



Cultural Drivers of Radicalisation

Hungary/D5.1

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List of Abbreviations

FIDESZ: Fiatal Demokraták Szövetség (Alliance of Young Democrats)

GVH: Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (Hungarian Economic Competition Office)

KESMA: Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány (Central European Press and Media Foundation)

MTI: Magyar Távirati Iroda (National News Agency)

MTVA: Médiaszolgáltatás-támogató és Vagyonkezelő Alap (Media Services and Support Trust Fund)

NMHH: Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (National Media and Telecommunications Authority)

RSF: Reporters Without Borders

SZFE: Színház- és Filmművészeti Egyetem (University of Theatre and Film Arts)

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This report examines the media scene in Hungary and how it serves as a tool of radicalisation. It traces mediatisation of certain events that we call first migration related and second cultural legacies related radicalisation and follows the depiction of these issues both in legacy and social media. We interpret such two mechanisms as resonators of micro events to reach macro audiences. In the first instance, the issue relates to what appears as a racially incited attack by a tv camerawoman against an irregular migrant that happens to cross the Hungarian-Serbian border and enter Hungary. In the second instance, we review the general cultural scene in Hungary in order to depict more specifically how certain legacies are circulated and presented for general public consumption. In this instance, we depart from the politicisation of theatre and its consideration as a particular reflection of Hungarian national culture. We delineate more general cultural memes that replicate existing historical legacies in order to maintain theatre in particular and culture in general as pinnacles of keeping historical grievances alive and polarising the society along the themes that continue to serve as a currency of radicalisation. The conclusion wraps up our discussion as to why culture as a topic of research relates to understand the relationship between I-GAP spectrum as an instrument of radicalisation.

1. Introduction

Media is an instrument for injustice claims both for their depiction and manipulation. Considering its extensive outreach and malleability, media can serve as a tool to unleash grievance and ultimately feelings of alienation from those depicted as the Other. Both mundane events as well as the evolution of cultural legacies that face recent events could trigger polarisation. Moving on from what we evaluate as the conceptualisation of the I-GAP (Injustice, Grievance, Alienation, and Polarisation) spectrum in the D.Rad project, in this report we look at how media turned into an instrument of radicalisation in Hungary. Henceforth, this report looks at the unfolding of two media events. Our first case relates to an instance whereby a Hungarian camerawoman was filmed kicking and tripping an irregular migrant family as they crossed the Hungarian-Serbian border in 2015. We initially follow the events in the immediate aftermath of the release and the circulation of this footage, and then we look at how her actions later turned into a criminal court case. What is crucial for our purposes is the polarisation around the action of this camerawoman as a mediated event, and the reactions that her trial and, ultimately, her acquittal have generated in Hungary. We trace the mediated depiction of the event by online sources and polarisation over her action becoming an instrument of radicalisation. We take this event as an example of how a camerawoman's reaction to a border incursion - perhaps merely as reflex - has stimulated polarisation and grievance as way of radicalisation in Hungary. We call the first case *migration-related-radicalisation* (MRR). Our second case reflects on a more historical legacies focused elaboration of radicalisation following the continuous eminence of a historical novelist Albert Wass, and how political and cultural figures exploited his eminence including on the occasion of a recent theatre play staged by a theatre director. This case study follows Hungarian cultural politics and the way they can trigger polarisation particularly between the liberal and conservative media. In our report, we will follow Albert Wass's legacy as an instrument of *cultural legacies related radicalisation* (CLRR).

To elaborate on both MRR and CLRR, the report looks at a plethora of empirical resources. For the former case study, we are studying three YouTube videos, user comments associated with these videos, and ten online news stories including from liberal and conservative media outlets to see how the camerawoman's trial and the eventual verdict have generated polarisation across media outlets. This covers a period of three years from 2015 when the footage was released until her acquittal in 2018. For the latter, we turn to legacy media sources. We are particularly interested in Albert Wass – a historical Hungarian novelist – and how his novels and legacy turned into an instrument of presenting a conservative interpretation of Hungary's past as a mirror for its future. In this respect, a particular theatre play, its staging, and the media reactions that it has received in the aftermath showed the polarisation potential of cultural events. What is important for radicalisation research is how Hungarian radical movements including the extreme right since 1990s have turned to novelist such as Albert Wass and his representations of historical and traditional Hungary to

frame how they envision the present-day Hungary. We emphasise the elements of irredentism and revisionism in the way the radical movements use historical cultural works such as those from Albert Wass. The time period for this analysis covers the last ten years.

