



in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate



Trends of Radicalisation

Bosnia and Herzegovina/3.2 Research Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards the measurable evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include the person's sense of being victimised, of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation in order to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of 17 nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering the strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This report will examine the trends of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina using two hotspots as that represent the manifestations of radicalization in current Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the hotspots will present religiously motivated radicalism embodied in Mevlid Jašarević who is a member of Salafi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who executed an attack on the United States embassy in Sarajevo and the second hotspot represents ethno-nationalistic radicalism embodied in Chetnic movement (Serb radical ethno-nationalistic organization) and its gathering in Višegrad (Town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Using the two above mentioned hotspots and perpetrators involved in events mentioned report will analyse three levels of radicalization:

- Micro level: Personal Factors (Background of Individual Actors)
- Meso Level: Social Setting Factors (Groups, Networks, Communities)
- Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

Analysing the three levels of radicalization will give us an overview of factors driving and supporting radicalization that correlate with each of the identified hotspots.

This report will also talk about factors that are related to political and socio-cultural environment of the individuals responsible for the hotspots that facilitated the violent acts. These facilitating factors of radicalization will give us an overview that make violent acts possible or attractive.

Using I-GAP spectrum, constructivist method, the report traces the motives that drive radicalization of perpetrators described in the hotspots. For each hotspot, country reports will examine four aspects of radicalization that motivate individuals to engage in violent extremism. Country reports will ground the chosen hotspots in perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarization* (I-GAP), and finally culminate in the violent act.

Introduction

Radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a process that can be traced back to the war that happened from 1992-1995 and that process has been ongoing until today, which can be seen in the political rhetoric of local political elite that, in most cases, set base of their politics on ethnic identity and presenting “the other” as an enemy. Being an ethnically divided society with high numbers of unemployed (especially youth) and extremist political rhetoric, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a country considered as a fertile ground for terrorist and extremists.

In this report you will read about two examples or “hotspots” of trends of radicalization that present religiously motivated extremism and terrorism and ethno-nationalistic extremism. First example or “hotspot” is the attack on embassy of United States in Sarajevo, BiH by Mevlid Jašarević, member of Salafi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was carried out in 2011. The other example is the Chetnic movement (Serb nationalistic organization) and their annual march in Višegrad (town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina), where number of war crimes have happened during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), committed by Serb army.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina we are able to recognize two types of extremist groups and behaviour: ethno-nationalistically (right wing) oriented and religiously (Mostly Islamic) oriented (Dušanić 2020, Pećković 2018, Bećirević 2018), so these two examples will illustrate state of trend an types of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as ideological and political background of perpetrators of terrorist and extremist acts.

Structure of the report is as follows: In the “Hotspots of radicalization” part of the report we will give a general overview of chosen hotspots, methods used and reason for choosing the presented hotspots. We will also discuss micro, meso and macro factors of radicalization, where we will focus on different factors and processes, driving and supporting radicalization related to both hotspots of radicalization.

While analysing of trends of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina we will focus on specificities of political, economic and cultural development and tensions that make structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As this report will show, the manifestations of extremists` violence take different shapes and forms in Bosnia and Herzegovina and they are vivid and consequential. By “Hotspots” we mean specific events that qualify as hotspots are (1) premeditated and (2) potentially scalable acts of (3) extremist violence within (4) a larger series or pattern of similar acts that are committed by radicalized individuals (5) clearly linked to or influenced by a radicalized group, network or organization.

In the part of the report about micro level of radicalization, we focus on personal background of individuals responsible for planning, organizing and carrying out of terrorist acts. We will also examine issues that can be considered as drivers for radicalization of the individual. Meso level of radicalization will focus on wider radical milieu of the perpetrators. In this part of the report we will discuss potential political connections or connections to certain religious groups of the perpetrators. In the part of the report where we will discuss macro we will focus on societal factors of radicalization. This part of the report will contain information on issues such as: socio-economic opportunities, political and religious tensions, cultural

cleavages, social alienation and other factors of radicalization of the perpetrators. We will also discuss facilitating factors for radicalization in order to identify political and socio-cultural environment of the individuals responsible for committing terrorist attacks or extremist behaviour. At the end of the report you will also read about motivational factors of perpetrators of the hotspots.

By motivational factors we mean factors of radicalization that motivate perpetrators to commit violent acts. The motives are identified from the point of view of the individuals involved in the hotspot and reflect these individuals' own sentiment and impressions rather than external or "neutral" perspectives.

This report will examine four possible factors that motivated the perpetrators to commit extremist and violent acts: Injustice, Grievance, Alienation, Polarization (I-GAP). Motivational factors will be assessed through I-GAP spectrum is a constructivist method of multifaceted assessment that allows to trace the motives driving radicalization.

Hotspots of radicalisation

As mentioned above two “hotspots” we have chosen to present in this report are the attack on the United States embassy in Sarajevo, executed by member of Salafi movement in 2011 and the annual Chetnic movement parade in Višegrad (Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina - Republic of Srpska), that promotes Serbian ethno-nationalistic ideology, on the one side and as well as serves as a message to non-Serbs that they are not welcome in Višegrad.

Overview of chosen hotspots

First hotspot that we will discuss in this report is the ***attack of a member of Salafi movement on the United States Embassy in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)*** on Friday 28.10.2011. The attacker was identified as 23 year old, Mevlid Jašarević, citizen of Republic of Serbia (Novi Pazar). During the attack the U.S. embassy was closed, so there were no injuries of the embassy staff, but the embassy has suffered several damages from bullets. Two police officers were wounded and the attacker himself was also wounded as the police shot him. He was a member of Salafi community and had strong ties to Salafi community in Gornja Maoča (Srebrenik municipality in North-East Bosnia and Herzegovina). On the 28th of October 2011 Mevlid Jašarević came to Sarajevo from Gornja Maoča. Previously to the event Mevlid Jašarević has made a DVD, which contained a video testimony where he described what he is going to do and why.

