



Mainstreaming, media, and communication

Germany/D5.2 Country Report

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List of Abbreviations

AAS	Antonio Amadeu Foundation
AfD	Alternative for Germany
CDU	Christian-Democratic Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
SPD	Social-Democratic Party of Germany

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards the measurable evaluation of de-radicalisation programs. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include the person's sense of being victimised, of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of 'us vs them' identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation in order to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of 17 nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering the strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

Hegemonic gender roles and the traditional heteroparental family are heavily referenced in Germany's contemporary far-right rhetoric as an essential element to the preservation of national identity and societal cohesion that progressive discourse jeopardizes with its inclusion of LGBT+ and feminist perspectives. In this report, we aim to distil some of the discursive lines present in far-right rhetoric on gender, on the grounds of the qualitative analysis of social media posts – particularly memes, infographics and TikToks – and find three main tendencies. First, the right-wing promotes hegemonic gender roles, particularly hegemonic masculinity, as necessary to preserve the normality of society and to solve Germany's demographic crisis, also implicitly promoting right-wing spaces and political struggles as ways for men to reinvigorate their masculinity and confidence in it. Second, the right-wing positions itself against gender mainstreaming, commonly referred to as 'gender hysteria' or 'gender Gaga', which it imagines as an ideological program of petty demands that threatens German language and freedom of speech, separating ordinary people with normal, 'real' grievances from a minority concerned with exaggerated political correctness. Finally, we find that right-wing actors instrumentalize individual women and members of the LGBT+ community in their spaces to legitimize their discourse, showcasing them as tokens portrayed as honest, 'normal' people distinguished from the overly progressive nature of mainstream LGBT+ and feminist rhetoric.

We also analyse the way progressive stakeholders of deradicalisation and ordinary users engage with the topic. Among the former, we find their style of communication to have limited potential to speak persuasively to the far-right, a problem exacerbated by social media algorithms that are unlikely to show their content to audiences outside their ideological bubble. This is also the case with the latter, although viral contents created by ordinary users showed to spark more contrasted debate in the comment sections.

1. Introduction

Gendered radicalisation in Germany needs to be seen in a broader societal context of polarisation since the late 1980s. The two major political camps - the Christian-Democrats (CDU) and the Social-Democrats (SPD) - clashed back then in the so-called “asylum debate” (*Asyldebatte*), a row over the country’s political asylum legislation. The early 1990s saw the asylum debate escalate into a series of arson campaigns targeting foreign citizens (asylum seekers and refugee shelters) on German territory, until the SPD agreed to revise the asylum legislation (Herbert, 2001; Prenzel, 2015; Adaire, 2019). Ever since, new events and actors have fed this polarisation. Other political parties and societal forces have increased the complexity within the two camps, with Greens and, more recently, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) competing with the SPD and CDU for the role of main mobilisers on the left and right.

The 1990s saw the CDU take up the *Leitkultur* (“lead culture”) slogan, stressing the prominence that “German” culture should have over “immigrant cultures” and rejecting alleged left-wing multiculturalism (Tibi, 1998, Scholz, 2017). The 2000s saw the rise of “gender” as yet another issue dividing the two camps, with the centre-right and right-wing camps claiming that feminism is a radical ideology taking over the country. The main mobilisations would take place in the 2010s when the conflict over “gender” would be less about feminism and more about sexual education in schools as well as sexual and reproductive rights. Right-wing opponents of “gender mainstreaming” and “early [sexual] education” (*Früherziehung*) would, on the one hand, fight the presumed multiculturalism of the left, allowing the questioning of traditional gender roles. On the other hand, they opposed the alleged “traditional” understanding of gender roles among immigrant and especially Muslim communities, claiming that such communities threaten women, and homosexuals in Germany. As elsewhere in Western Europe and North America, right-wing actors would fuse debates over immigration and gender into one narrative (Burschel, 2015; Lang & Peters, 2018; Kruse, 2022).

There are, however, large differences between the centre-right and the far-right in how much these forces perceive immigration and gender as threats. While the centre-right in principle accepts the other side - Social-Democrats, Greens, LGBT+ groups - as legitimate actors in the country’s social and political landscape - the far-right sees immigration and gender together with all the actors it associates with these issues - as existential threats to German national identity.

This report discusses the gender dimension of the far-right (de-)radicalisation in Germany as it is reflected in some media objects and their interaction with social media audiences. By the far-right we mean primarily the political public oriented towards the AfD, as the only far-right political party represented in the German parliament with over 10% of the seats won at the most recent elections (2021), but also more extreme political organisations, milieus, and subcultures. We discuss the rise of the most important gender-related debates in Germany since the unification of the country (particularly, on “gender mainstreaming”), the far-right mobilisation around them as well the far-right instrumentalisation of gender equality for anti-Muslim and anti-migrants campaigns. We proceed with analysing a number of the media objects exemplifying the use of (social) media platforms by the far-right agents of radicalisation for advancing gendered radicalising narratives. We discuss separately the objects (and social media reactions to them) illustrating the promotion of the “traditional” gender roles, the objects

attacking the “gender mainstreaming,” as well as instrumentalisation of the non-traditional genders and gender equality argument for advancing the racist narratives. Then we turn to the analysis of the objects illustrating some of the media strategies employed by some of the most important de-radicalisation stakeholders in Germany (e.g., Antonio Amadeu Foundation) and some typical problems they encounter, while trying to break through the social media bubbles’ boundaries to the radicalising audience with the counter-narratives. Finally, we discuss “citizen communication,” i.e., how some regular German citizens and independent activists challenge far-right gendered radicalisation by their use of social networks (particularly, TikTok). We end the report with the generalisation of the radicalising and de-radicalising media strategies in relation to the major gender issues and typical social media reactions they encounter.

2. Methodology and Methods

To find the media objects analysed in this report, we manually browsed across different social media platforms using key hashtags of buzzwords or phrases often present in radicalised anti-gender mainstreaming discourse and in progressive feminist and queer activism. For the first, hashtags such as #konservativ, #patriotisch, #nurnochafd, #stopgenderwahn, or #gendergaga were especially helpful for finding conservative meme sites on Instagram, such as @afd.memes, from which we took one object to analyse on this report, or @reaktionaere and @konservative_meme_aktion. Finding out which other meme accounts these accounts follow (by browsing through the “Following” section on their profiles) helped establish a sort of network of conservative and pro-AfD humour sites, which all shared similar lingo and used similar hashtags to boost their posts. However, some of the posts we selected had no hashtags and we had to manually browse for them through individual sites to find objects that best fit the aim of this report. For the latter, #fckafd, #fcknzs, #noafd, or #neinzurafd, which have gone enormously viral, led us to many content creators, especially on TikTok, that engage with feminist and queer discourse. Browsing for keywords such as ‘toxic masculinity’ (“*toxische Männlichkeit*”), etc., also helped find loosely connected networks of content creators on TikTok that posted TikToks on the topic.

When following far-right channels on Telegram, we looked after buzzwords such as ‘gender’ (“*Gender*”), ‘feminism’ (“*Feminismus*”), ‘men’s rights’ (“*Männerrechte*”), ‘strong men’ (“*starke Männer*”), etc with the Search option to find viral content disseminated in them, which led us to the song analysed in 4.1.4 and the cartoon section of the magazine Junge Freiheit, from which we take the cartoon in 4.2.2.

We used Facebook particularly for browsing the pages of NGOs we knew to be engaged with anti-radicalisation feminist and queer efforts, such as the Antonio Amadeu Foundation. This proved a little more insightful than most of the NGOs’ Instagram presence. Facebook also offers a Search tool, in which we looked for keywords we expected in posts and event pages related to our topic. We went back mainly to the NGOs cited as stakeholders of deradicalization in report 3.1 (Glathe, 2021), the work of which we had previously been acquainted with, but also found other projects to research through the network of further NGOs that the stakeholders from report 3.1 had online interactions with or that social media algorithms recommended after interacting with their content.

Among the several dozen shortlisted media objects, we selected for our analysis those which 1) could illustrate some of the main major topics of gendered radicalisation as outlined in the Introduction and Section 3; 2) were visually non-trivial; and 3) mostly led to some significant interaction with the audience with lengthy comments. The latter was particularly important for analysing not only (de-)radicalising representations in the media objects but also their circulation and consumption. We found several social media posts and memes disseminated by far-right accounts in the spirit of specifically gender-conservative far right radicalization, as well as illustrations and online campaigns led as deradicalization efforts by different NGOs, and social media content created by ordinary users with the aim of exhibiting the gender-conservative and anti-feminist element of far-right discourse. Many of these items also contained substantial discussion threads in their respective comments sections, which further helps illustrate the way different discourse lines around masculinity and the far-right in Germany emerge and develop.

It is important to note that all items used in section 6 created or disseminated by ordinary users (not public figures, academics or political activists), as well as all comments in the discussion threads to items in sections 4, 5 and 6 are anonymized out of ethical concerns.

Table 1. Overview of media objects selected for analysis

Media presence, production, and circulation of collective agents of radicalisation					
Description	Author	Date	Platform where found	Link	Statistics on interaction (as of August 2022)
AfD electoral poster for 2017 elections	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	2017	Hung on streets during campaign period and disseminated in multiple online platforms, found on article at Horizont website	Available for download at: Wahlplakate der AfD: Populistisch, auch populär? (horizont.net)	N.A.
Junge Alternative post on the traditional family values necessary to solve Germany's demographic crisis	Junge Alternative	15.5.2021	Instagram	Junge Alternative on Instagram	637 likes, 74 comments

AfD Munich greetings for World Men's Day on Instagram	AfD Munich	3.11.2021	Instagram	AfD München on Instagram:	59 likes, 1 comment
Kategorie C song "Deutschland krepelt die Ärmel hoch" (Germany rolls up ist sleeves)	Hooligan music group Kategorie C	August 2021 (original release)	Various alternative video sharing platforms, after taken down from Youtube, also constantly taken down and reposted in other platforms	DEUTSCHLAND KREMPELT DIE ÄRMEL HOCH (SONG XAVIER NAIDOO & HANNES) - Wiki-Tube (Video-Server 3 von Wikihausen.de)	16000 views on Wikitube, 2800 plays on Soundcloud (hard to trace because of repeated takedowns and reuploads)
AfD-affiliated meme ridiculing the gendered language	Instagram meme page with pro-AfD views	18.3.2021	Instagram	Originally AfD Memes on Instagram : " 🇩🇪 #afd, account currently shut down	Over 3000 likes, account currently shut down
"Junge Freiheit" cartoon on rainbow flags in football	<i>Junge Freiheit</i> (Young Freedom) magazine	28.3.2019 (posted to Facebook)	<i>Junge Freiheit</i> magazine website and social media accounts	Facebook	On Facebook: 2020 reacts, 196 comments, 513 shares
Blog entries against 'gender ideology' from David Berger's blog <i>Philosophia Perennis</i>	David Berger, theologian and publicist	Various between 2017 and 2018	<i>Philosophia Perennis</i> internet blog	Grüner "Transgender-Abgeordneter" im Bayerischen Landtag (philosophia-perennis.com), Transsexuelle gegen die Glaubenssätze der Genderideologen (philosophia-perennis.com), Wie die Gender*-Sprachpolizei uns alle foltert und Transsexuelle	2205 reads and 29 comments; 121 comments (number of reads invisible); 809 reads and 24 now deleted comments