We first present the methodology used in this report. We will then reflect on the media landscape and cultural and political context of radicalisation in Hungary. In this regard, we also note that freedom of press and media independence have been systematically dismantled by Fidesz party since 2010. The current status quo in media representation and ownerships suggest that there is a government media empire, which serves to scatter propaganda. We discuss the contemporary media ecology in Hungary in the first part of the report. In the next part, we explore the political context of radicalisation with an emphasis on the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. We identify the governing Fidesz party as a stakeholder in radicalisation through migration related scaremongering on the media. We continue to explore the cultural polarisation of the country by looking at Hungarian theatre and the role that Attila Vidnyánszky, the current director-general of the Hungarian National Theatre, played to install government's control over cultural life in Hungary.

In the second part of our discussion, we explore both MRR and CLRR through the lens of tradition and nationalism reflected by social media and video sharing platforms. We identify MRR in the case of Petra László, a camerawoman, appearing in a footage gone viral in 2015. We will demonstrate how this controversial video led to polarisation in the country. In relation to CLRR, we introduce Albert Wass the novelist as one of the main symbols of right-wing political views in Hungary. To shed light on the resonance of his works, we discuss a YouTube video, a theatre-play and a social media post by Viktor Orbán. We look into the comment sections in social media to identify the drivers of radicalisation and polarisation in Hungary and to identify the underlying social, historical and political issues. The conclusion reflects on the findings.

2. Methodology

The report studies the audience-making potential of events, cultural outputs and their visualisation, and to this extent proposes two methods. The first follows rhetorical analysis as a tool to study digital media while the second one relies on the circulation and consumption of cultural signifiers in the public sphere. We delineated how these signifiers became embedded in either user comments, speeches, or cultural outputs namely a theatre play. Both methods assist us to understand how either recent events, such as external migration or reinterpretation of historical legacies anew to respond to current events can be polarising. Henceforth, we propose migration-related-radicalisation (MRR) and cultural-legacies-related-radicalisation (CLRR) as two case studies.

For the MRR case, our method is inductive and interpretivist. We first selected a micro event that later gained macro-political connotations thanks to the way the media presented it in a polarising manner. We approached this event inductively, contextualised it, and interpreted how it evolved into a means of polarisation based on where the viewer situates themselves as either pro- or con- the camerawoman's action. For the CLRR case, however, we adopted a more deductive and exploratory method to interpret the salience of historical legacies and their continuous polarising and grievance-resonating potential at the face of more recent events. We note as crucial particularly the currency of the Trianon Treaty that remains as a historical legacy for radicalisation with a justice-injustice scope. This treaty was signed in 1920 at the end of W.W.1st and implied significant territorial losses for Hungary.

Beyond the representation of either migration or cultural legacies by media and cultural outputs, we also note their circulation and consumption. That is why we propose the role of media in these two cases as a mechanism for harnessing grievance and coalesce the folk alienated from liberal/European/progressive causes around common causes and polarise them further from their actual and virtual foes. To this extent, YouTube videos and comments provide us with content and the empirical material for research. In order to study MRR, we used two videos and selected three viewer comments out of several hundred. For CLRR, we used one video and used one comment once again out of a several hundred comments.

We also note the difficulty of using media and the representation of cultural themes as outputs in contexts where media freedom is curtailed. In the Hungarian printed media, it is not possible to trace a discussion on migration that provides alternative opinions (Korkut 2020). There is a distinct domination of the cultural scene by conservative right thanks to government funding and its particular aims. Twitter use is very limited, and YouTube appears as a main outlet for visual outputs. Considering the absence of an open discussion on migration, even the YouTube comments singlehandedly present migrants with a security-focused glance. Methodologically what is interesting here is how government-led radicalisation in the country (Gyollai 2021) can also affect the way the themes of injustice-grievance-alienation feature in social media - otherwise a free-space of discussion. Polarisation within reactions towards micro-events such as the tripping of a migrant family (MRR) and the role that a theatre director has gained to occupy in the Hungarian cultural scene emerges (CLRR) but does not retain its salience while social media becomes yet another mechanism to resonate the government discourse. This is rather manifest in user comments. We note the mitigation of the role that social media plays and the need to approach micro and macro-issues related to radicalisation both inductively and deductively to tackle media, visual and cultural outputs as instruments of radicalisation.

