DeRadicalisation

in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate

Cultural Drivers of Radicalisation

Slovenia/D5.1 Country Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

The purpose of this report is to investigate a specific contemporary political and media discourse in Slovenia, with a focus on migration and race issues. It focuses on radicalisation mainstreaming through far-right SDP party-affiliated traditional media (like magazine front covers and billboards) and new media (such as digital platforms and social media). The report undertakes a representation and discourse analysis of media objects that have repeatedly used racialisation and othering of migrants as what seems to be a deliberate political strategy in the six years since the start of the so-called Syrian refugee crisis. The report exposes the role of the SDP and SDP-affiliated media in constructing a specific Slovenian "we" community that excludes non-white migrants (and other non-white residents). Understanding the analysed media objects as cultural drivers of radicalisation and extremism, the report argues that an alliance of far-right politicians, far-right mass media and radical(ised) audiences/users of social media has been established in Slovenia. According to the report, the alliance of these three key players appears to serve not only as an important factor in strengthening the exclusionary Slovenian identity but also as a potential trigger of radicalised behaviour of citizens in relation to migrants during the studied period, as detected by Interpol in its latest counter-terrorism report on Slovenia.

1) Introduction

Slovenia, which borders Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Croatia and has a population of 2 million people, was a part of Yugoslavia before becoming independent in 1991. Never a coloniser nor violently colonised, Slovenia's population is predominantly white and homogeneous both ethnically (83% Slovenian) and religiously (69% Roman-Catholics) (Census 2002a; 2002b). Slovenia's Constitution (1991) and legislation favour ethnic Slovenians over Slovenian citizens because citizenship is defined by the principle of *ius sanguinis* (Zorn 2005, p. 136; Bajt 2010, p. 208). In addition to the three officially recognised minority groups – Hungarian, Italian and Roma – the country also has non-recognised ex-Yugoslav minorities. While a tiny Muslim minority in Slovenia originates from Bosnia (and Kosovo) and is considered moderate, Muslim migrants from non-European countries are less likely to stay in Slovenia (Prezelj and Kocjančič 2020, p. 31).

Due to historical divides between conservatives and liberals, as well as socialists and anti-communists, the media landscape in Slovenia could be understood in terms of a left wing-right wing division, with political parties and their supporters owning and directly influencing a significant number of media outlets. In recent decades, agents affiliated with the far-right SDP party have become strategic owners of print media (Demokracija), television (Nova24TV) and several online portals, all of which use racialisation, othering, and hate speech against non-white migrants.

This report understands the media discourse and cultural representations that support the idea of symbolic expulsion of non-white groups of people from the Slovenian community as racialised. Certain politicians and the media, we argue, are not simply exercising their freedom of expression when they repeatedly emphasise the superiority of white Slovenians or perceive non-white migrants, non-white residents, or non-white citizens of Slovenia as a threat to Slovenian culture. They should rather be understood as representatives of a powerful group of prejudiced people who perceive the idea of black, brown, and other non-white Slovenians not as something that should be celebrated as a contribution to national diversity, but rather as an anomaly and a deviation from the racial norm which should not have happened. In other words, they are agents of racialisation doing their best to affect real-life circumstances of non-white groups of people in Slovenia for the worse.

With this in mind, the report investigates the role of traditional media (magazines and election posters) and new media (online news portals and social media) affiliated with the SDP party play in mainstreaming radicalised attitudes towards migrants in Slovenia. It examines how these media have constructed non-white migrants as the racialised Other who presumably poses a severe threat to local wellbeing, instilling in citizens a sense of injustice and grievance, and leading to a division and polarisation between "us" and "them" in traditional media discourse, as well as "us" and "you" in

new media discourse. The report presents a series of specific media objects that appear to have employed a deliberate strategy of migrant racialisation over the last six years, since the start of the so-called 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. These media objects drew the attention of the general public through repeated offline and online exposure, as well as social media sharing. Using representation analysis (Hall 1997) and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010, Gee 2014) of selected media objects, as well as public reactions to these media objects, the report exposes the role an alliance of SDP politicians, SDP-affiliated media and radical(ised) audiences play in constructing a specific Slovenian "we" community/identity that excludes large swaths of other groups, in particular non-white migrants.

Understanding these media objects as cultural drivers of radicalisation and extremism, the report also argues that this alliance of politicians, media, and audiences is a potential cultural trigger of citizens' radicalised behaviour. This alliance appears to strengthen and encourage patterns of othering, racialisation, and xenophobia against migrants, facilitating symbolic (and even practical) exclusion of non-white immigrants, non-white residents, and non-white citizens from national community membership and participation in the democratic process, including deliberation, voting, and standing in the election.

The Methodology section of the report describes how media texts are analysed in this report and introduce key concepts such as racialisation, representation, and discourse. The chapter on the Slovenian media landscape describes changes in media ownership and political influences on media organisations over the last thirty years, with a focus on the SDP and SDP-affiliated media. What follows is *An analysis of the representation, circulation, and consumption context of the media objects*. In this section, the report employs analytical interpretations to dissect individual cases of racialisation in cultural texts published in Demokracija, an SDP-affiliated magazine, and the SDP's 2018 parliamentary election campaign. In the final chapter, we discuss the links between the SDP and SDP-affiliated media racialisation, as well as new anti-migrant vigilante paramilitary groups.

2) Methodology

Images and texts, like ideas, have different meanings for different people. When linguistic elements are combined to form a complex system that both reflects and influences reality, we refer to it as discourse(s) (Fairclough 2010, Gee 2014) and representation(s) (Hall 1997). These are powerful tools for naturalising and normalising a specific meaning (among many meanings) of a societal or cultural phenomenon. Consider the phenomenon of 'race.' We understand race not only as a contested but also as a socially constructed category with serious, possibly life-changing consequences not only in theory but also in real life.

Today, the construction of 'race' and 'races' occurs through a variety of phenomena, including media discourse and what Stuart Hall (ibid.) refers to as "cultural representations and signifying practices". Every media discourse and every cultural representation implies specific power relations between groups. A specific discourse on Slovenian identity, for example, or a representation of a Slovenian person, always entails preconceived notions about cultural qualities and even physical characteristics of a Slovenian. A preconceived notion of a black Muslim Slovenian, for example, is quite rare in Slovenian society. As the report will present, this has significant political consequences in the daily lives of Slovenians.

Racialisation refers to the process by which the media or politicians assign racial traits and identities to individuals and groups of people (as in, "Slovenians are white"). Frantz Fanon (2005/1961) was arguably the first to present the concept of racialisation as a phenomenon or process by which blacks were excluded from a community of fellow human beings by a group of people who perceived themselves superior. The latter group invented a system of meaning in which they were the racial opposite of blacks, or rather the racial norm against which all other races should be judged – whites. Contemporary racialisation processes have been extensively researched in the context of (im)migration (see Palida 2015; Engh et al. 2017; Grill 2018) and can also be observed in this context in Slovenia, as will be shown.

Specifically, this report attempts to analyse migrant racialisation in Slovenia by interrogating the ways in which racial stereotypes are attributed to migrants (and Slovenians) in SDP-related political propaganda and media discourse. To that end, it investigates the meanings of the front covers of the Demokracija magazine dedicated to migrants between 2015 and 2021, as well as the circulation of these media objects via social media. The 2018 SDP's pre-election propaganda materials, such as posters and videos, are then subjected to the same analytical process, and they are compared to similar political anti-migrant campaigns in Slovenia and other countries.

There were twenty-one Demokracija front pages that fit the racialisation profile, as well as three SDP propaganda media objects, including a propaganda video, an offline poster, and an online poster. Offline and online circulation and consumption via Facebook and other social media platforms were also addressed, though they were difficult to assess – not only in terms of scope and number of engagements, but also of the level of radicalisation. One reason for this is that in recent years, major restrictions on hate speech have been employed by social media platforms, resulting in censorship and auto-censorship. For example, official SDP videos on YouTube are often not open for comments. In addition, accounts of several Slovenian far-right groups have been blocked on Facebook and other social media platforms. Hence, many of these groups' social media engagements have been removed or migrated to closed FB groups and less popular apps like Telegram. Finally, the Demokracija magazine Facebook page seems to have deleted previous engagements and

changed URL addresses to website articles featuring front page images that the magazine was sharing via social media.