				taktlos ausnutzt - Philosophia Perennis (philosophia- perennis.com)	
Media presence, production, and circulation of stakeholders of de-radicalisation					
Description	Author	Date	Platform where found	Link	Statistics on interaction (as of August 2022)
Infographic from the “Gender Dings” (<i>Gender Things</i>) initiative	Antonio Amadeu Foundation	2017 - 2019	Genderdings project website	Was ist eigentlich dieses Genderdings? Infos, Erklärungen, Meinungen	N.A.
SHEROES Fund main poster	Antonio Amadeu Foundation	2021	AAF website and Facebook	Antonio Amadeu Foundation	573 likes, 106 comments, 210 shares
Announcement of results of the “Miss and Mister Homophobia” online poll	“Enough is Enough” queer NGO	31.10.2017	NGO’s Facebook	Facebook	369 likes, 333 comments, 126 shares
Media presence, production, and circulation of ordinary users against radicalisation					
Description	Author	Date	Platform where shared	Link	Statistics on interaction (as of August 2022)
Tweets by Andreas Kemper	Andreas Kemper	Various from 2021	Twitter	AndreasKemper on Twitter.; AndreasKemper on Twitter (original tweets with following discussion threads)	838 likes, 201 retweets, 316 replies; 131 likes, 15 retweets, 6 replies
TikTok on misogynistic statements by AfD politicians	anonymized	19.6.2021	TikTok	N.A.	8676 likes, 925 comments, 432 shares
TikTok on Alice Weidel’s contradictory profile	anonymized	10.8.2021	TikTok	N.A.	1713 likes, 43 comments, 22 likes

3. Mediated hegemonic gender presentations and its relationship to radicalisation in the country

The main gendered radicalisation trends concern societal reactions to legislation on gender mainstreaming passed from the late 1990s on. With the United Nations launching the first gender mainstreaming strategy in 1995, European institutions and national governments followed suit, with Germany enacting the first law in 1999 (Altgelt, Maschewsky-Schneider & Köster, 2017). Several currents emerged in response. The first reaction was the emergence of networks of “anti-feminist” organisations and individuals, from members of the liberal party (FDP), to Germany’s neo-Nazi party NPD. Rather than claiming male superiority over women, “anti-feminists” decry the alleged violation of men’s and especially fathers’ rights; twenty years after the passing of the first mainstreaming legislation, “anti-feminists” are usually to be found among members of right-wing and far-right political forces (Lucas, 2018).

However, while “gender mainstreaming”-legislation indeed coalesced a growing movement for “men’s rights”, anti-feminism is a broader and older phenomenon, characterising the discourse of mainstream media outlets since the 1980s. As Huhnke (2013) argues in her empirical work on major German press outlets, the large Western-German weeklies *Die Zeit* and *Spiegel* fostered since the 1980s an image depicting feminism as a threat and as an “ideology” going too far. Even though there are no overlaps between the journalists writing on the topic in the 80s-90s and the later activists and politicians in the 2000s movement for men’s rights, the discourses of the two time periods share many similarities, from the trope of masculine victimhood to the idea - first expressed in the 1990s - that a wave of “political correctness” censors expressions of men’s rights.

Second, other groups oppose gender mainstreaming by taking issue with sexual and reproductive rights more generally. The development spurring most mobilisation is the growing concern among these latter groups over children’s *Früherziehung* (early sexual education), and the fear voiced by right-wing and far-right-wing groups and commentators that *Früherziehung* indoctrinates children into performing “non-natural” gender roles. The *Früherziehung*-topic too is since the 2010s firmly in the grip of right-wing and far-right groups, but it needs to be remembered that the first attacks on gender mainstreaming came up in respectable publications around the mid- 2000s. These include the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and the *Spiegel*. Authors from both newspapers complained that gender mainstreaming represents “political sex change” (Zastrow, 2006) and “identity destruction” (Pfister, 2006).

Früherziehung-opponents represent a loose network stretching from publications and persons affiliated with the centre-right (liberal FDP and Christian-Democratic CDU) to the far-right *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany, AfD). Main actors include the *Junge Freiheit* publication, an outlet hosting such New Right authors as Alain de Benoist and sponsored by the FDP’s Alexander von Stahl, a former federal state prosecutor; and the *Demo für alle* - coalition, founded by future AfD member Beatrix von Storch (at that time member of the FDP) (Kruse, 2022) and headed by Hedwig von Beverfoerde, a CDU-member until 2016 renowned for her homophobic positions (Klages, 2015). *Demo für alle* is the exact translation of the *Manif pour tous* (“Protest for all”) network and campaign in France, and takes the French

mobilisation as its explicit example and source of inspiration. In 2014-2016, *Demo für alle* organised the first larger protests of anti-gender-mainstreaming groups. Drawing the yearly participation of around 5,000 people from catholic, conservative, and far-right groups, the protests targeted the educational reform planned by the government of the Baden-Württemberg federal state, calling for the government to “stop the indoctrination” and “sexualisation of children” (Maier, 2016).

Other petition campaigns and mobilisations followed a similar pattern, with right-wing and far-right groups launching campaigns against specific publications. One was a handbook on “Sexual pedagogy of diversity”, with criticism targeting the book since 2014 (although it came out earlier in 2008). The other was the Berlin federal state’s guidelines for “inclusive pedagogical actions”, that the *Junge Freiheit* targeted from 2018 on through its publication and petitioning activities (Kruse, 2022), although without being able to repeat the mobilisational success of *Demo für alle* in Baden-Württemberg.

From “early sexual education” to “national extinction”: *Früherziehung* and *Volkstod*

The intensification of anti-feminist and anti-*Früherziehung* mobilisations in the 2010s coincides with the rise of the AfD and the refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016. “Gender ideology” and the “homo[sexual]- and gender-lobby” represent the targets of a political movement that at the same time participated in campaigns targeting immigrants and especially Muslims. Both “gender” and “Islam” become threats to the nation that the AfD and the numerous organisations mobilising together with it throughout the 2010s see as two sides of the same *Volkstod*-scenario, meaning national death or national extinction, a slogan of German Neo-Nazis (Glathe & Varga, 2021a). Conspiracy theories connect these various mobilisations and concepts into one seamless narrative, conjuring up the threat of globalist interests, allegedly promoting political correctness, gender mainstreaming, immigration - and, most recently, anti-COVID-19 vaccination – for the sake of harming and undermining national communities. The main disseminators of this narrative are major right-wing and far-right outlets and organisations, such as *Junge Freiheit* and the AfD. Thus, the idea of a “homo[sexual]-lobby” operating in the back of gender mainstreaming initiatives (Kruse, 2022) is a mainstay of AfD discourses in both West German and East German regional chapters, and are heavily circulated in *Demo für alle* - mobilisations, despite the fact that organisers of *Demo für alle* have distanced themselves from the AfD. Therefore, people joining the mobilisations of *Demo für alle* out of concerns over “gender indoctrination” come in touch with the broader narrative adhering to the *Volkstod*-scenario, and the opposition to gender mainstreaming fosters a significant potential for political radicalisation (Kruse, 2022).

4. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of collective agents of radicalisation

In this section, we explore how the gender issues are exploited for the far-right radicalisation in Germany. In order to present the multifaceted and contradictory processes, we focus on three dimensions of gendered radicalisation. Firstly, we discuss the proactive promotion of the traditional gender roles by the German far right that allows them to weave together

conservative, social redistributionist, and racist narratives. Secondly, we explore the reactive challenge to the gender equality discourse, typically framed in Germany as criticism of the “mainstreaming” of the so-called “gender ideology.” Finally, we analyse how the far-right instrumentalise the non-conventional gender identities in order to advance racist and anti-migrants narratives.

4.1. Traditional gender positioning by the far-right in Germany

4.1.1. AfD electoral poster for 2017 elections

We start from a poster (Appendix 1.1.1) that was released by the AfD as a complementary visual element to the section on family issues in its electoral programme for the 2017 parliamentary elections (AfD, 2017). It is fair to assume that it was representative for a stance on a major gender issue and a strategy to mobilise the voters of the largest far-right political organisation in the country. The poster shows a traditional family consisting of a man, a woman and two children holding hands at the beach, presumably on a vacation, aiming to appeal to the family memories of AfD voters as they are imagined. The image is accompanied with the caption “‘Traditional’? We like that!”, and the party’s common campaign slogan “Dare, Germany” next to the party’s logo.

Traditional gender values are very explicit in the German far-right programme, with the AfD’s electoral programme for the 2017 election explicitly consolidating the party stance against so-called ‘gender ideology’ (deemed unconstitutional) and its application in schools, as well as against changing the Constitution’s definition of family to include alternative forms of family beyond the heteropaternal one, which would allow these to get special state support through family welfare policies. The normalisation of single-parent families is condemned, stating that children “need a father and a mother”, and supporting “strong fathers” that are needed by the country. AfD politician Beatrix von Storch, for example, released a video during the 2013 campaign harshly condemning gender mainstreaming (or ‘gender ideology’), deeming it dangerous to German society and the normal socialisation of children (Beatrix von Storch, 2013). Many other AfD politicians have made statements in the same spirit.

The poster also speaks on the socially re-distributive dimension of the party’s programme, which supports state financial support through the expansion of taxation privileges for families complying with the constitutional definition of ‘family’ (*Familiensplitting*), as well as support for the kindergarten and daycare systems that would allow mothers to care for their children without having to give up their professional prospects.

Finally, it can be linked to the racial dimension of the AfD’s project. The AfD frames Germany’s problem of population ageing, which demands birth rates to rise for the pension system to not be jeopardised, as a threat to ‘our people’, the German nation, going as far as stating that they will not “stay actionless while our people are disappearing”. This is reminiscent of the point presented by the AfD as analysed in report 3.2 (Glathe & Varga, 2021b), which perpetuates the myth of the ‘Great Replacement’, implying that German families not reproducing allows non-German families to take over German society in number.

4.1.2. Junge Alternative post on the traditional family values necessary to solve Germany's demographic crisis.

Noteworthy, the far-right positioning even for the younger Germans tend to follow the same lines. We analyse an Instagram post that was released by the *Junge Alternative* ("Young Alternative," a youth organisation among AfD supporters) to commemorate the Day of the Family on May 15, 2021, having gotten over 600 likes to date (Appendix 1.1.2). It shows the slogan "Day of the Family! Father, mother, child" in the centre of the picture on top of a background image of a family holding hands, with a child in the middle of a woman and a man. In the post's caption, they state that the family "consisting of man, woman and child is the ground stone of all order", but that instead of being recognised, it is starting to be "questioned that the traditional family is normal", referencing the idea widespread in the far-right that gender mainstreaming is being taken too far and threatening German society and its traditional values. The caption emphasises that the current 'anti-family' German policy needs to be replaced for an approach that invites Germans to have children as a solution to the demographic crisis, stating that it 'cannot be solved through immigration', hinting at the previously mentioned theory of the 'great replacement'.