3. Media landscape in the context of radicalisation in Hungary




Figure 1 - 'Multiplicity' of the Hungarian media

3.1 Media ecology in Hungary

Media representation in Hungary has become one-sided since 2010, when currently governing FIDESZ-KDNP party gained power in the national election reaching a two-thirds majority in the Parliament. More than 20 years after the transition to democracy, Hungary faces another censorship-dominated and government-led media representation. Conservative and nationalist voices have earned a near-hegemony in the print press and the broadcast media, whereas liberal or opposition views have been largely marginalised. By mid-2010s, the Fidesz party alliance had transformed most outlets into tools of pro-government propaganda, including a large-scale anti-immigration campaign in 2016. Overtly pro-government outlets currently include fourteen public service broadcasters, a nationwide commercial television channel (TV2), a cable news channel (Echo TV), several local and networked radio stations (Karc FM, Radio 1), quality dailies (Magyar Idők, Magyar Hírlap), a tabloid outlet (Riposzt), most of the regional dailies, several weekly magazines (Demokrata, Figyelő, Lokál) and a number of online news sites (Origo.hu, 888.hu, Ripost.hu). With the purchase of the local newspapers, it is estimated that some 90% of all media in Hungary is now directly or indirectly controlled by the Fidesz. As Figure 1 demonstrates, pro-government local newspapers follow the same heading. Most local commercial radio stations re-broadcast the news of the Hungarian Wireless Agency, while opposition owned radio and TV stations, as well as newspapers remained under

attack by the government. This shows how the Fidesz government bought its way to the voters' screens since 2010.

Following the Reporters Without Borders' (RSF) annual reports on Hungary, it is clear that the freedom of press in the country has declined. The pro-government media foundation, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (abbreviated as KESMA in Hungarian) dominates the media landscape, and market distortion of state advertising to media is still going on. Meanwhile, the RSF reported that "access to information is more and more difficult for independent journalists. They are banned from questioning politicians freely in the Parliament or from attending political events. Government politicians do not give interviews to government-critical media outlets. Press departments of public institutions typically do not reply to questions of the independent media" (RSF, 2015).

Given the background of media ecology in Hungary, the question arises what the government uses mass communication channels for. As an example, when migration became a hot topic in 2015 in the country, the government spent 14 billion Hungarian Forints (ca. 33 million Pound Sterling) on anti-migrant campaigns in the period of 2015-2016, preceding the 2016 referendum against the European Union's migrant relocation plans. During the media campaign, pro-government TV and radio stations were flooded with xenophobic incitement. Despite the millions spent on campaigns, the referendum was invalid due to the lack of participation.

Up until 2018, pro-government media was owned by individuals. However, in 2018, these individuals decided to gift their companies to KESMA foundation, which now consist of over 500 of Hungary's media outlets with an estimated asset value of 88 billion euros. The Hungarian Economic Competition Office (GVH) did not raise its voice against the giant conglomerate, as the Fidesz classified the transaction as an issue of national economic importance.

3.2 Political control of the public media

National public television (MTV) and radio have a historical legacy in Hungary. Up until the regime change in 1989, the public television was the main broadcaster of news and television was the only narrative that reached the public. Similar to the national radio station, public broadcast was exploited by the government. During the Soviet regime, opposition political views and activists had no chance to raise their voice in television or radio.