“I do not have to explain why I attack Americans. They have started a fight against Islam and the Muslims in the whole world. They kill Muslims, rape their women...But what happens in these territories? The Americans are preparing new slaughter over Muslims together with Serbs and Croats” (Conner, 2017).

In order to execute the terrorist attack Mevlid Jašarević has brought with him two pieces of assault weapons, ammunition and five bombs. Allegedly, Mevlid Jašarević has shot out more than 100 rounds of ammunition before he was shot and wounded himself by the police. Mevlid Jašarević was sentenced firstly on 18 years and then to 15 years in jail by Bosnian Court of Law (BBC, 2012).

The second hotspot that we will discuss in this report is the annual meeting of Serb ultra-nationalistic Chetnic movement in Višegrad. Each year the members of this organization from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro gather in Višegrad, commemorating the leader of Chetnic movement in WWII, Draža Mihajlović (N1 Sarajevo, 2019). Višegrad was a place where several war crimes have happened during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were committed by members of Serb army under the same ideology as Chetnics.

Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović, the Chetnic’s general during WWII was arrested by Yugoslav Partisans in 1946. He was prosecuted and condemned to death. He was executed in Belgrade in 1946, but he was also rehabilitated by authorities in the republic of Serbia because of believe that his trial was politically motivated (Sorguc, 2020).

Since Višegrad is a place with lots of Bosniak returnees who still remember the war crimes, committed by the Serb army during the war from 92-95 (ICTY, 2016) these gathering

produce great amount of fear among the returnees and wake up the war trauma that still exists and which can be motivated by the wish to expel Bosniaks from Višegrad and Republic of Srpska in general. At this point it is important to mention that around 3000 of Bosniaks were killed in Višegrad during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in public executions (Memišević, 2020). This gathering of Chetnic movement is also an event of annual character that celebrates Draža Mihajlović as a symbol of Serbian fight for national liberation and their wish to “live on their own land”. It is an act of extremist ethnic (mostly) psychological violence, which is organized in Višegrad, but lots of members coming to the gathering from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. This psychological extremist ethno-nationalistic violence can turn to other forms of violence if conditions for that are suitable. These gatherings are open to the wider public, but its nature does not allow non-Serbs to participate. If they do, there is a clear danger of physical violence, which happened to the journalist during these events what will be also described in this report. Songs that can be heard during these events are very indicative and send clear message to non-Serbs living in this area: “There will be hell, the Drina will be bloody, and here come the Chetniks from the Serb mountains”.

Chetnic movement was a Serb army during the WWII who argued that they are the Kings Army in the Homeland. Serbian/Yugoslavian king has immigrated to London as the German army took over Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the beginning of WWII. During the WWII they have committed several massacres over the non-Serb population and their leader was captured, prosecuted and condemned to death on the 15th of July 1946 (Yves T, 2010).

Methods and reasons for choice of hotspots

The hotspots of radicalisation that we will present in this report, illustrate the context and the state of radicalization that Bosnia and Herzegovina find itself in at this moment. As previously mentioned, we are witnessing two types of radicalization and extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One is the religious radicalism (mostly connected to Islam), embodied in Salafi movement and the other is ethno-nationalism, embodied in organization like radical ethno-nationalist organization Chetnic movement, which is a Serb ethno-nationalistic movement that has its roots in WWII from the territory of Yugoslavia. Both hotspots are clearly premeditated, organized and executed by members of radical groups, representing certain ideological concept that they wish to represent and impose to others.

First hotspot that will be discussed in this report is the attack on the United States embassy in Sarajevo that was executed by Mevlid Jašarević, a member of Salafi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2011. The reason for choosing this hotspot is Mevlid Jašarević's clear connection to certain radical religious leaders, who are also members of Salafi community, such as Nusret Imamović, who was an unofficial leader of Gornja Maoča Salafi community, where Mevlid Jašarević lived before committing of the terrorist act. It is also important to mention that Nusret Imamović was also arrested with suspicion of giving support to Mevlid Jašarević to execute the terrorist attack (Večernji.hr, 2012). Nusret Imamović, was placed on the black list by the Bureau of Counterterrorism (US Department of State), because of his contentions to the al-Nusrah Front (US Department of State, Executive order 13224). According to Atlantic Initiative report Gornja Maoča was the Salafi community with most numbers of individual participants in the Syrian war, to be precise 58 of them. These facts, among others, clearly indicate radicalization processes in this Salafi community. Mevlid

Jašarević is, according to his testimonies that are available in media reports, was fighting against the enemies of Islam and trying to protect his Muslim brothers and sisters, which is part of a general narrative of Islamic terrorist in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere. One of his testimonies that he recorded morning before the attack states:

“You know, if you do not withdraw your army from Afghanistan in a month and do not withdraw from the fight against Islam and Muslims, your food and water will be poisoned. You have risen up in war against the Muslims. And now the Muslims will come with the war in your houses” (dnevno.hr, 2012).

The second hotspot this report will discuss is the ***annual meeting of members of Chetnic movement in Višegrad (Bosnia and Herzegovina)***, which serve as commemoration of Chetnic general during WWII, Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović.