This line of discourse is taken further by some of the comments, which are explicitly racist and even bound to conspiracy theories, such as that of the 'great replacement' (Appendix, comments 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4). In 1.1.2.1, for instance, a comment in the Russian language explicitly goes to say, "white families have to be multi-children!" (comment 1.1.2.1), with another comment also stating that globalists and communists must be happy about the average birth rate of 1.2 children per German family (comment 1.1.2.3). However, the post reaches a polarised audience and does also spawn some rejection in the comments, with replies such as comment 1.1.2.2 constituting cliched responses that call out the discrimination of minorities in the AfD ideological programme and implied in the discourse around families present in this specific post. In comment 1.1.2.5, a lengthier exchange of comments between an AfD sympathiser and a left-liberal user reveals the implicit homophobia and racism in far-right positions, showing a user complaining about the 'glorification' of queer couples that are shown going through life happily, but would not be able to survive in a country where Muslim families, who have more children on average, take over demographically and lead to the loss of 'German values'. They also state that traditional families are important for preserving German culture, further pointing to the gender-conservative stances of Islam and how even people in Muslim countries resist Islam. A more left-leaning user reads this as an attack against gender equality, dismissing the AfD as a potential electoral choice because of its stance against same-sex marriage, and challenges the concept of 'German values' and 'German culture', which shouldn't be threatened or jeopardised by the 5 million Muslim people in Germany, stating immigration problems have been working well in his opinion. He also notes that citizens in the Middle East do not resist Islam *per se* but Islamists.

4.1.3. AfD Munich greetings for World Men's Day on Instagram

Some far-right media objects exhibit an explicit anti-feminist position, for example, the post that was uploaded to the Instagram page of AfD Munich on November 3rd, 2021 (Appendix 1.1.3). Although, its popularity is questionable, having gathered only 59 likes and only one comment to date, with the account also having less than 900 followers.

The image depicts a “strong” man: bearded, worked out, white, and conventionally masculine-presenting. The caption on the image of the man reads, “Strong men bring good [in this context rather ‘prosperous’] times!”, followed by the party’s 2021 campaign slogan “Germany, but normal,” and the logo of the party’s Munich section. In the text accompanying the image, AfD Munich thanks all “strong, confident” men who still stand true to their masculinity despite feminist and globalist efforts to pit genders against each other in a sort of ‘war between genders’ to “soften” basic masculine characteristics. They also state that “weak men bring tough times, and tough times bring strong men,” an idea backed and repeated by the only comment in the post, containing an implicit threat to the ‘weak men’ at the government benches that potentially bend to liberal feminism. The text ends with the following quote: “The AfD group in the Munich City Council fully supports boys’ development into strong, self-confident and successful men who will also bring our society through the hard times that may be ahead of us.” This reaffirms the gender-conservative view widespread in far-right rhetoric that men should be combative and stay true to traditional presentations of masculinity (which will also be explored in the next selected media objected), and that left-leaning ideals are emasculating while right-leaning ones, embodied by the AfD, for example, have the potential to invigorate one’s masculinity.

4.1.4. Kategorie C song “Deutschland krempelt die Ärmel hoch” (*Germany rolls up its sleeves*)

Looking beyond the AfD political network, in even more extreme far-right milieus, we find even more assertive visual manifestations of the conservative masculinity. For example, the song and video “Deutschland krempelt die Ärmel hoch” (“Germany rolls up the sleeves”) were released in 2021 by the hooligan scene far-right group Kategorie C against COVID-related vaccination mandates, calling for ‘strong men’ to fight back against the supposedly repressive nature of the massive state-led vaccination campaign and the implied “castration” of Germany through it, that should lead to the dissolution of the whole nation. The name of the group, ‘Category C,’ refers to the classification of the German police in which category C includes football fans that seek violence for whom the game is secondary. The song’s name is also ironic, borrowing a slogan used by the government in the vaccine campaign to promote voluntary vaccination against COVID-19 (for which it is necessary to roll up one’s sleeves to exhibit the shoulders) (Bundesregierung, 2020). In turn, the song’s lyrics bend the meaning of the phrase to represent the combative nature of strong men who oppose such state mandates, rolling up their sleeves to fight back.

The video was originally posted on YouTube but was deleted, after which it was disseminated in alternative video platforms, none of which seems to have amassed a significant number of views or comments, and it is also heavily promoted in the group’s Telegram channel, where anti-vaccine propaganda and far-right memes are also often shared .

The men on the video present themselves as victims, with lyrics calling to rise against the dictatorial and emasculating character of Germany’s COVID-19 policy. The video starts with a spoken dialogue between the two vocalists featured in the song, in which one calls to gather all the ‘strong men’, “which not many seem to be left of”, for his idea for the video. The video refers to traditional masculinity during the song as one of the victims of COVID-19 restrictions: “Germany, what happened, are you already so castrated?” More importantly, in the chorus, there is a direct invitation to men to be combative and rise up in the chorus: “The strong men, where are they? Germany, roll your sleeves up!”

The video is especially interesting in terms of the way it depicts masculinity, with elements associated with the hooligan scene and broader standards of gender-conservative masculinity, such as leather, torches, and tattoos. It is worth noting that this group was also very active for the brief period the HoGeSa (*Hooligans gegen Salafisten*) movement existed, showing an evident anti-immigration and Islamophobic stance to the refugee crisis of 2015-2016, however with very limited presence in mainstream social media platforms and leaving behind almost no visual material.

4.2. Against “gender mainstreaming”

Besides asserting the traditional conservative gender values, another major line of the German far-right media activity is reactive criticism of the gender equality/feminist values, which they try to present and ridicule as imposition (“mainstreaming”) of an artificial and dangerous “gender ideology”. Below we analyse two exemplary memes.

4.2.1. AfD meme ridiculing the gendered language

As mentioned, ‘gendered language’, a term referring to efforts to use gender-inclusive wording in German language that goes beyond the default inclusion only of males in many standard terms and phrasings, is often attacked by the far-right and gender-conservative movements. This meme (Appendix 1.2.1), with over 3,000 likes to date, was posted on Instagram on March 18th, 2021, by the account @afd.memes, a meme account with pro-AfD views. The account has gathered over 9,000 followers. In this meme, which tells a satirical story over a photo carousel consisting of five images, gendered language (used to include individuals of all genders in grammatical constructs in which male declinations are the default standard) is ridiculed and depicted as overly sensitive.

The story shows a man asking a pink-haired girl how to get to the train station, causing the girl to go into a hysterical rant accusing the man of misgendering her by calling her ‘Sie’ (German for formal ‘you’, which sounds the same as third-person feminine singular ‘she/her’) instead of using the non-binary ‘neopronoun’ “sier”, and also of not gendering the word ‘train station’ (by adding a feminine suffix, e.g. *Bahnhof_in*). This is followed by her calling the man a racist, asking if he even supports the Black Lives Matter movement since he did not even show any verbal support for it during the interaction. At last, the man asks another guy and gets a straight answer, while the girl demands the ‘sexist racist’ to stay and keep listening to her lecture.

Fitting to its narrative, the meme uses typical troll faces used to depict archetypical internet personalities, with the man being shown as a Wojak in an ordinary sweater, usually used to embody innocent or non-confrontational male personalities, while the girl is a pink-haired Daddy’s E-girl prototype cartoon typically used in the Incel movement, usually a depiction of ‘woke’ overly sensitive or politically female personalities with a sort of progressive ‘herd mentality’ in supporting left-liberal talking points. It reproduces stereotypical female hysterics while targeting the principle of gender mainstreaming in language, depicting the cause of inclusive language as ridiculous and nonsense, completely out-of-touch with everyday situations and concerns, with the satirical exaggeration of a feminist asking for the formal ‘you’ to not be used because it sounds like a female pronoun, or for the noun ‘train station’ to be ‘gendered’. This way, it exhibits the perception widespread in far-right humour that left-liberal activists are self-righteous and too sensitive in a way that ends up being disruptive to everyday communication.

The meme has polarising reactions in the comment sections, with some of them just laughing in support of the meme's framing of feminist activism and even emphasising in a more serious tone that the meme depicts a "sad reality" in a country headed for cultural decay, mentioning examples of 'similar' situations seen in TV shows (see appendix, comments 1.2.1.2, 1.2.1.3). In polarising reciprocity, other comments point to the fact that the meme's narration depicts a totally unrealistic situation and an inaccurate form of using inclusive language that would not come up in real life, highlighting the 'mimimi' stupidity of the meme authors (see appendix comments 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.4).

4.2.2. "Junge Freiheit" cartoon (March 2019) on rainbow flags in football

This (Appendix 1.2.2) was the weekly cartoon of the magazine *Junge Freiheit* ('Young Freedom'), a right-wing political magazine, in March 2019, shared on the magazine's Facebook profile on March 28th, 2019, with the title "Nooo, noo, little friend, those are not the right colours."

The cartoon shows a white man in a simple outfit featuring a white t-shirt that has the German flag printed on it, being escorted out of a football stadium by the security guard. In the background, the bleachers are crowded by an audience waving multiple rainbow Pride flags, banners with anti-AfD slogans, and one big sign reading "Football is all of us." On the left, a sign points to the bathrooms, featuring a gender-neutral/non-binary icon.

This cartoon was most likely published in response to an ad that had recently been posted by Volkswagen, then the official sponsor of the German football team, with the same title written in the big sign on the comic's background: "Football is all of us". In this ad, a rainbow Pride flag is featured being waved by football fans in two frames, appearing on the screen for a total of some two seconds and always next to German flags in each frame. The cartoon, then, satirically exaggerates the presence of queer iconography in football games, implying that soon rainbow Pride flags will dominate stadiums and 'normal' German flags will not be allowed.

Many comments on the Facebook under the post treat the situation depicted in the cartoon as a soon-to-be reality, which there already allegedly have been some symptoms of, with a user asking whether the Bundesliga will start playing for a Tolerance Cup instead of the German championship. Another comment replies that it depends on the "idiots, the do-gooders, and the Greens" (Appendix, comments 1.2.2.3). Another comment takes on a more solemn tone, with a fan declaring he stopped strongly supporting the team after the introduction of a jersey without national colours, the increase in the number of players with migrant backgrounds such as Mesut Ozil (who is of Turkish origin), and now, the start of Pride flags appearing at football games, which only "serves as a political instrument for the whole 'Germany is colourful' movement" (comment 1.2.2.4). Other comments, however, just point out the cartoon's lack of realism, calling out and ridiculing the way football fans seem to victimise themselves (comments 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.2) for something that poses no threat to the game and that is heavily exaggerated in the cartoon. Another comment also asserts that the cartoon exhibits a right-wing interpretation of the national identity in monopolising the role of who defines it, stating that 'real Germans' are tolerant, that homosexuals can be as German as anyone else, and that the cartoon is "weak and not worthy of a real German."

A long discussion also emerges from a comment questioning the patriotism of hooligan-like behaviour in football games, which creates significant violence and material damage that has

to be mended using taxpayer money (comment 1.2.2.6). In the replies, the discussion is quickly readdressed to focus on left-wing parties and activists that allegedly are more often at fault of organising violent riots that not only generate immediate material damage but also are harmful to the entire nation in the long term because of their pro-migration attitudes (comment 1.2.2.5). Other comments identify migrants as a threat to security, which is backed by the example of the Chemnitz city festival that had to be shut down because of confrontations allegedly caused by provocations by Turks and Antifa activists (comment 1.2.2.7).