Despite these methodological hurdles, here are some figures. The following engagements were generated on the Demokracija Facebook page as a result of the front covers that were examined: 99 shares, 97 comments and 402 likes (out of which there were 281 thumb ups, 55 angry face emojis, 29 sad face emojis, 17 laughing face emojis, 11 shocked face emojis and 5 heart emojis). The SDP propaganda video we examined generated 4,486 views, 62 likes and 66 dislikes on the SDP YouTube account; 299 likes and 54 comments on the SDP Facebook page; and 2.3K views, 95 retweets, 5 quote tweets, 123 likes and 2 replies on the SDP Twitter account. The SDP online poster generated 198 reactions (122 likes, 24 laugh emojis, 5 angry emojis, 2 sad emojis, 1 shocked emoji), 70 comments and 30 shares on SDP Facebook page; 81 retweets, 4 quote tweets, 146 likes and 7 replies on SDP's president Twitter account; as well as 10 retweets, 23 likes and 3 replies on another SDP politician's Twitter account (see Appendix 3 for more details).

3) Media landscape, cultural and political context of radicalisation in the national setting

According to regular reports on media pluralism (see Milosavljević 2016; Milosavljević et al. 2017; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020), the Slovenian media landscape has been significantly influenced by the former socialist society's economic and political restructuring, the 2008/2009 economic crisis, and the rise in Internet usage. With 98.4% of the population covered by broadband and 95.9% of households covered by DSL, the digital transition in Slovenia was smooth and digital media spread seamlessly.

Slovenian population receives its information predominantly from TV news, followed by the online sources and finally radio and print, which is inconsistent with the European average, where according to the Standard Eurobarometer 86 report print is the second most important source of information, followed by radio and the Internet (Milosavljević et al. 2017, p. 2). Despite the fact that there is no official data on Google, Facebook, and other digital intermediaries' advertising market share in Slovenia, it has been reported that between 2016 and 2019, over 50% of advertising income went to television, while merely 3% went to print media (Milosavljević 2016, p.2; Milosavljević et al. 2017, p. 2; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 10).[1]

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[1] "The revenues in the audio-visual sector have been increasing in the past years, although there is no official and regular data being collected, analyses show that revenues in the radio and newspaper sector have been decreasing. There is also no official data being collected to show, if the number of journalists employed in any media sector (local or national) has increased or decreased, which is a problem in showing the real employment structure in the media landscape. It is known however, that not many media companies are employing new

Slovenian media function within a significant political left wing-right wing divide that, rather than focusing on economic policies, reflects attitudes toward tradition (rural v urban), religion (clerical v liberal), nation (ethnic nationalism v multiculturalism), the Second World War era (Home Guard collaborators v Tito's partisans) and socialist times (totalitarian communist dictatorship v socialist welfare state).[2] A number of media outlets have been owned by political parties, their (former) members, visible supporters, and businessmen open to making deals with politicians, using media ownership as an instrument for negotiation and political influence (Ramet and Kuhar 2015, p. 18; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 7).[3]

RTV Slovenia, the sole public broadcaster, and private broadcasters Pro Plus (including the influential POP TV channel), Planet TV, and TV3 are the main national televisions. The far-right SDP party launched the Nova24TV news channel in 2016, claiming for decades that television news is biased. Resold several times in the last 30 years,[4] three out of four main dailies – Delo, Dnevnik, Večer and Slovenske Novice – originate from the socialist era (Ramet and Kuhar 2015, p. 16). In the early 1990s, Christian conservatives launched a daily newspaper, but it only lasted six years.[5] Right-wing political magazines, on the other hand, have lasted longer, with Mag (1995-2010), Reporter (2008-) and the SDP-affiliated Demokracija (1990-) being the most successful. Mladina [Youth], the main liberal weekly that became renowned for its critical stance against the Communist regime in the 1980s, has had an unclear ownership structure for decades (Kuì 2019b), but its editorial policy is clearly leftist.

The SDP party seems to openly manage Nova24TV and Demokracija magazine. According to various reports, including investigative journalist Kučić (2021a; 2021b), the owners of Nova24TV, Planet TV, and Demokracija have close ties with Hungarian

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[2] journalists for full time positions, mainly they practise journalism through establishing private companies, so the media companies don't have to cover their health and pension expenses" (Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 11).

[2] Not only the media but also the journalist associations are split along the left- and right-wing lines. There is the conservative Union of Slovene Journalists (Združenje novinarjev in publicistov, ZNP) and the liberal Slovene Association of Journalists (Društvo novinarjev Slovenije), the latter having a larger membership base.

[3] "The law does not regulate a conflict of interest between owners of media and the ruling parties. Especially in the local areas this conflict is very present: a lot of local small newspapers and publications are connected with major political parties [and local mayors]" (Milosavljević 2016, p. 7; also Milosavljević et al. 2017, p. 9; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 12). "[These local media are] published by the municipality, financed from the state budget and [reflect] the ideas of the local government (mayor, party) ..." (Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 12; see also Kučič 2019a) Also, there are no provisions in the Media Act and no specific act that includes journalist's right for protection in case of an ownership or editorial line change (Milosavljević et al. 2017, 8; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 11). "There are no common regulatory safeguards to guarantee autonomy when appointing and dismissing editors-in-chief and there is occasional interference in these procedures in practice" (Milosavljević et al. 2017, 11; Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, pp. 11-12).

[4] "Media legislation contains a specific threshold for ownership concentration (20%) after which the approval of Ministry of culture is needed in order to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership. There are several public bodies that actively monitor compliance, including the ministry, which also has sanctioning powers. Violations still happen as the ownership is easily hidden using paper companies. The radio sector has seen an intense process of concentration and takeovers in the past years. As for newspapers, the authorities have also been quite ineffective in preventing controversial takeovers. Internet content providers are not mentioned in the law regarding ownership and concentration" (Milosavljević 2016, p. 5).

[5] The conservative daily Slovenec [The Slovenian] was launched with support of the conservative government soon after Slovenia declared its independence in 1991 and folded in 1997 (Ramet and Kuhar 2015, p. 16).

right-wing politician Victor Orban and his party Fidesz, which is an ally of the SDP (see also (Milosavljević and Biljak 2020, p. 12). There is also a network of 20 radio stations (Milosavljević 2017, p. 9) and at least 16 online news portals connected to the SDS party (Kučič 2019b). As a result, the SDP media empire, as Milosavljević et al. (2017, p. 9) refer to it, appears to be quite substantial, mention their numerous social media accounts, which have been exposed on several occasions for using astroturfing to spread SDP's agenda (see Klarič 2017; Boštic 2021a,b,c, d).

SDP president Janez Janša, a three-time PM and former communist turned outspoken anti-communist, has arguably been Slovenia's most divisive and polarising politician. Janša's obsessive and toxic tweets earned him the nickname "Twitler" and "Marshall Twito" (see Vladisavljević 2021). Boasting more than 80,000 followers, his tweets are "often full of sarcasm and denunciations of political opponents and the mass media, along with expressions of racist, xenophobic, and sexist views" (Pajnik 2019, p. 23). While investigative journalists have discovered links between SDP and neo-Nazi groups (Delić 2011; 2015a; RTV SLO 2014; Valenčič 2010; 2011; 2015b), Janša and other SDP members have presented themselves as victims of "communist", "leftist-fascist", "leftist-jihadist" and "radical leftist" conspiracies. While the Identitarian Movement is classified as a right-wing extremist in Germany and banned in France (Darmanin 2021), the movement's books are published in Slovenia by SDP-related publisher Nova Obzorja [New Horizons] – namely, *Manifesto for the Homeland* in 2018 (Jureković 2018) and *Europe of Nations* in 2019 (Kršinar 2020).