In the ideological sense, Serb ethno-nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina identify themselves with the ideology of Draža Mihajlović and Chetnics in the WWII, and they did so in the war from 92-95. This is notable from the iconography that can be seen during the event, uniforms and songs that participants sing during the event.

“*There will be hell, the Drina will be bloody, and here come the Chetniks from the Serb mountains*” (Gadžo, 2019) is one of the song that can be heard during the annual gathering of Chetnic movement in Višegrad.

Since several war atrocities happened in Višegrad during this war, when around 3000 people were killed and that is the main reason why this annual event creates such fear among Bosniak (Muslim) returnees to Višegrad. One of the returnees says: “*What we have seen in 1992, we are seeing again. Buses and cars are coming from Serbia again. Instead of building and creating something, we must look at scenes like this. This iconography is a great threat for people that are progressive*” (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2019)

Journalist of N1 TV station from Sarajevo has been attacked during this gathering. Since this TV station is based in Sarajevo, the participants of the gathering have presumed that journalists are Bosniaks and did not want to allow them to record the gathering. As one of the journalist testified “*one tall person came to our camera man, took the camera out of his hands and starting to hit him over his head with the camera. At least, I thought he would not hit a woman. As I started to beg him to stop hitting him and to just let us go, that we are sorry... He took my microphone out of my hand and started to hit me with it*” (N1, 2016)

The gathering of Chetnics is clearly, on side waking the traumatic events of 1992 of Bosniak returnees in Višegrad, but on the other side it is also serving as promotion of the Serbian ethno-nationalistic ideology. It is important also to mention that there are 16 such NGOs officially registered on the territory of Republic of Serbs entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Klix, 2019), even though Article 145 of the BiH Criminal Code, clearly states that anyone who publicly incites or incites national, racial or religious hatred, discord or intolerance between the constituent peoples and the Others, as well as others living or residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be punished by imprisonment from three months to three years. Last year is the first time that the organizers of the gathering Dušan Sladojević, Slavko Aleksić and

Risto Lečić were on trial for inciting hatred between Bosnia and Herzegovina's main ethnic groups at a rally in Višegrad (Sorguc, 2020).

Both hotspots are representing types of radicalism and extremism that are present in Bosnia and Herzegovina at this stage and they are our emblematic for Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also the fact that they have roots and historical background in the previous war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are values and concepts that are still present and promoted among radical groups.

Micro-Meso-Macro Levels of Radicalisation

In the context of driving and supporting factors of radicalization connected with hotspots discussed in this report we recognize three levels of radicalization, such as:

Micro level: Micro level of radicalization focuses on personal factors of individual responsible for planning and executing violent act of terrorism or extremism. Factors of radicalisation on micro level can include the identity problems, failed integration, marginalization, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation, stigmatisation, and rejection, often combined with moral outrage and feelings of (vicarious) revenge, level of education and other.

Meso level: In the Meso level of this report, we will focus on supportive social surrounding of individuals and organizations from the involved in the hotspots described in this report. This level will include potential political connections, religious communities and/or leaders and networks that contribute or support radical behaviour.

Macro level: In this part of the report, we will discuss potential role of factors, such as government and society in the processes of radicalization of perpetrators of violent acts, mentioned as hotspots in this report. This includes different structural factor in the society, political parties, ethnic relationships and other.

Hotspot 1: Mevlid Jašarević – Attack on United States Embassy in Sarajevo

Micro level of radicalisation

Mevlid Jašarević, the attacker on the United States embassy in Sarajevo is a citizen of Republic of Serbia, part of Serbia with the Bosniak (Muslim) majority. At the time of the attack, he was 23 years old. In 2005, in Austria he was convicted of robbery and imprisoned in an Austrian jail for 3 years and then expelled to Serbia. According to the Bosnian Security Agency, director Džuvo, Mevlid has visited Gornja Maoča previously, Salafi's movement community in North-East Bosnia and Herzegovina (Deutsche Welle, 2011). He was also arrested by Serbian police on 28th of November 2010, while him and two friends were standing in front of a building where 10 of ambassadors should have a meeting (Jutarnji.hr, 2011).

After the attack, police has searched his house and found literature about radical Islam and a military uniform.

Mevlid Jašarević is a child of divorced parents as his grandfather said. "That is my grandson. He lived in Austria with his parents. They got divorced and both parents did not take care of him properly. I was OK with him being religious, but that Salafi way I could not support. We wanted him to be here with us, but he went to Bosnia. He is young and inexperienced" (RTV Novi Pazar, 2011).

According to his final words in the court, speaking about his previous convictions, Mevlid Jašarević mentioned that he was 15-16 years old at that time and that he lived with his mother who was working whole day and she could not do much about it.(Media Gerilla, 2013).

At this stage, it is important to mention that Mevlid Jašarević was married and has a child. His wife currently lives with her mother abroad and works as a cleaning lady on a bus station. He has obviously led a very poor life and was a child mostly left to himself, which made him an easy target for recruiting and radicalization. According to his attorney, Senad Dupovac, the people that have contributed to his radicalization have not continued communication with him and have not provided him any kind of help, or to his wife and child (Source, 2015). The same source argues that whenever his father came to his home town, he would spend lots of money for his own purposes, while Mevlid and his mother led a very poor life. This clearly indicates a bad relationship with his father and a broken family and home life.

Meso level of radicalisation

According to attorney of Mevlid Jašarević, he was recruited to Salafi movement during the stay in prison for bank robbery in Vienna (Austria), where he stayed for 3 years (Source, 2015).