4.3. Instrumentalisation of non-traditional gender models for the far-right purposes

Last but not least, the recent trend in the far-right gendered radicalisation relies on the instrumentalisation of the non-conventional gender identities. To illustrate it, we chose to analyse the publications on David Berger's websites and the typically extensive audiences' interactions with them. Even though these are not visual objects, they explicate some of the typical arguments and reactions of how alternative gender identities are "tokenised" and exploited to legitimise right-wing radicalising narratives within the context of a relatively more progressive consensus about the gender roles.

David Berger is a habilitated PhD in theology and prominent publicist who came out as gay in 2010, while being active in many conservative Christian organisations. In the past election cycles, he has shown support for the AfD, also being a member of the board of trustees of the AfD-affiliated Desiderius Erasmus Foundation. Berger currently runs a blog named *Philosophia Perennis* (philosophia-perennis.com), which identifies as "liberal-conservative" and "shaped by the Catholic background of its author." The blog's views, which are Berger's own, claim to have their origin in "European, Judeo-Christian tradition" and are "closely related to the values of the German Constitution," standing against "all totalitarianism, whether National Socialism, Communism or Islam." Furthermore, the blog claims to sustain views that are pro-American and pro-Israel, arguing concretely that Israel remains "the only state in the Middle East that is a global model for defending against aggressive Islam while at the same time upholding human rights and democracy."

In his blog, a "trans team" of reporters is often credited, particularly in articles in which gender mainstreaming and so-called "gender Gaga" or *Genderwahnsinn* (roughly 'gender insanity'), meaning efforts to create more inclusive and "politically correct" discourse around gender in public spheres, is spoken against, being deemed actually unfavourable and useless to LGBT+ people. This already shows a certain sense of tokenism, as a team of queer authors (Berger, who is gay himself, and the transgender reporters) refers to their own sexual orientation or gender identity to legitimise their conservative and racist views. In this section, we take a look at three articles from Berger's blog in which he slams gender mainstreaming.

4.3.1.1 'Gender ideology' oppresses 'honest' transgender people

This article (Berger, 2018a) was posted to Berger's blog on November 11th, having gathered 498 likes when shared to Facebook and 29 comments in the open discussion forum to date. Berger criticises 'gender ideology' but goes as far as saying that it is oppressive to 'true,' 'honest' transgender people.

Berger reminds the readers that the first-ever member of a city council in Germany to come out as transgender was not from the Greens (as may be stereotypically assumed from the Greens' progressive views on gender) but from the AfD: Nico Wittmann, a member of the district council of Tempelhof-Schoeneberg in Berlin. He emphasises this in response to the claims spread in German media that Markus Ganserer, a male-presenting but not a cisgender representative from the Greens in the Bundestag, is the first-ever transgender person in German parliamentary institutions. According to Ganserer, deeming this male-presenting individual, whose appearance in public has usually not being recognised as transgender, is a symptom of gender ideology that oppresses 'honest' transgender people, banalising the label 'transgender.' Berger claims that a transgender person is one that wants to live their life as the opposite gender fully, transitioning using hormones, not just "someone who dresses up as a woman twice a month."

Berger also goes as far as accusing the Greens, or some individual politicians in the party, of queerphobia, claiming that Ganserer "should just be careful not to cross paths with a group of people much respected by his party, for which this is fornication. It can end up stupidly otherwise." In contrast, he presents the quote by AfD politician Nicole Höchst, who spoke for the respect of all individual freedoms (which is largely the AfD's core talking point when it comes to sexual diversity, which should be respected as private, individual characteristics without being 'forced' on society and in public spheres). In bashing 'gender ideology' for oppressing 'honest' transgender people, he also bashes those parties that support it, coming back to the point that the more gender-conservative parties that allow transgender people to exist without creating supposedly counterproductive public policies and discourse are the ones that are in fact helpful to the interests of 'honest' transgender people.

The comments generally are supportive of the article's stance, which is less surprising given that this is not a post on a broadly open social media platform, but one posted on Berger's own website. Gender mainstreaming, research on gender, and transgender are generally talked about as 'fads' or excesses of modernity. One comment criticises the article's mention of the fact that Ganserer should be careful of some members of the Greens that could frown upon his gender identity, seemingly misunderstanding that this refers to AfD politicians that the AfD transgender council member should fear (which is not what is meant in text). The commenter calls this a 'shameful assumption', sarcastically saying the AfD must be nazis in that case.

4.3.1.2 Trans people against the doctrines of gender ideologists

This article (Berger, 2018b) was posted on July 29th, 2018 and had an extensive comment thread, with 121 replies to date.

Berger again claims that the perspective of his blog's trans team is one that is confusing because it's the one "always deadly silenced in media." The trans team argues that being transgender and transitioning implies a long introspective process of self-discovery, in which one's gender identity never changes but is only 'found', making transsexuals declared enemies of the 'gender lobby', given that 'gender ideologists' support an overly casual and fluid approach to gender, by which one people are encouraged to "be a little man today, and a little lady tomorrow". Much like in the first article, the authors accuse the typically left-leaning supporters of gender mainstreaming of trivialising the discourse on gender, which causes the

deeply complex, personal experiences of transgender people to be seen as rather spontaneous, modifiable at will, or being a symptom of a trend or fad.

In the article, it is mentioned that Islamic countries are among those where transgender people are oppressed and cannot access services and are marginalised or murdered. This point is not further commented on, but it fits the narrative often constructed by the AfD that they are the true guardians of the safety of LGBT+ people as they support reducing the influx of people from the Middle East, whose religion encourages them to be violent to LGBT+ people.

Comments also seem to be mainly supportive, except for one that states that people who defend gender ideology are impossible to have a conversation with, especially when they defend Islam, referring to the Muslim immigrants in Germany. The left-liberal pro-feminists are allegedly silent about the “violent” aspects of the said religion, even though they present a danger to themselves.

4.3.1.3 Gender* Language Police torture us all and tactlessly exploit transsexuals

This (Berger, 2017) is an article from August 5th, 2017, which had 24 comments that are now hidden. In this article, gendered language is slammed, under the central claim that transsexual and intersex people do not need the previously mentioned use of asterisks to create gender-inclusive terms and do not need to be made visible in every word, but rather just want to be integrated as a “normal part of society”, the entirety of which is annoyed by the gendered language initiatives that progressives supposedly push intransigently.

Instead of gendered language, what transgender people need is, as cited, proper medical care, the abolition of waiting times for approved treatments, and quicker procedures for changing documents. Again, it is emphasised that gender ideology sabotages the integration of trans people because it presents gender as a casual and fluid occurrence that can change ordinarily, and not a solid standard that trans people rigidly aim towards. The article is also making the argument that the “tolerant” Western cultures (unlike the “backward” ones) protect the trans-people. The article claims that the trans-people are only safe in cultural spheres free of transphobia, which includes the “safe streets,” an argument often used by the far-right to legitimise the idea of restricting Islam and Middle-Eastern immigration in Germany.

5. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of stakeholders of de-radicalisation

This section discusses the media performances of the de-radicalisation stakeholders and the audience's reactions to them. Two of the media objects that we analyse below were produced by a partner (*Gender Dings*) and an initiative (*SHEROES*) of the Antonio Amadeu Foundation (AAF), which operates not only in Germany but, increasingly, internationally. The AAF is one of the most important German non-governmental organisations focused on countering right-wing extremism, antisemitism, racism, and other forms of hateful ideologies. They have supported about 1,800 projects and campaigns since its founding in 1998 (AAF, n.d.). What is important in the context of this report, the AAF pays specific attention to countering hate and group-focused enmity online.

The analysis of these objects illustrates some of the typical problems that institutionalised de-radicalisation efforts encounter. Firstly, de-radicalisation messages may not be effective if they are not appealing, particularly, because they are not moving beyond the established common sense. Secondly, the amplification of the identity markers working for the liberal in-group do not help breaking the boundaries of the online bubbles to the radicalised groups and perform the actual de-radicalisation. The third object (*Miss and Mister Homophobia* contest), which was produced by a large *Enough is enough* queer NGO, is an example of a more offensive, even if non entirely unproblematic narrative, that at the same time challenges the in-group dogmas and LGBT+ tokenism.

5.1. "Gender Dings" (*Gender Things*)

Gender Dings project illustrates the inefficiency of some of the deradicalisation initiatives, which are not moving beyond the changing common sense of the West European societies. It is one of the sub-projects within the Social Media Interventions project that worked in 2017-2019 and attempted to counter right-wing anti-feminist narratives and hate speech in the social media echo chambers by providing counter-narratives "in a way that is suitable for the Internet and make them accessible in a bundled, low-threshold form" (SoMI, 2021). The *Gender Dings* website (genderdings.de) attempted to gather the most typical arguments in defence of the pro-diversity and feminist positions (covering the topics of gender equality, early sexual education, abortion, discrimination against men and others), the vocabulary of the most important concepts in feminism and gender studies, practical advices on addressing hate speech and cyberbullying, explanatory texts, videos, and infographics on the topics of gender, sexuality, and love.

One of the most important elements of the *Gender Dings* concept was collecting "informative and low-threshold" media objects in order to be efficient and break through the virtual bubbles. The outcome was, however, quite poor. Object 2.1 in the Appendix is one of the infographics distributed by the Social Media Interventions project. Its goal is to present that a family can take different forms, and the contemporary family may be patchwork families, single-parent families, rainbow families, and co-parenting, which are no less "normal" than a traditional heterosexual nuclear family. The infographic is visually simple and supplied with a brief lecturing text explaining the concept and how it can be used for pedagogic goals.

Noteworthy that the project that was supposed to address right-wing anti-feminist radicalisation in social networks was barely using the social networks. The Instagram page has about 900 subscribers, and the Facebook page - 1,600 subscribers. Both pages have very little interactions: usually less than 20 likes and no comments at all. The contents of both pages are mainly the text-pics with the pro-feminist/pro-diversity short slogans or "arguments."

Remarkably, the project did not use memes or any other viral online-communication methods to provide effective counter-narratives to the anti-feminists and rightists. The outcome is predictable. The politically correct media production that reproduced the consensual narratives and arguments, instead of breaking into the radicalising circles, remains largely undemanded. Effectively, they do not work as de-radicalising tools.

5.2. SHEROES Fund

Another initiative of the AAS, the *SHEROES Fund*, illustrates a different problem of de-radicalisation - not excessively consensual, however, excessively provoking language acts,

which also do not allow reaching the radicalised circles but may rather alienate the potential audience.

The SHEROES Fund was established to support women (as well as trans-, inter-, and non-binary people) who are threatened as a result of their attitudes and actions targeting racism, anti-Semitism, and other hateful ideologies and require some financial help for relocation and protection. The fund was established in 2021 when a known anti-racist writer and social media activist Jasmina Kuhnke got under a targeting campaign from the extreme right who published her address, and she needed to change her home.

The SHEROES Fund points specifically to the problem of the hateful targeting of progressive activists as well as "doxing," i.e., collecting online and publicising personal information with the aims of systematic intimidation and provoking physical violence.

The main SHEROES ad poster (Appendix 2.2) depicts three women of an "Amazonian" outlook with a shield, a spear, and a rainbow flag, who are apparently ready to fight back. All of them are black (probably, emphasising the anti-racist direction of the initiative or with reference to Jasmina Kuhnke, who has a partial African origin), tattooed but not apparently genderqueer.