In the past, SDS's discourse has already been assessed as racist (see Frank and Šori 2015). It does not therefore come as a surprise that SDP-related media represent Slovenian identity in an exclusively ethnic sense, rejecting multiculturalism and embracing xenophobia, especially in relation to ex-Yugoslav minorities (including Bosniak Muslims) and non-white minorities such as Roma and Muslim migrants.[6] Slovenia lacks knowledge of Islam due to a lack of actual contact with it (Bajt 2016, p. 53), and the attitude toward Muslim migrants is highly prejudiced. In their study of the Facebook pages of major news portals between 2010 and 2017 Vehovar et al. (2020, p. 633-634) discovered that 28.1% of all comments on migrants were insults directed at migrants, while 7.5% of comments called for violence against migrants. A further 20.7% of comments used threats, insults, and foul language in general (not directed specifically toward migrants). The combined results show that 58% of all comments

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[6] According to the latest Census (2002a), 17 percent of the population were ethnic minorities, including 120,000 ex-Yugoslav minorities (39,000 Serbs, 36,000 Croats, 32,000 Bosniaks/Muslims, 6,000 Albanians, 4,000 Macedonians, 3,000 Montenegrins), 6,000 Hungarians, 3,000 Roma (unofficial estimation 7,000 to 12,000), and 2,000 Italians. In terms of religion, the Census (2002b) lists 69.1% of the population as Catholic, 1.1% Evangelical, 0.6% Orthodox Christian and 0.6% Muslim. The tiny Muslim minority in Slovenia originates from Bosnia and is considered moderate (Prezelj and Kocjančič 2020, p. 31). The first mosque in Slovenia opened in 2019, approx. 60 years after the Muslim community first presented the idea in public. Muslim migrants from non-European countries are not likely to remain in Slovenia (*ibid.*). Both Slovenian Muslims of ex-Yugoslav roots and ethnic Slovenians consider themselves to be South Slavs, and both have lived in the same country for at least 100 years and speak similar Slavic languages.

on migrants are what Vehovar et al. refer to as "socially unacceptable discourse" (ibid.).

And arguably, it is the SDP-affiliated media that perpetuates the worst kind of socially unacceptable discourse on Muslims and other non-white groups. Their hateful anti-immigration discourse culminated during the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016. Right-wing political parties, right-wing media, and newly established social media pages and groups such as *Zavarujmo Slovenijo/Protect Slovenija*,[7] *Slovenija zavaruj meje* [*Slovenia secure the borders*][8], and *Stop Migrantom v Slovenijo* [*Stop Migrants to Slovenia*] produced large quantities of xenophobic and racialised texts and images at the time. According to Bajt (2018, p. 144) the following tweet from then-SDP member and journalist Sebastjan Erlah in August 2015 sparked public debate: "I have an even more radical one [solution for the migrant situation]: To allow the border to be approached only at 500m. If any closer, shoot them all; God will know his own" (see Portal Plus 2015).[9]

Members of anti-migrant Facebook groups seemed to compete for even more extreme "solutions" at the time, calling people to arms to fight migrants in the final battle to protect the fatherland and European civilisation, demanding the annihilation of all migrants, and musing about concentration camps and Hitler being right (Bajt 2018, p. 44; see also Vezjak 2018b). Because they were unable to moderate the wave of hate speech, national broadcasters and newspapers even temporarily shut down the comment sections of their online portals. As neither the state prosecution nor the police responded, various civil society groups issued open letters and appeals to authorities, urging them to prosecute hate speech before any hate crimes were committed (see DNS 2015; DAA 2015a; 2015b; MMC 2015). The governing coalition of centrist-liberal parties ignored the appeals, tightening the Defence and Asylum Acts and erecting a razor wire fence along the border with Croatia.

Consequently, an anti-hate speech vigilante digital activist group emerged in October 2018 and created the website ZLOvenia [EVILenia, 'zlo' translates as 'evil']. The site's creators gathered screenshots of hate speech comments made by ordinary people on Facebook, and then published them alongside publicly available personal photos of the persons who posted the comments, exposing and shaming them until they publicly apologised (Oblak Črnič 2017a; 2017b). The vigilantism spread further when (an) unknown person(s) began sticking these text and image combinations on lampposts in the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana, sparking a new and even more heated debate

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[7] This Facebook group still exists and this its official bilingual name. However, the Slovenian verb 'zavarujmo' translates also as (let us) secure, insure, safeguard, shield, shelter etc.

[8] The Facebook page "Slovenia secure the borders" was deleted from Facebook in 2017 due to the spread of hatred and xenophobia (Vezjak 2018b).

[9] There were condemnations of this statement from the left-leaning civil society (see for instance DAA 2015a; 2015b). Even the right-wing oriented Association of Journalists and Commentators said Erlah's Twitter comment had "crossed the line" (ZNP 2015) and stripped him of a journalism award. Yet no immediate legal action was taken (Bajt, 2018, p. 144).

about hate speech, freedom of expression, and the right to privacy (Oblak Črnič 2017b, p. 203). The SDP-affiliated Demokracija magazine contributed to this debate by linking the ZLOvenija shaming project to the burning of a car and violent threats against a German conservative politician – in Germany (see Ž. K. 2015). The entire public debate, however, is what Bajt (2018, p. 147) acknowledges as ZLOvenia's goal accomplished and the activist intervention's successful conclusion.[10]

4) An analysis of the representation, circulation, and consumption context of the media objects

A substantial body of research exists that inspects traditional media discourse (see Vezovnik 2017; Vezovnik 2018; Vezovnik and Šarić 2018) and new media posts and comments (see Bajt 2018; Vehovar et al. 2020) on migrants in the time during and after the so-called Syrian refugee crisis in Slovenia. These studies, which question the use of xenophobic texts and images, can serve as the foundation for our analysis of racialisation and othering of migrants in the discourse of SDP-related traditional and new media. This report demonstrates that racialisation and othering strategies are frequently used in SDP-related media. Whiteness of Slovenians and Europeans is a central issue in these media outlets, and it is persistently defended, mostly by avoiding direct biological racism and instead employing a slightly more ambiguous discourse of *cultural racism* or *new racism* (Barker 1981; Blaut 1992; Romm 2010), emphasising white Slovenians' and Europeans' superiority in cultural rather than narrowly biological racial terms.

We begin by looking for front covers of Demokracija magazine between 2015 and 2021 that feature whiteness-related (see Appendix 1) or migrants-related (see Appendix 2) issues.[11] We hence created two ideal-type categories. In the "whiteness cover" category we included only those that addressed whiteness but did not address migrants. Whereas in the "migrants cover" category, we included those that addressed migrants as well as possibly the issue of whiteness (as the topics of migration and race are often intertwined). There were three of the former and eighteen of the latter.

Here are the three whiteness-related examples. The first such front cover appeared in the 2018 Christmas issue, and it exclaimed: "Europe is beautifully white!" and featured an image of a smiling white family in winter clothes and a village covered in snow (see Appendix 1-1). The not-so-subtle pun at white Europe was replaced the following year

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[10] Bajt (2018, p. 147) also reminds us of a similar intervention that appeared in a Calais-based French newspaper Le Nord Littoral which juxtaposed the most offensive messages against migrants from the newspaper's Facebook page and the names of the people who posted them.

[11] For a basic understanding of the Demokracija magazine's take on race, let us point to the fact that its recent report on the event of jury finding former policeman Derek Chauvin guilty of murder of George Floyd was titled "Mob justice won!" (Žoher 2021).

by a blatant racialisation manoeuvre. Namely, the 2019 Easter issue cover stated "Diversity is beautiful, and Europe is already different enough," while juxtaposing five photos of young white women with different coloured straight hair (Appendix 1-2). Finally, the 2020 summer cover informed its readers that "the lives of whites also matter" and "All Lives Matter". It featured an image of a light brown wooden puppet with a noose around its neck and a dark brown wooden puppet facing the first. The accompanying text explained that it is a "puppet adaptation of a scene from the music video by black rapper XXXtentacion, in which a black boy watches the hanging of a white boy" (Appendix 1-3). The magazine failed to notice that it had been three years since the video (*Look at me*) had been released to controversial public reactions, and that the hip hop music star had already died two years ago.

Moving on to the migrants-related front covers, the first is from August 2015, and it featured a photo of over a dozen ISIS fighters sitting and standing on a pick-up truck, with the title asking, "Will these soon be your new neighbours?" (Appendix 2-1). Following the 2015 Paris attacks, the front cover screamed "ISIS attacks the EU! Will Europe be an Islamic Caliphate?" featuring a photo collage of the EU flag and the Eiffel Tower engulfed in flames, and an ISIS fighter waving a black flag in the foreground (Appendix 2-5). The following week, Demokracija declared "Burkas do not belong in our society!" (Appendix 2-6). A few years later, the magazine ran a photo collage on the cover of ten new-born babies, one of whom is white and naked, while the other nine are dressed in black niqabs, with the title "Will this be Slovenia 2050?". The smaller print explains that "the question is rhetorical for now. According to the European Commission, 18 million people can live in Slovenia [9-times the current population]. Is this a plan for forced settlement of Africans and Arabs?" (Appendix-2-9).