The Media Act of 2010, which enabled the overarching acquisition of 90 per cent of the media by Fidesz, became nationally and internationally controversial, when the institutional structure of public media was altered by the newly-formed Fidesz government. The laws also established a new public media fund, the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA), which was assigned all assets of the

public media companies. The MTVA receives the Government's annual funding for public media, which is managed by the Media Council.¹

The media landscape before the regime change regarding the public media of the nation resembles the current media landscape. Opposition party leaders or politicians are not welcome on air; the narrative of public media channels became extremely one-sided since 2010. The political interpretation of news is always in resemblance with the Fidesz party narratives and nominally 'impartial' public media is used for political propaganda. Similar to the KESMA, public media channels (M1, M2, M2 Petofi TV M3, M4 Sport, M5) are under the flag of Danube Media Service Private Limited Non-Profit Company. While Danube Media Service LLC. is responsible for public media, MTVA (Media Services and Support Trust Fund), owned by the Hungarian state through the NMHH (National Media and Telecommunications Authority), oversees the operation of the Danube Media Service. MTVA, with its pro-government management having more than 2,000 employees (in comparison with the 200 of Danube Media Service). As a private body, it has no transparency obligations. While the Media Council, as part of the NMHH, bears the responsibility to maintain democracy, balance and pluralism in the media, its president is appointed by the Prime Minister. She also serves as the chairperson of the Media Council at the time of writing. This means that two "nominally" independent regulatory bodies have the same chair appointed by the Prime Minister. In the confusing web of several companies, public and private bodies, the real issue affecting the Hungarian media is its being under government control while its objective should be to deliver politically impartial news to inform the public.

Since pluralism lacks in the media and particularly in the public broadcast media, it has become common for Hungarian opposition parties and politicians seek ways to reach the public through social media. Hungary has 7.1 million Facebook users, which is more than 75 per cent of the population (Statista, 2021). The spread of political content on social media might impair the Fidesz's control over the meta-narratives that the general public uses to interpret political and social events and developments. As a response from the government, Judit Varga, the Minister of Justice announced that the Ministry of Justice will draft a legislation to regulate Facebook and other big tech companies in Hungary on the basis of freedom of speech violations. This is not the first time the Fidesz has attempted to regulate the Internet narratives. In 2020, Hungarian government adopted regulatory framework on video-sharing platforms, incorporated Directive (EU) 2018/1808 amending Directive 2010/13/EU (Audio-visual Media Services Directive) into domestic law. While the main feature of the new legislation is user-protection, it also enabled NMMH to oversee video-sharing platforms and regulate providers in order to impose strict sanctions. According to the new provisions of regulating big tech companies, Facebook could only suspend accounts with well-established reason and Hungarian authorities would have the right to review suspension of social media accounts. In case the government succeeds with

¹ Act 82/2010, Section 22 and 40; Articles 108 and 136 of the Media Act further specify the Media Council's role in managing MTVA.

its plans to regulate Facebook, opposition voices could potentially be silenced in social media.

While public media has never been fully politically impartial, between the 1989 and 2010, it was a place for the making of political discourse and display of multiple narratives. However, since 2010, public media in Hungary became extremely one-sided, with a flood of tangled, not transparent background agencies, where opposition political narratives are banned and the Fidesz has maintained total control over the news content. Therefore, it can be established that Hungarian public media in its current form has lost its 'public' nature and became a tool to serve the political tools of the governing party.

4. Cultural and political context of radicalisation

4.1 Political context of radicalization

Over the course of the last 11 years, the Fidesz government turned Hungary into an ethno-nationalist, grievance-based and most importantly, politically polarised society. Orbán's neo-conservative the Fidesz have made significant electoral gains by skilfully combining a cocktail of chauvinistic sentiment (anti-gay, anti-women, anti-minorities, anti-Semitic, xenophobic and, above-all, anti-communist), militarism and Euroscepticism (Dale and Fabry, 2018). The political narrative of the Hungarian government has been monotonous, normalising xenophobia and rejecting all sorts of "foreignness" over the last decade (Korkut 2014). We believe that this political narrative contributed to the growing far-right radicalization in the country, which had its own roots in Hungarian historical legacies and was amplified during the so called 'refugee-crisis'. That is why we propose MRR and CLRR as two streams of radicalisation at times interrelated with each other.