Despite the apparent emphasis on mutual solidarity, most of the discussion on Facebook of the poster and the post on establishing the SHEROES foundation was about the calambur "sheroes." A long thread of comments was started by a comment (Appendix, comment 2.2.1) saying that a "proper" feminism is not about language games, which are either a sign of pseudo-progressive infantilism or an attempt of "totalitarian indoctrination":

I have been a feminist since my puberty – largely in the sense of Simone de Beauvoir.

I explicitly have nothing to do with the feminism of gender theory and 3-wave - and intersectional feminism.

And I also explicitly reject their linguistic precepts and language games.

And will mock them at every opportunity.

For me, in the more harmless case, this has adolescent-pseudo-progressive traits, but in the bad case, it is an attempt at totalitarian indoctrination with new language a la "1984".

This comment was posted by a user with a male name and got 16 likes. In response, the Antonio Amadeu Stiftung account commented that instead of expressing solidarity with a woman in danger, one starts a discussion about language trifles and should check his male privilege (37 likes):

It is exciting to see how, in the face of real threats to a woman by right-wing extremists, the discussion of terms is carried out here instead of showing solidarity with the woman concerned without any ifs or buts. You have to work very hard for this privilege (Appendix, comment 2.2.2)

Similar comments (Appendix 2.2.5) also emphasise the mansplaining and cliched arguments, e.g., "anti-feminist speaking automate" (37 reactions). However, they are countered with responses that question the strategy of language games: "If these quibbles are so meaningless, you might as well leave them alone, right?" (Appendix, comment 2.2.3, 2 likes):

Where do you find the right-wing extremism in this discussion again? This killer argument that is supposed to prevent any further discussion and force the discussion partner into a "right-wing" corner shows how little you are interested in genuine reappraisal. You are simply engaging in the most disgusting populism. Every word you use twists "normal" language and then your argument is that one should not attach so much importance to language?! You must be joking! (Appendix, comment 2.2.4, 1 like)

With the attention to the gendered language, one loses the original problem to discuss: the right-wing extremism and its threats to progressive activists. In this way, it also fails to reach the radicalised circles. Furthermore, it opens the initiative to charges that it is little interested in genuinely addressing the problem and serious solutions.

5.3. "Miss and Mister Homophobia"

An example of a more engaging de-radicalisation attempt could be "Miss & Mister Homophobia" online poll organised by the "Enough Is Enough" queer NGO on Facebook (Appendix 2.3). For example, in 2017, the "winners" were Alice Weidel (AfD co-chair) and David Berger, who were chosen because of their involvement in homophobic organisations/dissemination of homophobic content despite being queers themselves. The caption said, "this is another indication that we can increasingly discuss discrimination within the LGBTI* community." The framing of the poll directly responds to the idea of tokenism as used by the far-right to legitimise conservative stances:

Is it possible to act as a lesbian woman on the board of a party whose other members repeatedly make headlines with homophobic statements? Can you, as a gay man, run a blog that publishes texts that conflate adoption by same-sex couples with child abuse?

Other top nominees included conservative (CDU) and far-right (AfD) activists and politicians (e.g., Angela Merkel and Beatrix von Storch). About 9,300 users participated in the poll. The post had 45 reactions, five re-posts, and 19 comments.

Most comments were positive. However, some criticism was also voiced, particularly, about the inclusion of Angela Merkel, a centrist politician, in the poll (4th position). Comment 2.1.1 mentions that even if Merkel was not an active advocate of LGBT+ rights, she would be pretty distant from the active homophobes: "a lot of gays seem to be going for the 'Thank you Merkel!' thing now, too, and are actually listening to the very homophobic idiots it's actually against." The inclusion of moderate conservative politicians in the contest of homophobes may marginalise the agenda and, at the same time, look unreasonable and distant from the most urgent dangers against the queer people.

Besides, comment 2.1.2 criticised the sexist framing "Miss and Mister" that reproduced the binary identities, which is particularly weird in addressing the issue of homophobia. On the other hand, a user with an apparent far-right background (comment 2.1.3) sarcastically laughs at how the liberal left chose to attack two queer people: "Two homosexuals for 'Miss and Mister Homophobia' elected. Makes sense!"

6. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of ordinary users against radicalisation

In this section, we discuss how the regular German citizens, rather than institutionalised deradicalisation stakeholders, try to counter far-right gendered radicalisation. We chose to analyse social media objects by a relatively well-known independent scholar-activist Andreas Kemper, because he has actively pursued the topic of masculinity and gendered dynamics of far-right radicalisation. We also selected several TikTok videos by regular German users that challenged far-right radicalisation narratives related to gender.

6.1. Andreas Kemper

Andreas Kemper is a German sociologist, blogger, and activist born in 1963. His academic focus lies on gender, racism, and classism, with most of his works being available in full on his blog at www.andreaskemper.org. He is a member of, among other organisations, the German Society for Sociology and the Union of Democratic Scientists (BdWi), which is strongly positioned against far-right radicalisation. In 2021, he founded the Association for the dismantling of educational barriers (*Verein zabiba*), aimed at reducing class inequalities in access to education in Germany. He is currently primarily active on Twitter, having amassed a following of nearly 27,000 followers as of March 2022. He tweets about current political and social affairs, mainly from the domestic arena, with a clear stance against right-wing parties, particularly the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which he often criticises. Kemper's visibility is mostly due to his investigative success of proving that one popular AfD politician, Björn Höcke, usually denying any far-right affiliation, had in fact published several articles in a NPD (neo-Nazi) media, using a pseudonym; later on authorities picked up Kemper's investigations and officially accused Höcke of right-wing extremism.

Kemper's most notable academic work on masculinity dates from 2020 and is titled '*Crash statt Care: Virtuelle und apokalyptische Männlichkeit* (English: 'Crash instead of care: virtual and apocalyptic masculinity'), in which he criticises the term 'toxic masculinity' and suggests the terms 'apocalyptic' or 'fanatic virtual masculinity' to describe the reinvigoration of hegemonic masculinity in digital spaces, particularly in the context of right-wing radicalisation in Germany, finding instances in far-right political discourse in which such 'fanatic' masculinity has also intersected with racist and anti-feminist discourse (Kemper, 2020a). On Twitter (in a tweet we do not select for deeper analysis because of how little interaction it generated), he used the term 'apocalyptic masculinity', for example, to describe the style of the protests from August 2020 by Querdenker ('Lateral thinkers') and conspiracy theorists against COVID restrictions, which also featured flags from the German Empire and far-right slogans (Kemper, 2020b). In the following section, we analyse a selection of his Twitter posts in which he pinpoints masculinity as an important drive behind instances of radicalised violence and discourse, often causing outrage among repliers.

6.1.1. Tweet in response to a terrorist attack in Norway, October 2021

In this tweet (Appendix 3.1.1), Kemper tweets the link to an article published on the Tagesspiegel about a terrorist attack in the Norwegian city of Kongsberg, carried out by an allegedly Muslim suspect with unknown motivations leaving five casualties. Next to the link, he adds the caption: "I've been posting for years about such attacks. The problem is called

#masculinity. This is the smallest common in the profile of attackers. They're nearly always men. I don't think this has something to do with 'biological' masculinity".

As of March 12th, the tweet has 862 likes, 117 retweets, and 87 quote tweets. Considering that the median global average Twitter engagement rate is presumed to lie around 0.5% of total followers liking each tweet, which in Kemper's case would mean approximately 130 likes as of today, this tweet can be assumed to have been fairly popular and have gotten more circulation and interaction than his average tweet.

Replies are abundant, and most of them show disagreement with Kemper's assumption that the root problem behind the radicalisation that led to the attack is socially constructed masculinity, with most users being inclined to point at the fact that the suspected attacker was allegedly Muslim as the cause (particularly comment 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2, which are the responses that seem to have gotten the most likes, and 3.1.1.3, which sarcastically states that "Islam is as innocent and peaceful as a baby bunny, and Allah is a woman", all in the Appendix). Many comments also parody Kemper's assumption, stating, for example, that the "smallest common ground" is actually that they all "breathe oxygen" or "eat bread."

Kemper replies to many of the comments that question his focus on masculinity as a root cause of radicalisation with the link to the full text of his aforementioned 2020 study (Appendix, comment 3.1.1.4), which offers more details on his thesis on masculinity that the tweet may fail to convey.

Scrolling through the Twitter profiles of some of the ordinary users who replied to the tweet and rejected Kemper's framing of masculinity as an issue behind radicalisation, especially those who posted the comments included in the appendix, some tweets can be found rejecting and mocking gender mainstreaming and feminist discourse. However, none of these users have anything on their profiles (as of March 2022) that shows them to be explicitly affiliated to any far-right organisations or active in far-right networks.

Overall, this example is evidence of a lack of widespread support in the mainstream digital space for theses that deem hegemonic masculinity an important drive behind radicalisation processes.

6.1.2. Tweet commenting on a declaration by Bundeswehr soldiers planning to march against the government, December 2021

As commented in section 4.1.4, the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccination campaigns offered the far-right an occasion to spread its rhetoric and increase its appeal under the guise of defending freedom from the 'authoritarian' lockdown and vaccination promotion measures enacted by the German state, not rarely with an undertone of rejecting government measures as the brave and emancipated, and consequently masculine, thing to do. This is a quote tweet by Kemper (Appendix 3.1.2) in response to a tweet by journalist Robert Andreasch in which Andreasch shows two anti-vax members of the German Bundeswehr threatening with a revolt against the government in the context of the new COVID and vaccination policies implemented in December 2021, which, among others, mandated all members of the Bundeswehr to undergo COVID vaccination. The first one, Andreas Oberauer, declares war (*Kampf*) to the government "until order in compliance with the Constitution is restored" and gives an ultimatum to the government stating that soldiers "are ready for dialogue until tomorrow at 16.00" and that order in compliance with the Constitution can be restored until the next day. He promises

to fight for the Constitution and invites all citizens to defend their country and families, marching “alongside loyal soldiers”. Then, a Facebook post by Daniel Futschik is shown in which he vows to march to defend his family, using the phrase “the fight in me has been fought”, and claiming that the soldiers are “the first test object for the to-be-extended vaccination mandate”. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Defence released a tweet claiming to be aware of the circulation of Oberauer’s ultimatum and that consequences were already being considered (Verteidigungsministerium, 2021).

Andreas Kemper quotes the tweet in which Andreasch exposes these soldiers, adding the caption: “‘The fight in me has been fought’ The fascist fanaticism of Goebbels and Hitler also sounded like this. This has to do with soldierlike masculinity, taking a step into apocalyptic masculinity”. Again, he refers to the term developed in his 2020 paper, and pinpoints to hegemonic masculinity as a drive behind radicalisation efforts. As mentioned here and in our previous reports, the implementation of lockdown policies and institutional incentives for vaccination have been pivotal moments for far-right radicalisation, with new social movements such as the Querdenker (‘Lateral thinkers’), becoming breeding grounds for the normalisation of neo-Nazi discourse.