This statement is also supported by his aunt Senada Jašarević: "When he returned to Novi Pazar, we were shocked: by his look, the clothes, the ideas he spread, and then the people he started hanging out with. What we didn't do to save him, to get him out of the clutches of that movement, we jokingly said that we would pull out his chin. He just laughed, brought a bag full of books and criticized us for not reading anymore" (Novosti, 2011). According to his aunt, he was also much worse when he came back from Bosnia (Gornja Maoča), trying to recruit others in the Salafi movement, but he never succeeded.

Mevlid Jašarević was an occasional visitor of Salafi community in Gornja Maoča, knowing that Salafi community, as already mentioned, has most single cases of persons going to Syrian war from one local community and where he started his journey to commit the terrorist attack on United States embassy in Sarajevo.

In his concluding words, the Judge Branko Perić, wondered about the role of Gornja Maoča community and the role of the unofficial leader of that community, Nusret Imamović. "If it wasn't from Gornja Maoča" there would not be Mevlid Jašarević" argued judge Perić. (Arcives, Balkan, 2012).

Nusret Imamović, a radical leader of Gornja Maoča community lived there from 2006. During the war in Syria he went there with his family. They are all still in Syria, more concretely in Idlib town (Avdić, 2017). During the trial to Mevlid Jašarević, the several witnesses have claimed that Nusret Imamović is the authority in Gornja Maoča community, where he even advised community members to not take part in elections.

Taking all above mentioned in consideration, we can conclude that Salafi movement in Austria and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Gornja Maoča and in the case of Mevlid Jašarević, as an organized group, had the great influence on radicalization of Mevlid Jašarević. Still, there is no proof that they have motivated him or supported him to execute the attack on United States Embassy.

The influence of radicals Islamist, such as Nusret Imamović on Mevlid Jašarević was, definitely in the ideological sense. It is well known that radical members of Salafi community regard “the West”, especially Americans, as the enemy of Islam, which according to Mevlid Jašarević’s testimony, motivated him to execute the attack in order to send the message to “the West”.

Macro level of radicalisation

According to Mevlid Jašarević he committed the attack on on the United States Embassy in order to help Muslim brothers against the attack of infidels from the west. His terrorist attack can be understood as vengeance and a need to hit back and right wrongs that “infidels” have committed to his “brother and sisters”.

Of course, these kinds of values are not Bosnian product, but it is the general opinion of radicalized Muslims around the world who has found likeminded individuals and groups, also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such statements can be found in high ranking officials of radical movements, such as Bin Laden and his associates. Al-Zawahiri, for example, Bin Laden’s deputy, often accuses the West of engaging in a ‘new crusade’ against Muslims (CNN, 2005).

In the ideological sense this can be regarded as Pan-Islamic movement in the sense that it promotes all Muslims being “brothers and sisters” and general unity of Muslims and the “West” as an enemy.

In the context of Macro factors of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina research mostly speaks of economic deprivation, corruption, and political and institutional dysfunction (Azinović, 2018).

High unemployment, ethno-nationalistic rhetoric by leading politicians and ethnically divided territories are all pushing factors to radicalization and extremism. According to statista 40.18 % of youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unemployed (Statista, 2021). Mevlid Jašarević, as already mentioned, grow up in a poor family and with divorced parents, living with his mother who had to work hard and could not spend much time with him.

The sense of injustice can also be awaken by structural corruption that remains one of the leading challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the 2020 Transparency International report, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. This produces a general sense of injustice among citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which makes it easier for radical recruiters to recruit vulnerable youth into radical movements. A country, in a state like this is not able to offer its citizens the proper security, jobs, health care or other.

At the moment Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country divided along ethnic lines that remained after the war (1992-95). These ethnic lines were recognized in the Dayton Peace Agreement (OSCE, 1995), where international community led by the United States recognized the existence of two Entities of which one of the Entities (Republic of Srpska) is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbs are in the majority. The second Entity is Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Bosniaks and Croats are majority. In Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have two ethnically homogenous parts again, where Croats are in majority in western part of Herzegovina and Bosniaks are majority in the rest of this Entity. The results of such agreement leave a very little of space for minorities to fulfil their rights and to participate in community lives. Besides above mentioned, there is need to know that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes Bosnia and Herzegovina as an consociational democracy, which in Bosnian case, gives power to ethnicities and not individual citizens. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes three constitutional peoples, Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats. All the others are called simply "Others".

All this creates a discriminating environment for people who do not feel as one of the constitutional peoples and can lead to sense of injustice either if one is the "other" or if one does not belong to majority of population in his/her place of residence. One of the examples of minority discrimination (in this case in Republic of Srpska) is the issue with Bosnian language in school in Konjević Polje (Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina). Namely, the government of Republic of Srpska has decided to change the name of Bosnian language to Bosniak language (the language of Bosniak people), what produced protest of local Bosniaks in this community and wider. Parents took out their children from local school and enrolled them in school in Nova Kasaba in local community in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FENA, N1 Sarajevo, 2019).

This event is understood by Bosniaks as an act of systematic discrimination and has the potential to extremist acts and radicalization. In the mind set of Mevlid Jašarević and likeminded radicals this is clearly an attack on his "Muslim brothers and sisters" and can produce violent attacks or similar acts.

Hotspot 2: Annual meeting of Chetnic movement in Višegrad

During the WWII Chetnics were Serb nationalist army that considered themselves Kings Army in the Homeland. Lots war atrocities that happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and wider are attributed to Chetnics, especially against musliminhabitans of Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their leader Dragoslav Draža Mihajlović was captured by Yugoslav Partisans in 1946 and condemned to death.