The anti-refugee, anti-migration and xenophobic incitement derives from the fear of the "other" in the Hungarian society that also builds on historical reactions to foreignness in the Hungarian public philosophy (Korkut 2014). Exploiting historical grievances became a huge part of the Fidesz's campaign strategy during the 2016 referendum on EU's migrant relocation plan as well. The 'othering' amplified during the refugee crisis by pro-government media played on voters' fears and manipulated the public opinion to support a pro-government position on external migration. The Fidesz skilfully presented migration as a 'zero sum game', in which migrants' expenses 'would be paid by the Hungarian taxpayers'. As part of the government's anti-migration, nationalist propaganda slogans such as "If you come to Hungary, you must not take Hungarian jobs", "Did you know that Brussels wants to settle a city's worth of illegal immigrants in Hungary?" and "Did you know that since the beginning of the immigration crisis the harassment of women has risen sharply in Europe?" have been widely circulated (Gall, 2016). Furthermore, the government encouraged the voters to refuse the EU's binding relocation quota, which would have required Hungary to take

in 1,294 asylum seekers. The tax-payer-funded campaign cost around 20 million Pound Sterling and contained the distribution of an 18-page booklet to millions of households. This booklet was filled with disinformation about the EU migrant relocation plans, migration trends, also crime statistics and xenophobic incitement. The booklet linked migration to increased terrorism and referred to non-existent “no-go” areas in European cities with large migrant populations, including London, Paris, and Berlin, where authorities had allegedly lost control and where law and order is absent (Gall, 2016). Eventually, the referendum was both invalid and ineffective, as the participation was below 50 per cent.² It must be mentioned that only 44 per cent of the voters voted, in a ratio of 98-2 per cent, which means that the majority of voters decided to align with the the Fidesz and refused the EU’s migrant relocation quota plans. We treat the government narratives during the ‘refugee crisis’ to set the basis of what we develop as the migration related radicalization or MRR that we introduced in our introduction.

The othering against migrants certainly had some historical references, which we covered in earlier D.Rad 3.1 Hungary country report entitled Stakeholders of (De-)Radicalisation (Gyollai 2021) as well as the RESPOND *Border Management and Migration Control in Hungary* (Gyollai and Korkut 2019) and *Conflicting conceptualisations of Europeanisation - Hungary* reports (Korkut 2020). These reports both noted the role that the Fidesz government continues to play first in securitising the migration discourse and second the role that it has assumed it radicalising the society over the issue of the assumed increasing numbers of external migrants. Korkut (2020) noted the significant dominance of the government narratives in Hungarian national printed media and how these narratives even affected the tone of debate in what is otherwise opposition media with a left-liberal scope. These reports presented the scale of scaremongering around migration an issue causing grievance. Moreover, a close inspection of media discourse during the time when migration was a hot topic in Hungary between 2015-2019 shows that the independent media could not produce an alternative voice to government propaganda (Korkut 2020). Our report, however, goes beyond the printed media and shows that even digital media is dominated by a conservative right tone of debate in terms of how justice and grievance are elaborated as reactionary themes.

4.2 Cultural context of radicalisation

Theatre, literature, and poetry always played huge role in Hungary. The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-49 was started by young artists namely Petőfi, Jókai, Bulyovszky, Sebő, Ernő Gaál and Dániel Hamary. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was similarly started by a protest, when Peter Veres, the head of the Writers’ Union, read out a manifesto on the streets of Budapest. There are numerous historical examples of how artists protested against oppression in Hungary.

² The Fundamental Law of Hungary (Article) 8(4).

Theatre has also served as a means of dissidence with alternative theatre companies such as Kréta Kör as well as theatre directors namely Robert Alföldi and Árpád Schilling among others veering away from the national canon of Hungarian theatre and offering alternative and critical interpretations of Hungarian past at stage. According to theatre historian Andrea Tompa, from the end of the turn of the century, Hungarian theatre attracted and sustained until recently an amazingly solid audience, that is, in a country of 10 million people, 4.6 million theatre tickets were sold each year (Tompa, 2015). According to contemporary statistics, in 2019, 37 percent of Hungarians stated that they visited the theatre more than five times a year, whereas another 23 percent of respondents went to the theatre two to three times yearly.

Given the important role that theatre plays for Hungarian society as a form of entertainment, one of the initial aims of the neo-conservative government of Orbán was to take control of the theatre in Hungary. In 2019, the Fidesz government established the National Cultural Council (Nemzeti Kulturális Tanács) with the goal of “setting priorities and directions to be followed in Hungarian culture”, including theatre. The bill contains that “it is a fundamental requirement for activities belonging under the auspices of this law to actively defend the interests of the nation’s wellbeing”.³ The whole Hungarian artistic society expressed their protest against the establishment of the Council, as it curtails artistic freedom in an unacceptable way.