This tweet amassed only 134 likes, 15 retweets, and three quote tweets, having little circulation compared to the first tweet, with none of the answers rejecting Kemper’s framing (Appendix, comments 3.1.2.1). However, the fact that replies do not reject or mock the view that hegemonic masculinity is at the core of this right-wing radicalised threat, and that this tweet did not become nearly as controversial as Kemper’s previous tweet commenting on an allegedly jihadist terrorist attack with the same framing, may raise the point that among many ordinary users, radicalised Islam remains a more evident threat than the far-right and its hegemonic gender dynamics, despite the empirical evidence gathered in previous D.Rad reports about far-right radicalisation having a larger reach and having caused more violence in the last few decades (Glathe, 2021).

6.2. Countering radicalisation on TikTok

The social network TikTok has emerged in past years as a popular space to share short clips and video montages, becoming especially popular among Gen Z youth. While the content available is very diverse, it also has become an important platform for disseminating political views and creating awareness about political questions in short video formats, often with a humorous or satirical framing. Although the platform has been at the centre of controversy for eliminating or “shadowbanning” LGBT+-related content, many progressive bloggers, journalists, and activists have created accounts and amassed large followings. In this section, we examine two viral videos posted by progressive young content creators exhibiting the AfD’s position as a defender of hegemonic masculinity.

6.2.1. TikTok on misogynistic statements by AfD politicians, June 2021

Some content creators have taken to TikTok to spread awareness on the anti-feminist nature of far-right discourse, with many informative clips available that aim, often with a humorous or theatrical framing, to draw attention to the issue. A here anonymised account led by a German young adult with over 9’000 followers as of March 2022 exemplifies this. The user, whose bio includes the hashtags #niemalsAFD and #fcknzs, posts clips primarily criticising far-right

discourse and discouraging participation in and electoral support for far-right groups, often using the term Nazi to refer to the far-right movements and protests she criticises.

In a TikTok from June 19 (one of the very first she made), which already has gained nearly 90,000 views and over 8,500 likes, she reads out a selection of deeply misogynistic statements by male AfD politicians. She opens the video with the question, “Have you ever asked yourself what AfD politicians more or less think and say about women?” before moving on to the quotes, previously also giving a trigger warning. The statements chosen include, among others, stances against parity quotas and women in politics, with also a quote by Bavarian politician and former Bundestag candidate Johannes Normann in which he says that “a country that allows everyone in is as respected as a woman who allows everyone in” (verified), showing anti-immigration rhetoric to intersect with traditional gender roles. The video has 945 comments as of March 2022.

In the comments section, many users that reply to the original video agree with the user’s indignation, showing surprise that anyone could vote for such a party (Appendix, comments 3.2.1.1), but also a few users arguing that the quotes are taken out of context and that more information is needed about what was said immediately before (comments 3.2.1.2).

A comment that became especially controversial reads “They are just afraid of women,” which had 83 likes and got replied to by AfD politician Bianca Wolter, a former Bundestag candidate. Wolter replied by saying, “Oh, we have lots of women in the party,” to which the original poster replied that the AfD also has many members with an immigration background, while still hypocritically defending the idea that German citizenship should only be acquired by bloodline. In a similar spirit to that of Wolter, a user comments, “Have you noted what other parties are giving from themselves? This “misogynistic” party has a FEMALE top candidate,” referring to Alice Weidel (comments 3.2.1.3).

This shows a point consistently made in discourse around the AfD, by which AfD defenders resort to tokenism to legitimise some of their stances on feminism, LGBT+ rights and immigration, while getting called out by AfD opponents for not supporting policies in favor of the social groups represented by these individual members (or tokens).

6.2.2. TikTok on Alice Weidel’s contradictory profile, August 2021

There are several TikToks that have gone viral mocking the fact that Alice Weidel, a lesbian woman married to a Sri Lankan immigrant, is or has been a leader of the AfD. In this TikTok posted by a young adult who with nearly 5000 followers, a photo of Alice Weidel is shown with a quote by herself, in which she claims that the AfD is “the only real protective power for gays and lesbians in Germany.” This is followed by a clip of the content creator nodding his head in disapproval with the previous statement, with the caption:

“AfD politicians regularly express themselves in homophobic ways. The fight against homo and transphobia doesn’t interest the AfD in essence. AfD: “The equalisation of homosexuals leads to a hazard of the classical family””

The latter is not a verbal citation from a concrete AfD-affiliated individual but, apparently, just a quote taken from an infographic posted by the SPD to display the stances of the AfD about

LGBT+ rights¹. Finally, this is followed by a clip of Alice Weidel walking away from a podium with a facial expression denoting sarcasm or irony.

The video was posted with the caption “how I love the constant contradiction of this party (eye roll emoji)”, representing a general sentiment among many LGBT+ users who see Alice Weidel’s leadership role in the AfD, and the way she can be argued to be ‘tokenized’ to legitimize the party’s right-wing stances, as hypocritical to her own lifestyle and a form of ‘betrayal’ to her community as an LGBT+ individual, which is also seen in section 5.3.

Most comments mainly agree with the video, also pointing to the contradiction of Weidel’s leading role as a lesbian woman in a party that seems to not deeply support LGBT+ rights, using herself as a token to legitimise the party despite its conservative rhetoric. Some of the comments that got the most traction say:

Teacher: the exam will be simple

The exam: Alice Weidel” (Appendix, comment 3.2.2.1)

I think the lady sometimes wakes up crying at night and asks herself what she’s actually doing there (comment 3.2.2.2)

Surely Alice Weidel is a spy for the Greens

Alice Weidel - contradiction personified (comments 3.2.2.3)

These comments portray a general sense of contradiction that may be perceived in Alice Weidel’s persona, as an openly queer person and head of a homoparental family who is also active in a party that supports traditional families and conservative values. However, this is the exact reason the far-right could be argued to cling on to certain ‘minority’ tokens that legitimize their far-right views, which are presented as impossible to be homophobic if a queer individual supports and represents them. The image of Alice Weidel confuses and disorients queer activists but also public perception on AfD policies, which could be imagined to be less homophobic and less harmful by Germans when confronted with the fact that one of the party’s leading politicians is, indeed, queer.

7. Discussion and conclusions

The media objects we discussed and the reactions to them illustrate the complexity of gendered radicalisation by the German far-right as well as some of the typical strategies and problems to counter such gender-related elements of far-right radicalisation by the stakeholders of de-radicalisation and regular German users.

Despite the strengthening positions of the gender equality discourse and policies in the German context, the German far-right promotes conservative narratives about the “normality” of traditional gender roles and specifically masculinity. At the same time, gender conservatism is usually not the only or, sometimes, not even the most important goal of the far-right media strategies. On the one hand, gender conservatism is enmeshed in social-redistributionist discourse. Germany’s far right typically present the problems of gender minorities as “luxury

¹ See the infographic on the SPD’s website: <https://www.spd.de/faktenfunk/motive/die-afd-behauptet-die-klassische-familie-sei-bedroht/>

issues” that are allegedly opposed to the grievances of the majority in Germany. On the other hand, gender conservatism often serves the role of empowering nationalistic and racist narratives presenting alternative gender roles as a threat to “Germany” and exploiting an opportunity to advance racist anti-Muslim and anti-migrant scare.

As with the proactive assertion of traditional gender models, the far-right reactive attacks on “gender mainstreaming” are typically not about gender as such. On the one hand, they include an implicit populist moment that emphasises the distance between the “normal” people with their regular problems and the left-liberal gender agenda, allegedly out of touch with the reality on the ground. On the other hand, the far-right attacks on the “gender mainstreaming” typically try to exploit the alleged victimhood, not just of the far-right themselves, the views of which meet restrictions on public expression, but present it as a threat to the whole Germany and German national identity (understood in an ethnicised way). The typical reaction of the critics of such memes ridiculing gender-progressive and feminist views is to challenge their claims about the reality, which contributes to further polarisation, while denying any real basis for the grievances behind the memes.

Therefore, the far-right gendered radicalisation media strategies in the context of the dominating liberal positions in the German public sphere can be summarised as follows. The first line of argument is in defence of the traditional gender roles. Visually, this line is supplemented by the images of the “normal” heterosexual nuclear families, traditional masculinities, and femininities. The second line is an attack on “gender mainstreaming” where the far-right present themselves as victims. The visualisation of the “normal,” “regular” people coming under the attack of the “hysterical” (combined with misogynist stereotypes) liberal left for failing to conform to the “aggressively” promoted dominant ideology serves this goal. The final line instrumentalises ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientation or gender presentations in order to argue that it is actually a conservative position, not that of the liberal left, that protects the most urgent needs of the LGBT+ people. All the media strategies include two cross-cutting motives. The first one is a social-populist argument appealing to the unfulfilled needs of the majority that are presented as marginalised by the excessive emphasis on the “whims” of the minorities (even David Berger’s argument on what the trans-people “really” need instead of the gendered language follows the same pattern). The second cross-cutting motive is racism, in that it refers to the alleged threats both to the national identity of the German majority and to the gender minorities from Islam and Muslim immigrants. From the interactions related to the media objects, it looks like the arguments do not reach much further than the far-right sympathisers. The comments from the opposite camp are rather rare and polarising, which points to the strategy of ignoring the far-right communication, rather than entering into the discussion.

The report shows that the institutionalised stakeholders meet a dilemma in their de-radicalisation approaches in relation to the far-right gendered radicalisation strategies. On the one hand, the cliched reproduction of the consensual arguments and positions that hardly creates any substantial, transient debate and, on the other hand, provocation with the language games which may be counterproductive for breaking the boundaries of the social network bubbles to the radicalised people and achieving some actual de-radicalisation. A positive alternative could be the more self-reflective initiatives, open to criticism of the problems of progressive discourse.

We see that ordinary non-professional users have the potential to take advantage of social media, not necessarily being affiliated to any concrete NGOs, for the dissemination of progressive ideas, in calling out far-right groups' inclination to homophobic and misogynistic political stances, and their position as conservative forces with no interest in revising culturally normalised canons of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity, or a desire to reinvigorate it, still does not seem to be deemed in the mainstream social media discourse as a central drive behind radicalisation. Rather, as shown by Kemper and the selected TikToks, some users have engaged in criticising the German far-right from a feminist or LGBT+ angle, also confronting the "tokenist" belief that the AfD, for example, can not be deemed homophobic or misogynistic because of the existence of women or LGBT+ people in its lines.

At the same time, the regular users' communication may share some of the same problems as the institutionalised stakeholders of deradicalisation. The tweets such as Kemper's may provoke the Twitter audience pointing to the "apocalyptic masculinity" and not "Islam" as a cause of the terrorist attacks. It does not yet mean that the provocation would push the people under the radicalisation risk to change their opinion. The supportive comments may be generated within the social networks' bubbles, which are also reinforced by algorithms aimed at offering a customised selection of entertaining content to users. In this way, they do not overcome the problem of preaching to the converted, which is only exacerbated by social networks' algorithms.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Media objects by agents of radicalisation in Germany

1.1. Representation of traditional gender roles by German far-right

1.1.1. AfD electoral poster for 2017 federal elections

Source: https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/07/2017-07-20_afd-btw_faltblatt_familie-traditionell.pdf



1.1.2. Post by Junge Alternative and comments (the youth organisation of AfD).

Source: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CO5ilVbtqxh/>



Comment 1.1.2.1

██████████ Белые семьи
должны быть многодетными!