After the WWII Chetnic ideology was strictly forbidden by the ruling Communist Party and all Chetnics were considered traitors because of their collaboration with Nazis and Italian Fascist. As the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out in 1992 many of Serb ethno-nationalist in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have endorsed this ideology and iconography and Chetnic movement is no longer forbidden. In Serbia Draža Mihajlović was rehabilitated and put in same rank as Tito, the leader of Partisan movement in Yugoslavia

which clearly indicates ethno nationalistic direction of Serb political elite and Serbian president Vučić as its leader.

The annual event that Chetnic NGOs organize in Višegrad each year is commemorating the arrest and execution of Draža Mihajlović, the Chetnic leader during the WWII. Višegrad is a town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serb army following the Chetnic ideology have committed several war crimes. One of the most famous atrocities committed in Višegrad was “live fire” when in July of 1992 70 Bosniaks (Muslims) were robed and closed in one house and burned alive. Two officers of Serbian army, Milan Lukić i Sredoje Lukić, were prosecuted and convicted to 27 years in jail.

According to available information at this moment 16 Chetnic organizations are registered on the territory of Bosnian entity Republic of Serbs and are counting around 9000 members (Kešmer, 2021).

The fact that members or leaders of Chetnic organizations involved in organizing annual gathering in Višegrad are not open to talk to media and do not have websites it is difficult to find certain information about them, still in the context of their ideology and activities there are enough sources.

Micro level of radicalisation

One of the organizers of the Chetnic gathering in Višegrad, Dušan Sladojević, claims: “I am a Serb. I love my own and I am ready to die for my own, but I respect what is not my own. Someone wants to kill our national idea, to wash our brain, for me to become a cosmopolitan, a European or something else. I cannot be something that I am not” (BIRN Balkans, 2019).

This statement clearly indicates anti-European and anti-cosmopolitan (citizenship) idea of Dušan Sladojević and the Chetnic movement. If we add to this propagating hatred toward Muslims and anti-Yugoslav sentiment, it is clear that Dušan Sladojević is as a Serb a nationalist, who propagates Serb homogeneity and exclusiveness and that non-Serbs (especially Muslims) are not welcome at Serbian territory.

Another statement of Dušan Sladojević indicates his pride with Serbian past: “*We are proud of our past and we have something to be proud of. We will never forget our roots*” (Srpskacaffe, 2021). His nationalist sentiment can also be seen in his speech at Manjača (Bosnia and Herzegovina) where he states: “*We need to speak Serbian and think Serbian. Let us stand under the flag of Draža Mihajlović and in front of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Then we will be saved.*” (Dopreteslic, 2012).

Another high ranking member of Chetnic movement involved in organizing Višegrad gathering is Duke Slavko Aleksić. He was one of the founders of Chetnic movement in Sarajevo in 1990 and in the same year he became a member of Serbian Radical Party (Serbian radical ethno-nationalistic party led by Vojislav Šešelj from Serbia). Slavko Aleksić was born in Bileća (eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1956 and has spent the war (1992-95) around Sarajevo, leading a group of Chetnicks.

His anti-communist (Yugoslav) sentiment is clear from his speech held in Višegrad on the gathering of Chetnics in 2016: “Draža Mihajlović was captured and sentenced to death by a sect (Yugoslav Partisans), who as a our church official Nikolaj says, takes monkeys as forefathers and not dear God” (Visegrad 365, 2016). Besides Draža Mihajlović, Slavko Aleksić, is referring, also, to Serbian nobles from Medieval Serbia, such as Serbian King Lazar who promoted continuity of Serbia through centuries and awakening of Serbian ethno-nationalistic political thought and presenting the “Turks” as an ancient enemy. Among the Serbian ethno-nationals todays Bosniaks (Muslims) are the heirs of “Turks (Ottomans)”, because they were Serbs who had betrayed their religion and Nation and turned to Islam.

According to interviews with today’s supporters and members of Chetnic movement, they have inherited Chetnic ideology and tradition from their fathers and grandfathers. It is obvious that even though this movement was strictly forbidden in Yugoslavia it was still kept alive in the privacy of their homes.

At this stage it is not possible to find information about the pre-war past of Dušan Sladojević and Slavko Aleksić except the information mentioned above, but it is obvious that their attitude and ethno-nationalistic sentiment did not come over night and that it is something that has been there even before the war.

Meso level of radicalisation

The Chetnic movement organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, involved in organizing and participating in annual gathering in Višegrad are in great deal supported by Serbian Orthodox Church, whose members can be seen on every Chetnic gathering in Višegrad or elsewhere (BN TV, 2019).

During the gathering, the priests of Serbian Orthodox Church have organized a prayer for Draža Mihajlović and by doing so supported the commemoration to the convicted war criminal from WWII. This is also a message for Serbs that they should support the ideas and values of Chetnic movement as the Serb Orthodox Church do.

Aleksandar Topalović, Orthodox priest in Višegrad claimed that he is not allowed to talk to journalist without the Head Priest of Serb Orthodox Church (Hayat Media BiH, 2019). Other than that it was not possible to find any commentary on these events by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Serbian Orthodox Church and its leaders were occasionally accused of supporting war crimes during the war 1992-95. One of the examples is Patriarch Pavle who was on international arrest warrant, but never got to the court, since he died at the age of 95. (GfbV, 2005).

Spreading Chetnic ideology is mostly done on social media, but the iconography and rhetoric can also be seen and heard during certain events, such as different commemorations. Most of the social media sites of Chetnic organizations are closed to outsiders, but still on the ones that are opened Chetnic ideology, values and aims are very visible.