In November 2019, the cover title was "Invasion of Violence!" and the explanation was that asylum seekers are violent, hence the subtitle "Violence is escalating, Islam is becoming more aggressive". An illustration of a simple black and white map of Slovenia and surrounding countries flooded from the south by an imaginary green wave from which minarets and mosques protruded served as the cover image (Appendix 2-13). In January 2020, two illustrations of a simple black and white map of the European continent were juxtaposed. The Europe on the left is white in 2020, while the Europe on the right is black in 2050. "Will we allow it?" asks the title. What is the explanation? According to a statement by a European Secretary of Slovenian origin, "Africa has a demographic potential." (App-2-14) Unlike others, these two covers put forward particular representations of migrants where the migrants are implied by the design rather than actually appearing on the cover. They are represented by non-white colours such as black (denoting Africans) or green (denoting Muslims). These maps function as if they are weather maps in which cyclones move towards our lands. Or as if they are military maps that show the movements of armies over time. However, actual armies and fighters can also be found on the front covers of Demokracija. Not only as ISIS fighters who could potentially become Slovenian neighbours in the future,

but also as ancient religious warriors on horses. For instance, one cover reproduced a painting depicting a battle between Christian and Muslim armies in the 8th century AD, with a Christian axe cutting a Muslim throat in the foreground (Appendix 2-18).[12] The accompanying title asks, "Will we be able to do what our forefathers did?".

The covers of Demokracija appear to portray migration and migrants in specific demographic categories, burdening them with negative connotations and ancient myths. Muslims, Arabs, Africans, Blacks, and Islam are the main signifiers they use in this sense. In addition, they employ the most obvious colour dichotomy – white equals good equals us vs black equals bad equals others – to express the difference between Slovenians (Europeans, Whites, etc.) on the one hand and migrants (Muslims, Blacks, etc.) on the other. Migrants are perceived as nothing more than a threat, and this threat is very deliberately racialised, as evidenced by the covers that depict migrants as rapists. For example, on August 31, 2018, the front cover combined the title "Migrants bring rape culture to Slovenia" with a photo collage of a blonde, white woman and seven black male hands undressing her, including a palm on her breast (Appendix 2-9). On August 19, 2020, the magazine decided to show its readers a photo collage of the EU flag, in front of which stands a young woman with bruises and wounds on her face and hands, pulling her arms to her chest in a defensive position. She is threatened by what appear to be a stereotypical African pointed spear and a stereotypical Middle Eastern dagger. The heading reads "Criminal Cultures Threaten Europe" (Appendix 2-17). In both of these cases, Demokracija contributes to numerous reproductions of a well-established racialist and orientalist representation of a non-white male as a savage and criminal predator who preys on helpless white women, as seen most frequently in North American films and other popular culture items (see Berenstein 1994).

The SDP politicians and SDP-related media such as Demokracija and Nova24TV have used racialised discourse extensively and for a long time. However, after the so-called Syrian refugee crisis it has arguably become their deliberate strategy and common feature. Calls to seal the border, protect the homeland against Arabs and Africans, and send the army to rescue and fight Muslim intruders have become commonplace. Maliciously incorrect connections between ancient Ottoman invasions and current non-white migrations have proliferated. Slovenian whiteness has become a norm against which non-white migrants (and non-white Slovenians) have been judged in an ever-more extreme racially charged language. The exploitation of stereotypes and manipulations about migrants has become so systemic and repetitive that it seems to have been employed on purpose and as a strategy to gain support from prejudiced audiences and concerned voters.

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[12] The art piece was created in 1902 by Henri Grobet and it is titled Charles Martel at the Battle of Poitiers (or the Battle of Tours), which was held between 10 and 11 October 732 AD.

The normalisation of such discourse was arguably most obvious in political campaigns preceding the 2018 parliamentary elections, both of which the SDP won.[13] Due to a lack of space, we were unable to focus on the latter. However, we analysed the 2018 SDP pre-election political propaganda on the migrant issue, which included media objects such as posters, videos, social media images, and SDP-related media reports (see Appendix 3). The use of the slogan "Zavarovali bomo Slovenijo" [We will protect Slovenia] in relation to the alleged movement of non-white migrants was the first thing we noticed in the campaign. This phrase is nearly identical to the names of the above-mentioned Facebook groups "Zavarujmo Slovenijo/Protect Slovenia" and "Slovenija zavaruj meje" [Slovenia Secure the Borders], both founded during the 2015 migration influx and the latter banned from Facebook in 2017 due to publishing hate speech.[14] In addition, the anti-migrant SDP slogan was nearly identical to that of another far-right political party running in the 2018 parliamentary elections – ZSi [USi], short for Gibanje Zedinjena Slovenija [Movement United Slovenia], which read "STOP migrantom! Zaščitili bomo meje!" [STOP to migrants! We will seal the borders!] (see USi 2018a).[15]

SDP not only copied the anti-migrant slogan, but also the entire concept for the anti-migrant billboard and poster campaign (see Appendix 3-1.2 and 2-1.3). Namely, it used an almost identical concept to Victor Orban government's anti-migrant propaganda a few months earlier, which in turn copied the infamous Breaking Point poster from UKIP'S Brexit campaign. The Orban campaign used the exact same image as its UK counterpart, but added a STOP traffic sign where the Breaking Point slogan had been in the original poster (Matamoros 2018). The SDP campaign kept the STOP traffic sign but replaced the UKIP/Orban photo with a different but similar image of migrants (see Košak 2018; Mekina 2018).[16]

The STOP sign, along with the slogan 'We will Protect Slovenia,' frames the issue of migration as a security threat, and migrants as an invading force – an enemy, in both the billboard and online versions of the SDP image. Migrants are represented as a large queue or caravan of poorly dressed non-white people walking down a gravel road in what appears to be Slovenian countryside, past a (photoshopped or real)

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[13] In the 2018 parliamentary elections SDP won 24.92% of votes, winning in all constituencies, yet it could not build a governing coalition – until 2020 when Marjan Šarec's centrist-liberal coalition collapsed. In the 2019 European Elections the SDP and SPP (Slovenian People's Party) coalition won 26.25% of votes.

[14] Regularly reporting on the FB page's activities and the size of its membership, the SDP-related portal Nova24TV lamented the ban of the Slovenia Secure the Borders page in 2017 and blamed it on the Slovenian "radical left" (see Scheicher 2017).

[15] It seems that USi copied the slogan from either the same source as SDP or from SDP itself. The leader of USi is Andrej Šiško who is also the leader of the far-right paramilitary group Štajerska Varda [Styrian Guard] (incarnated from Šiško's far-right group Hervardi). Rejecting any affiliation with the Second World War Slovenian quisling Home Guard supporters, Šiško's relationship with SDP, which openly participates in the Home Guard remembrance events, has been complex. For example, in 2018 the authorities arrested alongside Šiško also another member of the Styrian Guard who turned out to be a member of the SDP youth faction. However, Šiško and SDP's president Janez Janša have at the time denied being allies, accusing each other of connections with "communist old boys".

[16] Ironically, the UKIP/Orban photo had been taken near the town of Brežice, Slovenia by Getty Images photographer Jeff Mitchell who later criticized UKIP's exploitation and manipulation of the shot and regretted the position in which agencies like Getty can find themselves when doing business with clients from the media and politics (see Beaumont-Thomas 2016).

STOP sign. The colours of the migrants' clothing are rather dark, and the photo's brightness is poor. The photograph is documentary in nature could have been taken by a photojournalist or a regular person a few years ago, when images like this were common in Slovenian and European media, implying the veracity and accuracy of the information as well as the gravity of the threat. Although one or two migrants are staringtowards the camera and are obviously cold and concerned, the migrants are represented not as individuals in need of help but rather as a generic, faceless, massive, dark horde that must be contained. SDP's campaign, like UKIP's and Orban's, directly exploited the hardship of Syrian refugees and other aspects of the so-called Syrian refugee crisis for political gain. The combination of all the visual elements in the poster (the slogan, the traffic sign, photograph, etc.) dictated an interpretation of migrants as racial, cultural, and political Other rather than victims of a humanitarian catastrophe and fellow human beings to whom one could relate.

While UKIP's poster was extensively criticised and removed in a matter of hours,[17] the authorities considered the spruced-up Slovenian (and Hungarian) versions fair game. The Breaking Point poster was interpreted as hate speech by various activists, politicians, and scholars. Legal philosopher Andrew Reid (2019), for instance, advocated for non-criminal sanctions against UKIP because the poster:

> "presents non-white migrants as a hostile or invading force and an imminent threat to British resources. The most plausible interpretation of this imagery is that it was an attempt to stir racial animus amongst a subset of Leave voters. The poster has been likened to an image used by Nazis. Even if we do not accept this, it is hard to interpret it as not singling out recent arrivals in the country specifically and, given the fascistic undertones, non-whites, for differential treatment. (Reid 2019, p. 630)."