35 нед. Ответить

Comment 1.1.2.2

██████████ Freiheitliche Nation.
Außer du bist homosexuell,
Ausländer, Frau, Moslem, oder
einfach kein Arier.



35 нед. "Нравится": 15 Ответить ***

Comment 1.1.2.3

██████████ 1,2
„Kinder“ pro deutsche Familie-Die
Globalisten,Kommunisten freuen
sich!



35 нед. Ответить ***

Comment 1.1.2.4

██████████ Schön zu sehen das es
noch eine Partei gibt die sich gegen
diesen ganzen Gender Gagga Mist
und Gender Mainstreaming
ausspricht! AfD



35 нед. "Нравится": 4 Ответить ***

Comment 1.1.2.5

██████████
@yes_for_democracy Die Glorifizierung findet zunehmend in öffentlichen Händen statt. Es werden bewusst immer häufiger homosexuelle Paare gezeigt die fröhlich durchs Leben gehn. Sie werden fortlaufend in Werbungen beispielsweise gezeigt. Tinder und der DFB als große Namen springen mit auf den Zug auf. Dagegen hat doch auch keiner etwas. Aber das ständige in den Mittelpunkt stellen von Familienstrukturen aufgrund von Gender und LGBTQI*+ ist Schwachwinn.

bisherige Integration und Assimilation scheitert. Während muslimische Einwanderer mehr Kinder zeugen als nötig und deutsche Familien weniger als nötig werden wir in den nächsten Jahren einen enormen Kulturwandel erleben. Mit mehr muslimischen Einfluss und Wirkung in unserer Gesellschaft verlieren wir deutsche Werte und Stück für Stück unsere Kultur während in muslimischen Nationen Menschen gegen den Islam kämpfen. Deshalb sind höhere Geburtenraten ein



Ja und darf ich wegen einem Punkt eine Partei nichtmehr unterstützen? Ich bin auch für Ehe für alle aber nur wegen einem Punkt der nicht übereinstimmt muss ich doch nicht meine Partei aufgeben oder haben Sie 100% Übereinstimmung mit ihrer Partei? Das wir mehr Kinder brauchen ist klar wenn wir uns den demographischen Wandel ansehen. Wir haben einen enormen Zug von Migration in den letzten Jahren gesehen. Und die bisherige Integration und

Geburtenraten ein wichtiges Mittel um deutschlands Kultur weiter zu erben. Einer der vielen Gründe neben Wirtschaftskraft.

Comment 1.1.2.6


@and.e17 inwiefern werden Familienstrukturen immer häufiger aufgrund von Gender oder LGBTQ+ in den Mittelpunkt gestellt? Ich bin im übrigen nicht parteipolitisch aktiv, habe aber trotzdem meine Ansichten. Und meine Ansicht sagt: Eine Partei die etwas so fundamentales wie die gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe ablehnt ist für mich nicht wählbar. Ja wir hatten Migration in den letzten Jahren, war nie anders. Das ist auch nichts schlimmes.

„deutsche Werte und Kultur“ sind. Und Menschen in muslimischen Nationen kämpfen nicht gegen den Islam sondern gegen Islamisten (kleiner aber wichtiger Unterschied). Ihre ganze Argumentation erinnert sehr an Stereotypen und ein biologisches Menschenbild, das die Wissenschaft längst widerlegt hat.



ist auch nichts schlimmes. Integration hat trotzdem relativ gut funktioniert, muss jedoch noch verbessert werden. Assimilation hingegen ist verfassungswidrig und daher auch nicht wünschenswert. Und wieso 5 Millionen muslimische Menschen in Deutschland angeblich unsere „Werte und Kultur“ bedrohen kann ich beim besten Willen nicht erkennen. Zumal mir bislang keiner erklären konnte was genau „deutsche Werte und Kultur“ sind. Und Menschen in muslimischen Nationen

1.1.3. AfD Munich greetings to commemorate World Man's Day

Source: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CV0FW2ZsIQV/>



1.2. Attacking "gender mainstreaming" by far-right

1.2.1. AfD meme ridiculing the gendered language



◀ ähm.. mit "sie" was ist daran falsch? ▶

ICH BIN NICHT BINÄR UND TRANSGENDER ALSO HEISST DAS "SIER" UND DU HAST BAHNHOF NICHT GEGENDERT DU SEXIST. BIST DU STOLZ DARAUF SO EIN SCHLECHTER MENSCH ZU SEIN?




◀ ich will doch nur zum Bahnhof ▶

BAHNHOF*INNEN WAS IST MIT DIR? alle Männer sind gleich.. und bist du eigentlich für BLM???? ODER BIST DU EIN RASSIST WEIL DU HAST NICHT GESAGT DU BIST DAFÜR HALLO?




◀

HALLO bleib hier du sexistischer Rassist! UNTERSTÜTZT DU EIGENTLICH LGBTQ DU HAST NÄMLICH NIRGENDS EINE REGENBÖGEN-FLAGGE DU HOMOPHOBE MÄNNLICHES ARSCHLOCH



hey weißt du wo es zum Bahnhof geht?

klar einfach die Straße lang und dann nach rechts




Comment 1.2.1.1

████████ digga ihr denkt euch szenarien aus, die so nie vorgekommen sind und fuckt euch darüber ab, ihr seid so lächerlich 😂

3 нед. "Нравится": 15

Comment 1.2.1.2

████████ Traurig zu sehen, wie das Land langsam aber sicher in den Abgrund schweift.

45 нед. "Нравится": 24

Comment 1.2.1.3

████████ Das traurige ist, dass Family guy mal so etwas als Spaß in einer Folge hatte... Diese Gesellschaft ist nicht zu retten

45 нед. "Нравится": 6

Comment 1.2.1.4

████████ Alter das ist ja an mimimi dummheit nicht mehr zu übertreffen 😂😂😂

45 нед. "Нравится": 7

1.2.2. Junge Freiheit cartoon

Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/jungefreiheit/photos/a.431214844941/10158364758884942/>



Comment 1.2.2.1

██████████
Dafür sicher nicht. Aber was Ihr könnt ist gut das Opfer spielen, seid Ihr aber nicht.



Comment 1.2.2.2

██████████
Junge junge wer den scheiß ernst nimmt und glaubt das hat irgendwas mit der Wahrheit zu tun der war noch nie im Fussball Stadion.
Das schöne ist aber das sich gleich die möchtegern verteidiger des Abendlandes bestätigt fühlen 🤔🤔

Comment 1.2.2.3


- [Redacted]

Sollen die Fans künftig die Nationalmannschaft mit "Vielfalt vor, noch ein Tor" anfeuern? Spielt die Bundesliga künftig anstatt um die deutsche Meisterschaft um den Toleranz Pokal?

  75



[Нравится](#) [Ответить](#) [Показать перевод](#)
2 г. [Отредактировано](#)
- [Redacted]

[Redacted] wenn es nach den Bescheuerten, Gutmenschen und Grünen geht bestimmt.

 7

[Нравится](#) [Ответить](#) [Показать перевод](#) 2 г.
- [Redacted]

Was für zwei dumme Kommentare

  2

[Нравится](#) [Ответить](#) [Показать перевод](#) 2 г.

Comment 1.2.2.4

Ich war immer ein glühender Anhänger der deutschen Nationalmannschaft. Bis zu dem Zeitpunkt wo das Team in "Die Mannschaft" umbenannt wurde, das erste mal ein Trikot ohne Nationalfarben getragen wurde, sich Spieler wie Özil breit machten und am Ende die ganzen Regenbogenflaggen die ständig geschwungen werden. Dieser Fussballverein dient nur noch als politisches Instrument der ganzen "Deutschland ist bunt" Bewegung und beleidigt meine Intelligenz.



Comment 1.2.2.5

Hast du schon mal ausgerechnet wie hoch die Kosten von Gewaltdemos der Linken, Grünen und SPDler sind und wie groß ihr Schaden am Lande durch Ihre Willkommenspolitik.



Comment 1.2.2.6

Hat eigentlich mal jemand ausgerechnet, was die Hooligan-Gewalt in unseren Fußball-Stadien den Steuerzahler kosten? Was genau ist an diesen Leuten eigentlich "patriotisch"?



Comment 1.2.2.7

██████████
██████████ wenn
Du dafür die Tatsache
akzeptierst daß von dem
Demozug der normalen
Bürger, die tatsächlich
Angst um ihre Sicherheit
nachts beim Chemnitzer
Stadtfest hatten, vielleicht
5% Rechtsextreme waren.
Die ständig von Türken
und der Antifa provoziert
worden sind. So daß es zu
einer "Menschenjagd"
kam, die eine Strecke von
25m lang war.
Daß diese Bürger recht
haben sieht man ja jetzt
daran daß das Chemnitzer
Stadtfest wegen
Sicherheitsbedenken
dieses Jahr abgesagt
wurde! 😞
Übrigens, die "Gejagten",
zwei arabische Jungs, die
laut Zeugen vorher
extreme provozierende

extreme provozierende
Gesten gemacht hatten,
hatten bei 30° kurze
Hosen und dafür aber
Handschuhe an. Komisch,
oder? Gerüchteweise sind
solche Handschuhe mit
Sand gefüllt und die
werden zum absichtlichen
Prügeln verwendet!



Comment 1.2.2.8

██████████
ich Frage mich was so eine
dämlich Karikatur soll.
Was hat Sexualität mit
Deutschland zu tun
homosexuelle Menschen
können genau so „ Deutsch,,
sein wie alle anderen .
Ganz ganz schwach und eines
echten Deutschen nicht
würdig.



Appendix 2. Media objects by stakeholders of de-radicalisation in Germany

2.1. Gender Dings campaign poster



2.2. SHEROES Fund

Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/AmadeuAntonioStiftung/posts/10159240047518256>



Comment 2.2.1

Bei solchen ungelenk-ideologischen Sprach-Mätzchen wie "herstory" und "Sheroes", bei denen manche glauben, Realität mit Sprach-Akrobatik verändern zu können, springe ich ab.

Ich bin seit meiner Pubertät Feminist - -- weitestgehend im Sinne Simone de Beauvoirs.

Mit dem Feminismus der gender theory und des 3-wave - und intersektionellen Feminismus habe ich explizit nichts zu tun.

Und deren Sprachvorgaben und Sprach-Spielereien lehne ich ebenso explizit ab.

Und werde sie bei jeder Gelegenheit verspotten.

Für mich hat dies im harmloseren Falle pubertär-pseudo-progressive Züge, im schlechten Falle ist es jedoch der Versuch der totalitären Indoktrination mit Neu-Sprech a la "1984".

Нравится Ответить Показать перевод 48 нед. Отредактировано 16

Comment 2.2.2



Автор

Amadeu Antonio Stiftung ✓

Spannend wie hier anbetachts realer Bedrohungen einer Frau durch Rechtsextreme Begriffsdiskussionen geführt werden, anstatt sich ohne wenn und aber mit der Betroffenen zu solidarisieren. Dieses Privileg muss man sich erst sehr hart erarbeitet haben. Wie man Sprache so viel Bedeutung zumessen kann, vielleicht beim nächsten Mal mehr praktische Solidarität als performative Kapriolen.

Нравится Ответить Показать перевод 48 нед.

37

Comment 2.2.3

Amadeu Antonio Stiftung Wenn diese Wortklaubereien so bedeutungslos sind, kann man sie ja auch sein lassen, gell. Interessant, wie hier Rechtsextremismus verharmlost wird! Sehr unwürdig.