One of the examples is the Facebook page Chetnic Movement from Ravna Gora – Draža Mihajlović (https://www.facebook.com/Ravnogorski-cetnicki-pokret-Dragoljuba-Dra%C5%BEe-Mihailovi%C4%87a-284520178339317/?ref=page_internal).

Most of the content on this page are historical documentary movies and interviews with ethno-nationalist intellectuals who support the Chetnic idea. Similar Facebook page is Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović (<https://www.facebook.com/General-Dragoljub-Draza-Mihajlovic-224568271076811>), where one of the posts from 15th of May 2015 says. *“Kill a Croat, so the Albanians don’t have a brother, kill and slaughter, so the Croat doesn’t exist”*. This is a song sung by Serbian extremists on different occasions and it can take different forms, depending to its dedication: Croats or Muslims. Obviously these Facebook pages and several others are designed to mobilize Serb ethno-nationalist and indoctrinate them in old Chetnic idea.

Another example of using social media for mobilization and radicalization is the Facebook page of Serb radical group that was also presented on Višegrad gatherings “Serbian Honour”. It is a closed group, by in its description it says that it is a group for honouring Serbianhood. Leaders of this group are presenting themselves as humanitarian workers, who help the poor, although their iconography and military appearance says something different (Borger, 2018).

Macro level of radicalisation

These events, such as the gathering in Višegrad, serve as a tool to frighten the returnees (Bosniaks) and in this way, it is also possible to make them to leave their homes. Rhetoric like this is fuel to the fire to already tensional relationships between Bosniaks and Serbs in this area, but also in other parts of Bosnian entity Republic of Serbs.

Several ethno-nationalistic organizations that participate in the Chetnic gathering are well known criminals and have participated as volunteers in Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Russia. Stand point of these organizations is that they cannot achieve any of their aims without a great force. In their case that is Russia.

“We Serbs owe a great debt to Russia. They have saved our country many times. When I saw what the fascists from the West are doing, I could not just sit back and watch it on television. I will stay here until our victory and I do not care if I am locked up when I back home” (Al Jazeera English, 2015). These are the words of a Serb who went to fight to Ukraine as a paramilitary soldier. These factors show connection of certain Russian elements that are connected with radical organizations in Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serb ethno-nationalistic organizations, as well as Serb nationally oriented politicians, consider Russia to be their ancient friend. This feeling is mostly based on different nation building processes in the Balkans and wider in the 19th century and the Russian pan-Slavic movement that Serbia supported even then. That is the sentiment that is very much alive today among Serb ethno-nationalistic organizations and politicians. One of the illustrations for this statement is the recording from a meeting between Russia president Putin and the president of Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik: “Russia is our last hope and we appreciate that you are supporting Republic of Srpska and the Dayton peace Agreement”

(Ruptly, 2014). This indicates Russian political support to Serbian political elites. Since these elites undertook no activity to stop the existence of Chetnik organizations, we can presume that they are unofficially supporting them and that Russia with Vladimir Putin in charge is in favour of Serbian ethno-nationalism.

Ethnic mobilisation through political rhetoric is not something unfamiliar to ethno-nationalist politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Constantly perpetuated story of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina among the ethnic lines is present again and mostly supported by Serb ethno-nationalist Milorad Dodik (The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats), who claims that “*peaceful split of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be best solution*” (RTRS, 2021).

One of the participants on gathering has said: “We are fighting with our politicians not to let them take our lands, politicians like Dodik, and we are hoping that someone will defend us” (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2016). This clearly indicates the support of Chetnics to the politics of Milorad Dodik.

At this point it is important to mention that Bosnia and Herzegovina has never been able to legally pronounce any extremist organization to be fascist or similar, because there is no political agreement about it. For example, as already mentioned, the Chetnic legacy is among Serbian ethno-nationalistic politicians very important and they would not allow for Chetnic organization to be pronounced fascistic. In this case their work would be forbidden.

Facilitating factors

In this part of the report, we will discuss several facilitating factors that represent certain elements in political and socio-cultural environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina that contributed to executing terrorist and extremist acts from the hotspots 1 and 2. We will discuss facilitating factors for Islamic terrorism and supporting and forming ethno-nationalistic organizations by certain elements in Bosnian society.

Hotspot 1: Mevlid Jašarević – Attack on United States Embassy in Sarajevo

First facilitating factor that we will discuss is the existing leadership and group value systems of terrorist such as Mevlid Jašarević. Mevlid Jašarević is a part of Salafi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has spent several years in Salafi community Gornja Maoča, which, as previously said, has the most numbers of departures to Syrian war from anyone local community.

Existence of such a group or movement creates opportunity of socializing young people into radical and extremist milieu and provides them with necessary knowledge and equipment to commit violent acts and spread the values and ideas that this group or movement supports. It also creates the opportunity to recruit new members into the movement and by doing so, to ensure the long term existence of the idea and movement.

The unofficial leader of Gornja Maoča community was Nusret Imamović who is on the list of the most wanted terrorist in the world (US Department of State, Executive order 13224). He is on that list because he was active in radicalizing youth and organizing their departures to Syrian war. In one of his media appearances Nusret Imamović was discussing and justifying

suicide bombing: "We do not consider this type of fighting to be forbidden, but we also do not think that it should be used as a classic conventional weapon, but only in exceptional occasions and situations" (Halimović, 2010).

The existence of community leadership indicates that Salafi movement is not purely religious community, but also an organized group with potentially, if it is necessary, to organize themselves to commit violent and extremist acts.