This could easily be argued in the case of the SDP poster in Slovenia, which used even more fascistic and racist undertones if measured by Reid's standards. However, the authorities in Slovenia have allowed such discourse to appear on a regular basis. From 2015 to 2020, the SDP-related Demokracija magazine used the migrant crowd, queue, or caravan image for at least five front covers (see Appendix 2-2; 2-3; 2-4; 2-8; 2-12), while regular articles on migration on the Demokracija and Nova24TV portals use this exact type of representation of migrants on a fortnightly, if not weekly, basis. The Nova24TV portal even uses the infamous UKIP/Orban-manipulated photograph, attributing it to Twitter rather than Getty images and photographer Jeff Mitchell (see M. S. 2019; M. V. 2019). Incidentally, the USi party used the same concept in some of

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[17] The Breaking Point billboard and bus sticker were released on the day politician and MP Jo Cox was murdered by a white far-right terrorist Thomas Mair. They immediately prompted an emotional response – they were reported to the police for inciting racial hatred and criticised by prominent right-wing Brexiteers, claiming it hurt the Leave campaign's cause. The Guardian newspaper and others pointed to the likeness of the image to a Nazi propaganda film shown in a 2005 BBC documentary (see Stewart and Mason 2016). The billboards and bus stickers had been removed within 24 hours by UKIP, but they could not be unseen as they have been profusely reproduced and shared via social media ever since.

their online communication, using a different photograph of a crowd of moving migrants and a different type of STOP traffic sign design (see for example USi 2018b).

Using images of migrants as crowds, queues, and caravans, as well as terms like "flood," "invasion," "hordes," and "mobs," and frequently focusing on stories about migrants' crimes and offenses, SDP-related agents intentionally fuel overestimation of their numbers and unlawful acts. The migrants in these propaganda materials become a homogenised non-white entity, almost non-existent as individuals and appearing as a mass. The goal of these discursive strategies appears to be to create a public perception of migrants as alien species, to alienate and dehumanise them, and to deprive them of the particularities that make them unique individuals. When comparing images of migrants on one hand and images of Slovenians on the other in SDP posters, videos (see Appendix 3-1), and other propaganda material, this strategy appears obvious. Slovenians, unlike migrants, are more individualised (by gender, age, occupation, opinions expressed, etc.) and familiarised (literarily as families of various types and sizes, although always white and heterosexual). This clearly demonstrates the difference between an abstract depiction of a group of people and a depiction of a family, a couple, or an individual person. The Slovenian public has yet to see what it looks like when non-white migrants living in Slovenia are portrayed as families and individuals in SDP-related media.[18]

When analysing the social media distribution and consumption of SDP propaganda and Demokracija magazine front covers, one encounters a number of methodological issues. For instance, Facebook and other social media platforms have begun to ban hate speech-related accounts from their platforms, including, as previously stated, the accounts of Slovenian far-right groups. As a result, many past engagements with the analysed media objects appear to have vanished along with the banned accounts. In addition, the SDP disables the commenting feature on most of their propaganda videos on YouTube. Furthermore, many official Demokracija magazine's Facebook

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[18] However, when SDP-affiliated politicians, media and their political allies do individualise migrants, they tend to represent them as offenders or criminals, scapegoating and demonising them to the point that their lives are threatened due to severe exposure of their identity to the public. There was one such case in particular which stuck out and which calls for more critical analysis than currently available (see for example Zorn 2021 for an excellent study). Namely, the case of Ahmad Shamieh (also Shami or Šami), who fled Syria during the war, walked through the Balkan states-controlled corridor and applied for asylum in Slovenia in 2016. What set him apart from other asylum seekers in the country was the fact that he quickly learned Slovenian and used it to help other migrants, occasionally also appearing in the media. However, his request for asylum was repeatedly denied on the grounds of Dublin regulation according to which, critics claimed, he should have applied for it in Croatia where his alleged "point-of-entry" to the EU was. Although at that point almost completely unknown to the general public, Shamieh's personal identity became exploited as a generic face of a migrant offender by SDP and other right-wing parties and media *ad nauseam*, especially after the 2017 presidential elections and during the 2018 parliamentary and 2019 EU elections. There were several hundred media reports published about his case, most of them in November 2017 when his deportation to Croatia should have happened (Zorn 2021, p. 154). In addition, SDP and other right-wing parties used his name and his facial images in their anti-migrant political propaganda campaigns, insinuating he had been receiving 1930 (or in another case 2000) euros monthly stipend from the state, while a Slovenian worker earns 500 (or in another case 820) euros per month. In reality, however, Shamieh was entitled to no more than 18 euros per month (Zorn 2021, p. 163). The state of Slovenia therefore allowed and even cooperated in public scapegoating and shaming of a specific migrant, to the point that he has become the only Syrian migrant in Slovenia known to everybody – a household name, or rather a racialised mascot of a migrant bogeyman.

posts have low engagement rates, which could be attributed to post-festum self-censorship. Moreover, their posts and tweets, including those that share the front covers, contain non-functional links to articles on the Demokracija website, implying that the URL addresses of the media objects have been changed, potentially decreasing audience engagement with these posts and tweets. Finally, hate speech vigilante public shaming initiatives such as ZLOvenia, which prompted many radical(ised) individuals to remove their hateful comments from public portals, have arguably begun to function as hate speech preventive mechanisms, resulting in hateful engagements decreasing and moving into closed FB groups or, more likely, alternatives to social media giants such as the Russian VK or messaging apps like Telegram.

Despite these issues, it seems clear that SDP-related media discourse on migrants has far-reaching consequences, as it is regularly reproduced and shared almost verbatim within SDP-affiliated media portals. Based on our analysis of a small portion of this discourse's circulation and consumption (see Appendix 3-1 and 3-3 for more details), it is safe to say that it reaches tens of thousands of people. Some of the media objects analysed elicited an emotional and often aggressive reaction from social media audiences, including calls for radical action to address the issue of non-white migrants in the country, reminiscent of Nazi Germany's methods. "[T]hey all should be put on the floorless train wagon and expelled from [S]lovenia," wrote one commentator on the SDP's official Facebook post featuring the online poster "We will protect Slovenia" (see Appendix 3-3). However, the most common feature of SDP-related media discourse reactions, both in general and on the particular topic of migration, is the us v them, or us v you polarisation. Comments like the one below, which appeared on the SDP FB post promoting the previously mentioned 2018 propaganda video, are very common on the SDP, Nova24TV, and Demokracija social media pages, dividing society along ethnic lines: "If something doesn't suit you, you know where your roots are, you are free to return to where you came from; you are of no use for us anyway." (see App 3-1) It is rather telling that these two comments have remained intact on the SDP FB page since January and May 2018, respectively.

5) Conclusion

Apart from arguably the representation of Roma in the SDP-related media, there are no equivalent or even comparable depictions of any other group of foreigners, let alone Slovenians, in SDP and SDP-affiliated media discourse. Non-white migrants are portrayed in the media as a powerful alien force threatening Slovenia's resources and the well-being of white Slovenians who are supposedly culturally, intellectually, and morally superior to the invaders. To convey this message, they use such discourse that could and should be defined as racialist, in our opinion. It affects Slovenian

population's perception of migrants in line with the most degrading racial stereotypes and orientalist prejudice, potentially leading to hateful perceptions and bigoted assumptions regarding non-white migrants in Slovenia among a significant number of Slovenian citizens.

Since this type of racialist discourse seems to have become the norm for Slovenia's most powerful political party, its allies, and its affiliated media, one is drawn to a conclusion that non-white migrants (as well as non-white residents and non-white citizens of Slovenia) are persistently excluded from the symbolic community of people who are welcome in Slovenia. This could and most probably does have grave consequences for the possibility of a participation of non-white migrants (as well as non-white residents and non-white citizens) in the democratic political processes in Slovenia, including deliberating, voting and standing in election. It seems that non-whites attempting to participate in Slovenian politics will be unable to do so on an equal footing with white Slovenian residents.

