extremist scene since 2001. It subsequently highlights broad trends and data, moving beyond the appearance that political violence has claimed less victims in Italy than in other European countries. Relatively few violent acts have been claimed by extreme Jihadist organisations and South Tyrol – the Alpine region between Italy and Austria inhabited by German and Ladin-speaking populations – has fortunately long overcome its bloodiest period of separatist political violence. However, the extreme left and anarchical groups remain very active on the Italian territory and have claimed the vast majority of violent actions recorded in official reports. Similarly, instances of rioting, disturbances and racially motivated violence by right-wing sympathisers has increased massively in the last decade.

The report also shows that Italian political parties have largely condemned political violence, and Islamist extremism and Jihadist violence, which is often framed as linked with migration across the political spectrum. However, right-wing political parties have maintained a somewhat ambiguous attitude to the illegal actions of far-right militants. In the case of South Tyrol, although the separatist political discourse has clearly distanced itself from the use of violence, local ethnicised politics provide a breeding ground for possible contaminations between legitimate socio-political institutions and extremist groups (often with a transnational character) on the basis of a very partial and distorted view of history and of a nationalist xenophobic ideology directed towards recent immigrants and refugees.

In the second part of the report, we consider a number of agents of radicalisation, starting with political movements. On the left, we consider the Federazione Anarchica Informale – Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale (FAI) and the Nuove Brigate Rosse (New Red Brigades/NBR). FAI is the most active anarchist groups in the country and has consistently engaged in violent political action, including vandalism, arson and sabotage, letter bombs and home-made explosives and violent attacks on prominent individuals, including the kneecapping of Roberto Adinolfi, CEO of the Italian nuclear power company Ansaldo Nucleare, in 2012. However, left-wing extremism is most closely associated with the NBR, which was responsible for the most high-profile terrorist attacks in Italy since 2001 (including the assassinations of government consultants Professor Massimo d’Antona in 1999, of and Professor Marco Biagi in 2002 and of policeman Emanuele Petri in 2003). The Covid-19 emergency and subsequent lockdown has offered opportunities for both FAI and the NBR to resume threatening letters and letter bombs against Italian authorities.

On the right, we focus on the self-defined ‘third millennium fascists’ of Casa Pound Italia (CPI). Despite a consistent emphasis on their cultural, social and leisure activities in support of the marginalised and deprived Italian population, it is well documented that CPI members and sympathisers have been responsible for ‘squadrist-style’ violent political demonstrations, riots and racially motivated violent attacks. The most highprofile act involved Gianluca Casseri (a CPI sympathiser according to CPI spokespersons) who, in a racially-motivated attack, shot and killed two Senegalese market traders in Florence in December 2011.

We subsequently consider ISIS and al-Qaeda inspired groups for which Italy served as a logistical hub since the 1990’s and represents a central transit country for Jihadists heading for the territories of ISIS. Although Italy did not yet suffer any major jihadist attacks, the country constitutes a target of potential terrorist attacks and propaganda directed against the Holy See and the city of Rome. Islamist extremism in Italy relies on individual pathways, on ‘Lone Wolf’ operations with linkages to a wider network such as the failed suicide bomb attack directed against a military facility in Milan by a Libyan citizen in 2009 that marked the arrival of home-grown jihadism in Italy. Since then, several Italian nationals, citizens with migration background and converts engaged in militant activities and contributed to recruit foreign fighters, with the web and social media platforms as primary sources of radicalisation.

Finally, we look at ethnonationalist and separatist driven radicalisation in the Alpine region of South Tyrol to focus on the historical weight of ethnic tensions in the area and on the dynamics by which different strands of radicalisation might combine. In this context, linguistic and ethnic differences have long been translated into a complex scenario still shaped by the concurrence and coexistence of two right-wing extremisms. On the one hand, with the end of clearly defined ethno-nationalist terrorism, a part of the German-speaking separatist discourse has increasingly become embedded and indeed swamped in the dynamics of right-wing extremism both at local level and among pre-existing transnational networks. On the other hand, Italian neo-fascism has been historically driven by a need of reaffirming the ‘Italianess’ of the region, in particular in the capital city of Bolzano, thought to a less extent today. In the last decades, such trends have received an increasing support also by young people. Indeed, Italian security reports have repeatedly pointed out how transnational contacts between for instance South Tyrolean skinheads and other pangermanist right-wing groups have been reinforced during transnational commemorations, concerts, paramilitary rallies organised abroad – mainly in Austria and Germany.

In the third part of the report, we present current initiatives for the prevention of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Italy. We underline that, despite a strong emphasis on identifying and punishing violent extremists, most de-radicalisation programmes in Italy are promoted and run by civil society actors. We specifically consider the activities of the following associations: the Association of Italian Victims of Terrorism (AIVITER); the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN); the Union of Islamic Communities of Italy (UCOII); the Italian Islamic Confederation (IIC); Co.Re.Is.; and Forum Prävention. We find that many of these initiatives have remained at the pilot level, and that lack of broad national-level guidelines, legal frameworks and dedicated funding hamper their long-term success and sustainability.

To conclude, the report clearly highlights the lack of a systemic approach to deradicalisation, which becomes a highly problematic feature when future trends of radicalisation are evaluated. In fact, although it is very unlikely that separatist-driven violence would resurge in the medium term, and while left-wing violent actions have remained a constant feature of the Italian landscape, right-wing extremism may become increasingly prominent in the future. In this context, different extremisms may reinforce each other. For instance, a rise in xenophobic attitudes can end up jeopardising societal cohesion and creating a fertile ground for individuals who experience marginalization and discrimination on a daily basis to be open to radical ideologies and jihadist propaganda.