It is important to say that it is not unusual to see ISIL flags in Gornja Maoča, which indicates supporting ISIL ideology among members of this community.

Another facilitating factor is the easy access to different kind of weapons that remained in possession of Bosnians since the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95). Although there were several efforts to collect those weapons, there are still lots of different kinds of weapons remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the UNDP report 34% of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina own a weapon. This means that almost every third person in Bosnia owns some kind of weapon (Hadžović, Kržalić&Mihajlović, 2010).

Weapons that were made in Yugoslavia have been used in several terrorist attacks in Europe. Such as the attack on Charlie Hebdo „Paris attack" in 2015 and the attack on the concert hall Bataclan (Deutsche Welle, ,2020). All the weapons used in the above mentioned attacks were made in Yugoslavian weapons factory "Zastava". This clearly indicates the possibility that these weapons are easily accessed by terrorist also in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Third, but not less important facilitating factor is the weak control of internet and social networks as means of communication among terrorist. Other than using it for communication among each other, they use it as a tool for sending a message to the world. In the morning of the day he executed the attack, Mevlid Jašarević has recorded his last will, where he explained why he is committing the attack. He gave the CD to his friend who was supposed to publish it on the internet after he gets killed by police or Embassy security.

Hotspot 2: Annual meeting of Chetnic movement in Višegrad

Ethnically divided country and nationalistic rhetoric of political elite are one of the facilitating factors for the formation and existence of organizations such as different organizations with Chetnic ideology. Both factors contribute to the social distance among different ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and making it hard for creating positive peace even 25 years after the war. Puhalo (2013) argues that on the collective level there is stereotypical perception of own and other ethnicities and that there is still restraint towards establishing close relationships amongst ethnic groups. He argues that the causes should be looked for in nationalism and state regulations of Bosnia and Herzegovina that regulated collective rights and obligations and not individual rights and obligations (2013).

Ethno-nationalistic ideology of important political factors in Republic of Srpska contributes to forming such organizations. Milorad Dodik, member of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has officially defended the members of ethno-nationalistic organization "Serbian Honour" as he was accused of forming paramilitary organization.

“There is no information about the illegal activities of that organization, and everyone who says something negative about them has no proof or support that it is a paramilitary. There are no paramilitary formations in Republika Srpska, this story serves the daily political needs of disqualifying the celebration of Republic Day and putting a stain on that day” (Novosti, 2018).

Another facilitating factor for radicalization and forming and existence of ethno-nationalistic organizations is complex political composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state made of two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska), 10 cantons and Brčko District.

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity has the Bosniak and Croat majority with both ethnicities living in mostly ethnically homogeneous territories and Serbs have the majority in Republic of Srpska. Brčko District has almost equal number of Bosniaks and Serbs and only a small number of Croats.

Most of the important decisions have to be made by consensus of both entities, which makes it very difficult for the state to function since both entities have the right of veto and can stop any decision making at any time. This makes it also difficult to make laws that would eventually stop events and organization like Chetnic movement to exist.

The fact that 16 of NGOs supporting Chetnic ideology are officially registered in Republic of Srpska and that Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have laws that forbid forming and functioning of such organizations, gives us the right to conclude that this ideological concept is supported by Serb authorities and that they stand behind it.

Conclusions

While describing the two hotspots we can conclude that trends of radicalization in Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on Islamic or ethno-nationalistic grounds. Mevlid Jašarević mentioned in the hotspot 1 was coming from a poor family and from divorced parents, from a father with whom he did not have contact and a mother who worked hard and long hours and could not give him proper guidance. Salafi community was a community he felt he belonged to and by involving himself into this community, he felt he could help marginalized Muslim brothers and sisters in their fight against the “west”.

Radical Islamic movement is not something that is made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is a Pan-Islamic movement that aims to unite Muslims in one state under the Sheria law, so all Muslims would be able to practice “real Islam”.

In the case of Mevlid Jašarević this ideological construct was more than clear. As he said in his final note recorded the same day that he executed the attack, he presumed it is understood why he is attacking the Americans (American Embassy). In his opinion they are the ones who are leading the war against Muslims. These are the same messages that we could also hear from ISIS fighter in videos that they have made and their leaders.

Second hotspot introduces in ethno-nationalistic radicalism also present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More concretely it discusses an annual gathering of Chetnic movement in Višegrad. This report offered a short historical background of this movement because the meaning of the Chetnic gathering would not be understandable without it. In the context of ethno-nationalism this annual gathering is the clear paradigm of ethno-nationalistic political discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its ideological concept, value system and relation to other nationalities and religions.

We can see some similarities, but also differences between two concepts of radicalism and extremism presented in the two hotspots. Islamic radicalism is a global phenomenon that is active in most of countries that are perceived as an enemy by Islamic radicals, while Serb ethno-nationalistic Chetnic movement is focused on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia with the exception of going to Ukraine to “help Russian” brothers there, what is similar is the process of group homogenization under same values, ideology and culture of violence.

Political influence in the case of hotspot 2 is also visible. The leading politicians from Republic of Srpska do not condemning the gathering of Chetnics and allowing their official registration in Republic of Srpska as NGOs, what sends a clear message that these organizations are welcomed there. Other than that, their connection with Serbia represents that this is as well as not a Bosnian product, but that it is also imported. This, again, illustrates political influence of Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

Hotspot 1: Mevlid Jašarević – Attack on United States Embassy in Sarajevo

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	2
Comments to Q1	Main motive of Mevlid Jašarević to attack the U.S. Embassy is to send message to the "West" to stop the war against Muslims.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	4
Comments to Q2	Mevlid Jašarević believes in the existence of war against Muslims and that all Muslims should live in one State in order to implement their own laws.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	Mevlid Jašarević main motive was freedom for all Muslims and stopping the crimes against Muslims.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	Mevlid Jašarević believes that injustice has been done to the Muslims on different levels. The non-Muslims do not accept the ways of Muslims and that is way Muslims need to fight for better position in society.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	4
Comments to Q5	The general position of Muslims in the world is not satisfying for Mevlid Jašarević. He believes that Muslims are marginalized and that the "west" does not allow Muslims their rights.