The SDP politician and SDP-affiliated media portray their use of racialised discourse as a mere freedom of expression issue. They persistently see themselves as victims of powerful left-wing elites, cultural Marxism, multiculturalist ideology or political correctness gone insane, which actually, they argue, is nothing but left-wing fascism. As Durrheim et al. (2018) noticed in the case of the Breaking Point poster, the UKIP leader gained additional popular support by using a discourse that his critics saw as racist, reinforcing the alliance between the radical politician and the people. In the case of Slovenia, the alliance between the far-right SDP and their radical(ised) supporters using the social media commenting feature is also apparent. However, the alliance includes another very important partner – the SDP-affiliated media. It is this perpetually mutually reinforced connection between the SDP politicians, the radical(ised) online commentariat and the radical(ised) SDP-affiliated media that creates a vicious spiral of seeminly neverending hateful discourse.

Since hate speech is not rigorously prosecuted in Slovenia, but rather tolerated by the Prosecutor's Office (see Bajt 2016; Moti and Bajt 2016; Splichal 2017), the alliance of these three key players enables and encourages the production of a specific political and media climate that readily condones racialised representations of migrants. Furthermore, the discourse employed by these actors is often accompanied by calls to action and threats to authorities. For instance, on the front page of the Demokracija weekly in May 2019, the headline read: "Enough! If the authorities cannot protect us from illegal migrants, we will take care of the implementation of the regulations ourselves and protect our lives and our property!" (see Appendix 2-11). One might not be hard-pressed to find links between migrant racialisation in SDP-affiliated media on the one hand and far-right anti-(non-white-) migrant vigilante groups operating in the country on the other. It should come as no surprise that, according to the most recent Europol (2020) Te-Sat report on radicalisation and terrorism, the main security threat in Slovenia is precisely the "paramilitary groups pretexting the state's impotence to

protect the population against the perceived threat from Islam and immigration" (ibid., p. 18). As a result, we must question whether the emergence of such disturbing phenomena as paramilitary hate groups targeting migrants is not enough to prompt a change in Slovenian hate speech legislation and hate speech prevention policies. What will it take for the state of Slovenia to begin addressing racism in SDP political propaganda and SDP-related media? Will vigilante groups in Slovenia have to start committing hate crimes against non-white migrants on a regular basis before the authorities finally embrace progressive legislative change? Or will it take the assassination of a non-white Slovenian citizen?

Appendices

Appendix 1: Demokracija magazine front covers featuring whiteness-related issues 2015 - 2021

1. 2018-12-20
"Evropa je lepa bela. Stara celina (in z njo Slovenija) je za Božič najlepša, ko jo pobeli sneg - Veliki božični intervju s [slovenskim rimsko-katoliškim duhovnikom in intelektualcem] Sebastijanom Valentanom - Kam za Božič?"
"Europe is beautifully white. The Old Continent (and with it Slovenia) is most beautiful for Christmas when it is whitened by snow - The Great Christmas Interview with [Slovenian Roman Catholic Priest and Intellectual] Sebastijan Valentan - Where to go for Christmas?"
(Image description: photo of a snow-white hill, a few houses with lights on in the windows, a large church and an outdoor Christmas tree decorated with Christmas lights and glowing brightly; in the foreground there is a young smiling group in winter clothes hugging like a family. Comprised of one male with a red woollen cap and two females with white woollen caps - either a father and two daughters or a father, mother, and daughter.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 11 likes; 1 share
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/19020334
36518415/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/19026792
19787170

2. 2019-04-19
"Različnost je lepa in Evropa je že dovolj različna."
"Diversity is beautiful, and Europe is already different enough."
(Image description: juxtaposition of five upright photos of five young white women with straight hair of different colours looking at us.
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 48 likes (45 thumb ups, 2 heart emojis, 1 laugh emoji); 4 shares
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/20730298
86085435/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/20752947
79192279

3. 2020-06-02
"Tudi življenja belih štejejo. Štejejo vsa življenja - Naslovnica je lutkovna adaptacija prizora iz videospota [*Look at me*, ki je bil premierno objavljen 17. septembra 2017] črnskega raperja XXXtentacion, ko črni deček gleda obešanje belega dečka"
"The lives of whites also matter. All Lives Matter - The cover is a puppet adaptation of a scene from the video [*Look at me*, released 17 September 2017] by black rapper XXXtentacion, where a black boy watches the hanging of a white boy"
(Image description: a photograph or illustration of two wooden puppets looking at each other, with the left one made of light brown wood, with a noose around its neck, and the right one of dark brown wood)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 25 likes; 1 share
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/29588144
24173639/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/29588156
50840183

Appendix 2: Demokracija magazine front covers featuring migration-related issues 2015 - 2021

1. 2015-08-06
"Bodo kmalu vaši novi sosedje?"
"Will they be your new neighbours soon?"
(Image description: a photo of ISIS fighters in, and on, a pick-up truck)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 2 likes (2 thumb ups); 1 comment
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/83886043
2835726

2. 2015-09-17
"Zahod zapira meje, Slovenija pripravlja postelje!"
"West closing borders, Slovenia preparing beds!"
(Image description: a photo of a crowd of refugees walking towards the camera;
underneath a colourful map of Europe featuring an arrow showing the route from
Greece towards Slovenia. Europe is divided into blue, red and yellow areas. Italy,
Slovenia, and the Balkan states are yellow, whereas Hungary, Austria, Germany,
Slovakia and Czech Republic are red.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 0 engagements
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/85823655
4231447

3. 2015-10-22
"Cerarjeva vlada zaspala. Bližnji vzhod na naših tleh"
"[Prime Minister] Cerar's government fell asleep. The Middle East on our soil"
(Image description: a photo of a very crowded group of refugees, moving in our
direction, and a sole (most probably Slovenian) policeman whose back is turned to
the camera.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 0 engagement
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/87217166
9504602

4. 2015-10-29
"Dovolj je evropske naivnosti! EU je eksistenčno ogrožena!"
 "Enough of European naivety! The EU is in existential danger!"
(Image description: two juxtaposed photos with the title in the middle. The upper
photo features German chancellor Angela Merkel smiling and posing with her thumb
up for a selfie with a refugee; whereas the other shows a crowded group of what
seem to be male refugees)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 2 likes (2 thumb ups)

5. 2015-11-18

"Napad ISIS na EU! Bo Evropa islamski kalifat?"

"ISIS attacks the EU! Will Europe become an Islamic Caliphate?"

(Image description: a photo collage of the EU flag and the Eiffel Tower in the background, with an ISIS fighter with a black flag and a huge fire in the foreground.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 2 likes (2 thumb ups)

6. 2015-11-25

"Burke ne spadajo v našo družbo!"

"Burkas do not belong in our society!"

(Image description: a photo collage featuring the Slovenian flag in the background and two human figures in burqas in the foreground.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 1 like (1 thumb up)

7. 2017-11-22

"[Delavec] Zasluži 820 €, [Migrant Ahmad Šami] dobi 2000 €. Vlada Slovence izčrpava, nezakonite migrante pa podpira!"

"[A worker] Earns € 820, [migrant Ahmad Shami] gets € 2,000. The government is exhausting Slovenians and supporting illegal migrants!"

(Image description: a photo juxtaposition of a generic helmet worker on the left and migrant Ahmad Shamieh on the right.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 4 likes (3 thumb ups, 1 sad face emoji), 4 comments

8. 2018-06-27

"Otroci? Fajonova vzemi jih domov, če jih hočeš! Medtem ko ilegalni migranti po Evropi postajajo vse bolj nasilni, jih evroposlanka iz vrst SD Tanja Fajon nespametno vabi v Slovenijo."

"Children? [MEP] Fajon, you take them home if you want them! While illegal migrants across Europe are becoming more and more violent, the Social Democrat MEP Tanja Fajon is unwisely inviting them to Slovenia."