Нравится Ответить Показать перевод 48 нед.

2

Comment 2.2.4

Amadeu Antonio Stiftung Wo nehmen sie in dieser Diskussion schon wieder den Rechtsextremismus her? Dieses Totschlagargument dass jede weitere Diskussion unterbinden und den Diskussionspartner in eine "Rechte" Ecke zwingen soll zeigt wie wenig Sie an der echten Aufarbeitung interessiert sind. Sie betreiben einfach nur ekelhaftesten Populismus. Jedes ihrer Worte verdreht die "normale" Sprache und dann ist Ihre Argumentation dass man der Sprache nicht soviel Bedeutung beimessen sollte?! Das ist doch wohl ein Witz! (So nun aber Feuer von allen Seiten, kann ja wohl nicht sein dass jemand widerspricht)

Нравится Ответить Показать перевод 48 нед. Отредактировано

Comment 2.2.5

Sie hörten den zeitgenössischen männlichen antifeministischen Sprechautomat.

Нравится Ответить Показать перевод 48 нед. Отредактировано

2.3. "Miss and Mister Homophobia" poll ("Enough is enough" NGO)

[Facebook](#)



Comment 2.3.1

Mich irritiert, dass mehr Leute Angela Merkel ihre Stimme gegeben haben als Alexander Gauland und Beatrix von Storch. Ernsthaft? Die Frau mag zwar jetzt keine Befürworterin sein, aber irgendwie scheinen jetzt auch viele Schwule auf die "Danke Merkel!"-Sache einzugehen und hören damit eigentlich auf genau die homophoben Idioten, gegen die es eigentlich geht.

Comment 2.3.2

Sorry, aber Miss geht gar nicht, das ist wiederum sexistisch oder würdet ihr etwa auf Deutsch Fräulein und Herr Homophobie sagen? Neutral hieße es Ms. und Mr., wenn ihr schon im binären Schema bleiben wollt.



Comment 2.3.3

Zwei Homosexuelle zu "Miss und Mister Homophobia" wählen.

Makes sense!

Das zeigt wie dumm ihr Linken seid und dass ihr in der politischen Debatte nichts verloren habt! 😞



Appendix 3. Media objects by ordinary users against radicalisation in Germany

3.1. Tweets by activist and blogger Andreas Kemper

3.1.1. Tweet in response to terrorist attack in Norway, October 2021

Source: [AndreasKemper on Twitter](#)



Comment 3.1.1.1



Comment 3.1.1.2

██████████ Oct 15, 2021 ...

Bei einem islamistischen Anschlag ist das Problem, laut Kemper, toxische Männlichkeit.
Die Anschläge von Hanau und Halle waren für ihn allerdings ganz klar rechtsextremistisch motiviert. Erklärt mir mal jemand diese Gehirn-Akrobatik?

AndreasKemper @AndreasKemper · Oct 14, 2021

Ich poste seit Jahren bei solchen Anschlägen:
Das Problem heißt #Männlichkeit.

Das ist die kleinste Gemeinsamkeit im Täter*innen-Profil. Es sind fast immer Männer. (Ich denke nicht, dass das irgendwas mit "biologischer" Männlichkeit zu tun hat) tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/p...
#Kongsberg

4 9 58

Comments 3.1.1.3

██████████ Oct 17, 2021 ...

Und ich dachte "biologische" Männlichkeit wäre nur ein soziales Konstrukt nach heutiger Sozialkunde 🤔
Ja was denn nun?
Vielleicht doch nur Religion?

AndreasKemper @AndreasKemper · Oct 14, 2021

Ich poste seit Jahren bei solchen Anschlägen:
Das Problem heißt #Männlichkeit.

Das ist die kleinste Gemeinsamkeit im Täter*innen-Profil. Es sind fast immer Männer. (Ich denke nicht, dass das irgendwas mit "biologischer" Männlichkeit zu tun hat) tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/p...
#Kongsberg

0 0 0 0

██████████ Oct 16, 2021 ...

Ich übersetze: Der Islam ist so unschuldig und friedlich wie ein Hasenbaby. Allah ist übrigens eine Frau. Jawohl, eine waschechte Frau.

AndreasKemper @AndreasKemper · Oct 14, 2021

Ich poste seit Jahren bei solchen Anschlägen:
Das Problem heißt #Männlichkeit.

Das ist die kleinste Gemeinsamkeit im Täter*Innen-Profil. Es sind fast immer Männer. (Ich denke nicht, dass das irgendwas mit "biologischer" Männlichkeit zu tun hat) tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/p...
#Kongsberg

1 0 2 0

Comments 3.1.1.4



The screenshot shows a Twitter thread with four tweets. The first tweet is a reply from a user with a black profile picture to @AndreasKemper, dated Oct 14, 2021. The second tweet is from @AndreasKemper, dated Oct 14, 2021. The third tweet is another reply from the same user with a black profile picture to @AndreasKemper, dated Oct 14, 2021. The fourth tweet is from @AndreasKemper, dated Oct 14, 2021. Each tweet includes icons for replies, retweets, and likes.

Tweet 1: [Redacted] Oct 14, 2021
Replying to @AndreasKemper
Das Geschlecht eines Menschen, welches er mit der Hälfte der Menschheit teilt kann wohl nie der KLEINSTE gemeinsame Nenner sein (außer man versteht das Konzept nicht)
1 reply, 2 likes

Tweet 2: @AndreasKemper Oct 14, 2021
Was hat die Gruppe der Attentäter*innen (Amokläufer*innen, Mass-Shooter, rechtsterroristische oder islamistische Terrorist*innen, Attentäter aus dem Incel-Milieu...) an Merkmalen gemeinsam, was die Gruppe der Nicht-Attentäter*innen nicht hat?
2 replies, 3 likes

Tweet 3: [Redacted] Oct 14, 2021
Replying to @AndreasKemper
Sorry Herr Kemper, aber das ist eine blödsinnige Argumentation, da Männlichkeit auch ihre Diversität besitzt und deren Schnittmengen dann wiederum auf biologische Aspekte deuten lassen. Entweder spezifizieren Sie auf der kulturellen Ebene nach Form(en) oder wechseln die These.
1 reply, 5 likes

Tweet 4: @AndreasKemper Oct 14, 2021
Ich habe das doch schon längst spezifiziert.
andreas Kemper.org/2020/05/03/cra...
1 reply, 9 likes

3.1.2. Tweet commenting on a declaration by Bundeswehr soldiers planning to march against the government, December 2021



AndreasKemper
@AndreasKemper



"Der Kampf in mir ist gekämpft" So klang auch der faschistische Fanatismus von Goebbels und Hitler. Wir haben es hier mit soldatischen Männlichkeiten zu tun, die den Schritt in die apokalyptische Männlichkeit machen.

[Translate Tweet](#)

Robert Andreasch @robertandreasch · Dec 30, 2021

Brandgefährlich: Die #Bundeswehr-Soldaten Daniel Futschik (Kaserne #Euskirchen) und Andreas Oberauer (#BadReichenhall) haben öffentlich angekündigt, den Kampf gegen die Regierung zu beginnen. Oberauer hat in einem Video ein "Ultimatum" gestellt, das morgen um 16.00 Uhr abläuft.

[Show this thread](#)

30. Dezember

1:02
8.7 MB

Hier die
Freiwilligenmeldung des
OFW Oberauer,

Hier der Aufruf des
OFW Oberauer,
an jeden wehrhaften
Bürger.
Artikel 20(4) GG, Widerstand
gegen jeden, der es unternimmt

kann. Vielleicht ein Kampf David gegen Goliath? Wer weiß? Ich für mich weiß allerdings, dass es der richtige und einzige Weg ist, den ich nun zu gehen habe. Nicht für mein Ego. Ich gehe ihn für meine Frau, meine Kinder, meine Eltern, Geschwister, Nefen, Cousins, Freunde und alle Herzensmenschen, die nicht die Kraft, den Mut oder Möglichkeiten haben sich zu wehren. Der Kampf in Mir ist gekämpft, Ich gehe diesen Weg mit Frieden und Kraft in...

12:33 PM · Dec 30, 2021 · Twitter Web App

Comments 3.1.2.1





3.2. TikTok comments


3.2.1. TikTok on sexist statements by AfD politicians

Comments 3.2.1.1




[REDACTED]
 Disgusting...es gibt einfach keine Entschuldigung dafür die zu wählen !!!
 2021-7-26 Responder ♥ 171


[REDACTED] **Creador**
 Eigentlich nicht.. und trotzdem wählen sie so viel... 😞
 2021-7-31 Responder ♥ 32


[REDACTED]
 Ja, viele hören nur auf die Parolen ohne wirklich darüber informiert zu sein was die für Grundeinstellungen etc haben. sonst würde die keiner wählen.
 2021-8-26 Responder ♥ 1


JessicaB
 Und es gibt Frauen die diese Patel für gut Empfinden, das muss man sich mal überlegen..
 2021-8-24 Responder ♥ 24


Frau.Kraft · Creador
 Das kann man sich eigentlich gar nicht ausdenken... das ist so verrückt und dumm. 😞
 2021-8-24 Responder ... ♥ 9


JessicaB
 erschreckend finde ich das
 2021-8-24 Responder ♥ 2

Comments 3.2.1.2


[REDACTED]
 Das ist doch voll auöem Kontext gerissen.
 2021-8-31 Responder ♥ 12


[REDACTED] **Creador**
 Na dann mal her mit dem Kontext.
 2021-8-31 Responder ♥ 9


[REDACTED]
 Für den Kontext ist derjenige verantwortlich, der zitiert. In dem Fall also DU.
 2021-9-5 Responder ... ♥ 4


[REDACTED]
 Hauptsache hetzen. Einfach mal die vorherigen Aussagen dazu mit veröffentlicht, dann würde sich vieles klären.

2021-7-27 Responder ♥ 23


[REDACTED] **Creador**
 Na dann her damit.

2021-7-27 Responder ♥ 22

Comments 3.2.1.3


[REDACTED]
 Die Haben nur Angst vor der Frau 😂😂

2021-6-20 Responder ♥ 83


Bianca
 Ach wir haben sehr viele Frauen in der Partei 😊

2021-7-27 Responder ... ♥ 1


[REDACTED] **Creador**
 Und? Ihr habt auch Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in der Partei und wollt trotzdem, dass nur DE mit DE Vorfahren den DE Pas bekommen.

2021-7-27 Responder ♥ 3


[REDACTED]
 Habt ihr euch mal gemerkt was andere Politiker im Bundestag so von sich geben? Diese „frauenfeindliche“ Partei hat ne SpitzenkandidatIN

2021-6-19 Responder ♥ 104


[REDACTED]
 Traurig das man jetzt so eine Partei versucht zu verteidigen 😞

2021-6-20 Responder ♥ 35


[REDACTED]
 JEDER Politiker benimmt sich im Bundestag komplett daneben & wirft mir Beleidigungen um sich, aber NUR bei der AfD merkt man sich's. Ach komm, hör auf

2021-6-20 Responder ♥ 27

3.2.2 TikTok on Alice Weidel

Comment 3.2.2.1



Comment 3.2.2.2



Comment 3.2.2.3



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