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	4
Comments to Q1	Mevlid Jašarević feels that Muslims are under in danger and under attack by U.S.

	and Europe. He believes that the "west" wants wipe Muslims out or completely marginalize them. He feels it his duty to help Muslims in their fight.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	4
Comments to Q2	Mevlid Jašarević grievances come from marginalizing Muslims for a longer period of time. It is mostly based on the tretment of Muslims by the "west".
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	4
Comments to Q3	Mevlid Jašarević, according to the information obtained, never experienced marginalization because of his religious believes., but as a Muslim he feels the obligation to help Muslims who did.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	1
Comments to Q4	Mevlid Jašarević has during the attack clearly addressed the United States to stop the war against Muslims, so he has defined the United States as an enemy.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	4
Comments to Q5	Sense of grievance is based on prejudice that all the west is against the Muslims and generally that there is a war against Islam.

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	2
Comments to Q1	Generally Salafi community, because of their way of practicing Islam and their looks not specific to Bosnia, is not accepted. Their radical views of Islam are also not accepted by majority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	2
Comments to Q2	Since Salafi community practices somewhat different form of Islam and want to live by the Sheria law usually they live in smaller communities and rarely communicate with others.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	2

Comments to Q3	Mevlid Jašarević was forced most his life to take care of him self since his mother was working and his father has left them. Even after committing the terrorist act, the Salafi community abandoned him. They have never visited him in jail or had any kind of communication with him.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	Mevlid Jašarević alienation process started when he joined the Salafi community. He lived by their values and did not have much communication with others.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	2
Comments to Q5	According to his testimony in jail he has left the radical ideology and wishes to lead normal life.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	3
Comments to Q1	Mevlid Jašarević is a member of Salafi community, but according to him he was doing it to help Muslims that are marginalized and attacked by the west, not only his group.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	2
Comments to Q2	He still feels that he is part of the Salafi community, but it seems that the community has rejected him since, according to his lawyer his community did not have any contact with him since he is in jail.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	4
Comments to Q3	Mevlid Jašarević supports all Muslims living in one state under the Sheria law, so he can not accept laws of this country and its institutions.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	3

Comments to Q4	Mevlid Jašarević did not speak so much about politics or political parties. His main concern is Islam and its marginalization.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	Salafi community does not vote or has any kind of political involvement.

Hotspot 2: Annual meeting of Chetnic movement in Višegrad

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	2
Comments to Q1	Chetnic supporters believe that Serbs were marginalized for centuries and that parts of their home land has been taken away from them.
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	4
Comments to Q2	Chetnic supporters believe that they deserve their ethnically homogeneous land and together with others they can not have it.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	4
Comments to Q3	Chetnic supporters believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the Serbian lands that has been taken away from them. That is what they base their separatist claim on.
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	Chetnic supporters organize events, such as annual gathering in Višegrad, as a tool for fighting for their cause.
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	2
Comments to Q5	Chetnic supporters are represented in ethno-nationalistic political parties such as The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats.

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	4
Comments to Q1	Chetnic supporters believe that Muslims, Croats and others have slaughtered them during the WWII and that parts of their homeland has been taken away from them.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	3
Comments to Q2	Their grievance is mostly based on the injustice of taking their lands from them and not being able to find the grave of their leader Draža Mihajlović as a symbol of their fight.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	4
Comments to Q3	Chetnic grievence is mostly directed toward Bosniaks and Croats generally. Communist and Americans also.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	2
Comments to Q4	They are addressing their demands to their politicians. Mostly, ethno-nationalistic political parties.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	4
Comments to Q5	Their requests cannot be enforced, because that would mean for other in Bosnia and Herzegovina to leave the country which is impossible.

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q1	Chetnic movement believes that Serbs should not live with the others and wish to live in an ethnically homogeneous society. Since that is not possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina they feel alienated from their "brothers in Serbia."
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	5
Comments to Q2	Chetnics do not wish to feel alienated, but since they feel that Bosnia and Herzegovina was forced up on them by different political

	processes they do not have a sense of belonging to it.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q3	Chetnics feel alienated because of the feeling that their political leadership has not fulfilled their goals, but still, they are hope they will in the future.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q4	Chetnics alienation is the process of a long term indoctrination by political elite and by myths promoted by media and their forefathers.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q5	Chetnics do not show any sign of wanting to de-radicalize at this stage.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	The Chetnics organizations involved in the gathering in Višegrad are deeply involved in radicalization and believe that they will bring the change to the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	1
Comments to Q2	Chetnics movement organizations are homogeneous with clear goals and values.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	3
Comments to Q3	Chetnics do not perceive State institutions as something important, but they support entity of Republic of Srpska as important. Other than that they consider the Serbian Orthodox Church as one of the most important issues.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	5
Comments to Q4	In the political sense Chetnics support ethno-nationalistic political parties and

	would not vote for someone who is of other nation or religion.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	5
Comments to Q5	Chetnics have their political representatives. Currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina they support The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and in Serbia is the Serb Radical Party.