(Image description: a photo collage of a crowd of migrants in the background and MEP Tanja Fajon in the foreground "pointing" towards them.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 42 likes (34 thumb ups, 5 angry face emojis, 3 sad face emojis); 19 shares; 7 comments

9. 2018-08-31 "Z migranti v Slovenijo prihaja kultura posilstev"

"Migrants bring the culture of rape to Slovenia"
(Image description: a photo (or a photo collage) of a blonde, white woman whose head and legs are not visible and seven black hands touching and undressing her, one holding her breast.)
IMPORTANT: As a result of Facebook's removal of the image, the Demokracija magazine ran on its Facebook page an image featuring an explanation which read: "Facebook nam ne dovoli objaviti nove naslovnice, zato puščamo uvodno sliko prazno!" ["We are not allowed by Facebook to publish the new cover, so we decided to leave the introductory image blank!"]
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 34 likes (8 thumb ups, 8 laughing face emojis, 8 angry face emojis, 5 shocked face emojis, 4 sad face emojis, 1 heart emoji); 2 shares; 19 comments
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/1761493613905732
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/1761475227240904
https://demokracija.si/fokus/v-novi-reviji-demokracija-z-migranti-v-slovenijo-prihaja-kultura-posilstev-sarceva-reciklaza-starih-obrazov-intervjuja-dr-stane-granda-in-milan-cadez/
https://demokracija.si/slovenija/neverjetno-tednik-demokracija-postavlja-umetniske-smernice-kar-je-bila-lani-poleti-bojda-sporna-naslovnica-revije-je-ta-teden-performans-na-ljubljanskih-ulicah/
https://nova24tv.si/slovenija/politika/sarceva-vlada-s-tozilstvom-uresnicuje-kucanovo-fatvo-z-ilove-gore-da-je-treba-neposlusne-in-motece-medije-kot-sta-portal-nova24tv-in-revija-demokracija-uniciti/

10. 2018-10-21
"Bo to Slovenija 2050? Vprašanje je za zdaj retorično. - Evropska komisija pravi, da v Sloveniji lahko živi 18 milijonov ljudi [devetkrat toliko kot zdaj]. - Je to načrt za prisilno naselitev z Afričani in Arabci?"
"Will this be Slovenia 2050? The question is rhetorical for now. - The European Commission says that 18 million people can live in Slovenia [9-times the population now]. – Is this a plan for forced settlement with Africans and Arabs?"
(Image description: a photo collage of a bird's eye view of 10 newborns, one of whom is naked and white, and the other 9 are dressed in black nijab.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 60 likes (28 thumb ups, 15 angry face emojis, 12 sad face emojis, 4 laughing face emojis, 1 shocked face emoji); 20 comments, 26 shares
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/1817414121647014/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/1817982471590179/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/1821837494538010
https://demokracija.si/fokus/v-novi-reviji-demokracija-bo-to-slovenija-leta-2050-dr-anze-logar-zahtevajmo-vec-pozdravimo-ljubljano-intervjuja-rajko-fajt-in-mag-maja-kocjan/

11. 2019-05-17
"Dovolj je! Ilegalni prehod. Posilstvo. Umor. Ugrabitev. Če nas oblast ne more zavarovati pred ilegalnimi migranti, bomo sami poskrbeli za izvajanje predpisov ter zavarovali svoja življenja in svoje premoženje!"

"Enough! Illegal passage. Rape. Murder. Kidnapping. If the authorities cannot protect us from illegal migrants, we will take care of the implementation of the regulations ourselves and protect our lives and our property! "

(Image description: a photo collage of an alleged illegal crossing, alleged rape victim in distress, bloody palms and knife blades, and a man in a trunk of a car. In addition, in the centre of the image, there are two white men and two Slovenian flags above their head. One man seems to hold one of the flags, while the other has a Slovenian flag painted on his cheek.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 7 likes (7 thumb ups)

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/2118125454909211/

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/2119668011421622

12. 2019-05-22

"Kakšno prihodnost želite? Odločitev je vaša"

"What kind of future do you want? The decision is yours"

(Image description: photos juxtaposed - a photo of a crowd of refugees on the left vs. idyllic natural and tourist attractions on the right. The latter also includes a beekeeper with a hive full of honey and bees. Context: European elections 2019)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 23 likes (22 thumb ups, 1 shocked face emoji); 1 comment; 10 shares

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/2128866817168408/

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/2128114287243661

13. 2019-08-23

"Izdajalca! Slovenija je gleda na dolžino meje in število ilegalnih prehodov najbolj luknjičasta schengenska meja - Bili smo v Beli krajini in se na lastne oči prepričali, da meja sploh ni varovana."

"Traitors! Slovenia's is the most porous Schengen border in terms of length of a border and number of illegal crossings - We were in [the southern border region of] Bela krajina and saw for ourselves that the border is not protected at all."

(Image description: a photo collage of Prime Minister Marjan Šarec and Minister of the Interior Boštjan Poklukar who both stand under a perforated container out of which water sprays as if from a shower.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 0 engagements.

Engagement: Demokracija Twitter Account: 5 retweets, 6 likes.

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/2287414341313654

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/2287287571326331/

https://twitter.com/demokracija1/status/1164408660728193029

14. 2019-09-19

"Invazija nasilja! Ekskluzivno objavljamo pričevanje, kaj se dogaja za zidovi azilnih domov: predozirani azilanti, napadi in pretepi z noži del vsakdanjika - Nasilje se stopnjuje, islam vse bolj agresiven"

"Invasion of violence! We are exclusively publishing a testimony on what is happening behind the walls of asylum homes: overdosed asylum seekers, attacks and knife fights are part of everyday life - Violence is escalating, Islam is becoming more aggressive"
(Image description: an illustration of a simple black-and-white map of Slovenia and the surrounding countries flooded from the south by a green-coloured wave from which minarets and mosques protrude.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 18 likes (11 thumb ups; 7 angry face emojis); 2 shares
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/23350148 23220272/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/23359757 23124182

15. 2020-01-09
"Bomo dovolili? Janez Lenarčič, evropski sekretar: Afrika ima demografski potencial."
"Will we allow it? Janez Lenarčič, European Secretary: Africa has a demographic potential."
(Image description: Juxtaposition of two illustrations of a simple black and white map of the European continent: on the left it says 2020 and Europe is coloured white, on the right it says 2050 and Europe is coloured black.)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 29 likes (15 angry face emojis, 12 thumb ups, 2 shocked face emojis); 12 comments; 3 shares
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/25680452 33250562/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/25691855 63136529

16. 2020-04-24
"Aleš Hojs: južno mejo je treba še bolj zavarovati"
"[Interior Minister] Aleš Hojs: the southern border needs to be secured even more"
(Image description: a photo of the Minister of the Interior Aleš Hojs standing in front of the Slovenian flag, which is covering the entire background)
Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 87 likes (79 thumb ups, 3 hearts, 3 laughing face emojis, 2 shocked face emojis); 7 comments; 17 shares
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/27859703 94791377/
https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/27862106 88100681

17. 2020-08-19
"Evropo ogrožajo zločinske kulture"
"Europe is threatened by criminal cultures"
(Image description: a photo collage with the EU flag in the background. In front lies or stands a young woman with numerous bruises and wounds on her face and arms, which she has pressed to her chest in a defensive position. She is threatened by what seem to be a stereotypical African pointed spear and a stereotypical Middle Eastern dagger.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 38 likes (23 thumb ups, 9 sad face emojis, 5 angry face emojis); 5 comments; 9 shares

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/30957878 73809626/

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/30934184 90713231

https://demokracija.si/fokus/v-novi-reviji-demokracija-kultura-posilstev-je-vse-blize-sloveniji-vrnitev-med-drzave-zahodne-civilizacije-stevilni-vnosi-novega-koronavirusa-s-hrvaske-razkrivamo-privilegije-socialisticnih-funkcionar/

18. 2020-11-12

"Predniki so zmogli, bomo tudi mi?"

"The ancestors were able, will we?"

(Image description: a reproduction of a painting from the year 1902 by Henri Grobet titled Charles Martel at the Battle of Poitiers [Charles Martel à la bataille de Poitiers]. The battle is also known as the Battle of Tours, and it was held on 10 and 11 October 732 CE.)

Engagement: Demokracija Facebook Account: 53 likes (50 thumb ups, 2 laughing face emojis, 1 heart); 11 comments; 11 shares

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.263978346990607/33436550 25689575/

https://www.facebook.com/tednikdemokracija/photos/a.327838640604577/33436689 09021520

https://demokracija.si/fokus/v-novi-stevilki-demokracije-preberite-najvecje-krscanske-zmage-proti-islamu/

https://nova24tv.si/sprosceno/zanimivosti/najvecje-krscanske-zmage-proti-islamu/

https://www.akg-images.fr/archive/-Charles-Martel-a-la-bataille-de-Poitiers-(732)----Histoire-de-France---Moyen-Age-2UMDHUWD9JZX5.html

Appendix 3: the SDP 3 June 2018 parliamentary election political propaganda, its representation, circulation, and consumption

1. SDP election slogan "Zavarovali bomo Slovenijo" [We will protect Slovenia].

1.1. Media object: SDP video titled "Slovenijo bomo postavili na prvo mesto!" ["We will put Slovenia first!"]. The slot about migrants (from 1:29 to 1:35) employs the slogan "Zavarovali bomo Slovenijo" [We will protect Slovenia"].

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for WP5 - Media Text 1.1.
Representation	The introductory text frames the images. The slogan 'We will protect Slovenia' frames the issue of migration as a security threat and migrants as an invading force, an enemy. The images are interpreted as a documentary and seemingly taken from the news connoting veracity and accuracy. Migrants are represented not as individuals but rather as crowds that need to be contained, surveilled and moved from one point to another by robocops rather than everyday policemen. Not unlike cattle being controlled by cowboys.
Narrative in representation	- The opening graphics and animation present the slogan 'We will protect Slovenia' as an attractive sports club logo design, placed on the background of a waving Slovenian national flag, denoting a sports competition shot of a national flag when the Slovenian sports person had won the competition. - The first shot featuring people captures a campfire filmed from behind a wire fence in the night-time. Cut to a daytime scene of a migrant camp tents and what seems to be a migrant hitting a side of a tent. Cut to shots of crowds of migrants behind iron fences surveilled by policemen in protective gear and helmets wearing surgical masks. Cut to a shot of policemen in helmets and protective gear escorting a large caravan of migrants forward, then cut to a moving drone shot of a caravan of refugees walking through fields.
Technical elements of narrative	- The title 'We Will Protect Slovenia' is designed as an attractive sports club or university name and placed on the background of a waving Slovenian national flag. - Editing is super-fast with shots lasting less than a second. - A moving drone shot is used when filming a queue of migrants. - The shots are documentary and factual. They most probably originate from news programs.

Source	Link	Audience reactions to the media text 1.1.
SDP YT	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-JAot5pK24&t=3s	4,486 views, 62 likes, 66 dislikes Comments turned off (viewed 23 April 2021)
SDP FB	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=10160537661490232	299 likes; 54 comments; shares not visible (viewed 23 April 2021) - Darko Juršič: (Odgovarja Nihad-u Coki) "Če ti kaj ne paše,veš kje so tvoje korenine svobodno lahko odideš tja od koder ste prišli itak ni koristi od vas." [Darko Juršič: (Answering to Nihad Coki) "If something doesn't suit you, you know where your roots are, you are free go back to where you came from, we have no use for you anyway."] - Nihad Coki: (Odgovarja Darko-u Jurišič-u) "če ne bi bilo nas bi se ti se danes vozil po makadamu in živel v kolibi. Sicer pa tvoj odgovor pove vse koliko ste v SDS strpni do drugih. Pač škoda mojih besed za tebe ker si očitno poden od človeka." [Nihad Coki: (Answering to Darko Jurišič) "If it weren't for us, you would be driving on macadam today and living in a hut. Otherwise, your answer says everything about how tolerant you are in the SDP. I'm just wasting my words here because you're obviously a man of the lowest kind."]
SDP Twitter	https://twitter.com/strankaSDS/status/996664664841912325	2.3K views; 95 retweets; 5 quote tweets; 123 likes; 2 replies (viewed 23 April 2021)
SDP WEB	https://www.sds.si/novica/slovenijo-bomo-postavili-na-prvo-mesto-15834	Comments not possible (viewed 23 April 2021)

1.2. Media object: SDP Offline billboard/poster employing the slogan "Zavarovali bomo Slovenijo" [We will protect Slovenia"]. The textual elements of the media object are as follows: "STOP; We will protect Slovenia; 1963 € FOR A MIGRANT; SDS (SDP party logo); for you".

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for WP5 - media object 2.1
Representation	The image of a red STOP traffic sign placed in the upper right corner frames the rest of the image and texts. Both the STOP sign and the slogan 'We will protect Slovenia' frames the issue of migration as a security threat and migrants as an invading force, an enemy. Migrants are represented as a large queue or caravan walking on a gravel road in what seems to be countryside behind and past what seems to be an imaginary STOP sign photoshopped onto the photo of migrants. The image is documentary and seemingly taken by a photojournalist connoting veracity and accuracy of information. Although one or two migrants are gazing towards the camera and are obviously cold, wet, and concerned, the migrants are represented not as individuals but rather as a caravan of people that needs to be stopped, either because government is too generous to them [SDP was an opposition party at the time] or because they are after Slovenia's money - namely, the 1963 euros per migrant.
Narrative in representation	Not only is SDP painting migrants as a security threat but also as a financial burden and a threat. Given that the minimum wage in Slovenia at the time was around 850 euros, 1963 euros for a migrant was an information that might have upset many a low-wage worker. The solution is your vote for SDP party that will put a STOP to this. There are alternative interpretations possible (1) SDP is offering a bounty of 1963 euros for a migrant; or (2) SDP will award every migrant with 1963 euros), but they do not seem likely.
Technical elements of narrative	Image of the caravan of migrants used in the poster does not employ a close up of a migrant's face but rather uses a "long shot" from a slightly higher angle (not full "high-angle shot" though), dehumanising the subjects and looking down on them. The billboard/posters were placed on various locations around Slovenia. The image is a rework of the online poster (or is it the other way around?). Here the "1963 € FOR A MIGRANT" text is added, while the SDP website and social media logos are missing.

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1.3. Media object: SDP online poster employing the slogan "Zavarovali bomo Slovenijo." [We will protect Slovenia."]. The textual elements of the media object are as follows: "STOP; We will protect Slovenia.; zate.sds.si (SDP election website); SDS (SDP logo); for you".

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for WP5 - media object 1.3.
Representation	The image of a red STOP traffic sign placed in the upper right corner frames the rest of the image and texts. Both the STOP sign and the slogan 'We will protect Slovenia' frames the issue of migration as a security threat and migrants as an invading force, an enemy. Migrants are represented as a large queue or caravan walking on a gravel road in what seems to be countryside behind and past what seems to be an imaginary STOP sign photoshopped onto the image of migrants. The image is documentary and seemingly taken by a photojournalist connoting veracity and accuracy of information. Although one or two migrants are gazing towards the camera and are obviously cold, wet, and concerned, the migrants are represented not as individuals but rather as a caravan of people that needs to be stopped.
Narrative in representation	SDP is painting migrants as a security threat. The solution is your vote for SDP party that will put a STOP to this threat.
Technical elements of narrative	Image of the caravan of migrants used in the poster does not employ a close up of a migrant's face but rather uses a "long shot" from a slightly higher angle (not full "high-angle shot" though), dehumanising the subjects and looking down on them. The image is a rework of the billboard image (or is it the other way around?). Here the "1963 € FOR A MIGRANT" text from the billboards is missing, while the SDP website and social media logos are added, adopting the image for personal online consumption.

Source	Link	Audience reactions to the media text 1.3.
SDP FB	https://www.facebook.com/slovenska.demokratska.stranka/photos/zavarovali-bomo-slovenijo-httpswwwsdssizateprogram-sdszateprijavite-se-na-e-novi/10159955258630232	198 reactions (122 likes, 24 laugh emojis, 5 angry emojis, 2 sad emojis, 1 shocked emoji); 70 comments; 30 shares (viewed 25 April 2021) - Peter Bernik: "Bravooo tako kot ste jo prej k smo stradal, vse na vagon brez podna pa izgnat iz slovenije.☺" [Peter Bernik: "Bravooo, just like you did before when we were starving, they all should be put on the floorless train wagon and expelled from slovenia.☺"]
SDP leader Janez Janša's twitter	https://twitter.com/jjansasds/status/950123841703038977	81 retweets, 4 quote tweets, 146 likes, 7 replies (viewed 25 April 2021)
SDP politician Božo Predalič's Twitter	https://twitter.com/bozopredalic/status/986155061674995712	10 retweets; 23 likes; 3 replies (viewed 25 April 2021) - Peter Hladnik: "Če #EU noče naredit red je potrebno vseeno začet #migrante popisovat tako kot #kriminalce odvzet 10xprstne odtise #DNK,

		34	vpisat v #interpol evidenco. V #EU doseč da se jim izda izkaznico brez katerih nimajo prostega gibanja" [Peter Hladnik: "If the #EU does not want to restore order, it is necessary to start registering #migrants in the same way as #criminals take 10xfingerprints #DNA, enter them in the #interpol records. To achieve in the #EU that they are issued with a card without which they have no free movement"
SDP WEB 1		https://www.sds.si/zate/program/zavarovali-bomo-slovenijo	Comments not possible (viewed 25 April 2021)
SDP WEB 2		https://www.sds.si/novica/program-sds-zavarovali-bomo-slovenijo-16222	Comments not possible (viewed 25 April 2021)

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