The next victim of the Fidesz was the Hungarian University of Theatre and Film (‘Színház és Filmművészeti Egyetem’ or ‘SZFE’). During the coronavirus pandemic, the Fidesz controlled Parliament, voted to pass a law that enabled the government to rule by decree during the global health emergency. Among other legislations that had no relation to protecting the country from a pandemic (such as changing of the Constitution and the election law), the Fidesz majority also passed a legislation through the Parliament in the summer of 2020, which transfers the ownership of public universities to private foundations. By the time of this report, fifteen Hungarian universities were transformed into the new system (‘modellváltás’), including the Hungarian University of Theatre and Film (SZFE).

It appears that assigning public assets to private conservatory bodies, such as the public media broadcast, is a common operation for Fidesz, and the universities alongside the state-owned castles, ports, parks, land, clinics and shares are also being re-organised into foundation ownerships. However, the fact that the independent SZFE became part of the Fidesz ‘university conglomerate’ further polarised the public. The students of the institution occupied the campus for months and campaigned for a free SZFE. The teaching staff of the university started an industrial action, which was found rightful by the Supreme Court of Hungary. Sympathisers held several demonstrations in front of the campus. Even though neither the industrial action nor the occupation of the campus led to a change in government’s plans, the Free-SZFE movement achieved a ‘degree solving’ solution, in which programme students of the university were offered to finish their studies in five different European Universities

³ 2019. évi CXXIV. Törvény.

without losing their credits. The Free-SZFE movement became viral last year, when actors and actresses around the globe expressed their solidarity with the movement, including Sir Ian McKellen, Eva Green, Cuba Gooding Jr. and Cate Blanchett. As an example of the polarising nature of the model change, in February 2021, a girl wearing a face mask with the Free-SZFE label was attacked on a public bus in Budapest. The offender cut her face with a knife and was later prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm.

Even though the government promised that the change of ownership would not necessarily mean that universities would lose their autonomy, to the new board of trustees of the SZFE, five pro-government officials were appointed with Attila Vidnyánszky becoming the new head of the board. As a subsequent protest, the university's entire senate as well as most of the administration staff and faculty members have resigned.

We want to underline Attila Vidnyánszky as currently the most iconic cultural figure in Hungarian theatre, occupying further a myriad of roles in Hungarian cultural establishment.⁴ Vidnyánszky took over the leadership of theatre education at the University of Kaposvár in 2012 with a strong political backing, and already attempted to build a kind of counter-institution against the University of Theatre and Film Arts in Budapest. He became a polarising figure of Hungarian cultural life, starting with his appointment to be the new director general of the Hungarian National Theatre in 2012. This came after the removal of its previous progressive director, Róbert Alföldi, after he received criticisms for his particular approach to theatre-making and his campaign for the acceptance of 'otherness' on stage at the Hungarian National Theatre. His critics stated that his campaign towards diversity and equality on stage and to bolster the acceptance of differences and fight against the exclusion of minorities should have found stage not at the Hungarian National Theatre but instead at a theatre of smaller scale. They also attacked Alföldi stating that his campaign did not suit the Hungarian National Theatre, which has a mission to protect Hungarian national values and traditions. Under Vidnyánszky's management, however, nationalist and traditional plays are staged at the National Theatre even if this led to ticket sales plummeting and decreasing by half.

Theatre, as well as other performative arts, are expected to represent and to create room for the people to have their voices heard (Asavei & Kocian, 2020). In case this voice is censored by the political regime, or the new generation of artists are grown under oppression, there will be a tension between culture and politics. This tension contributes to the polarisation process in Hungary that leads to radicalisation. In this

⁴ Current positions of Attila Vidnyanszky:

- Chief director of the Hungarian Dramatic Theater of Transcarpathia County,
- Chairman of the Human Resources Decision-Making Board, the Theater Arts Committee, and the Hungarian Theater Society, which protects the professional interests of theater,
- Deputy Rector for Arts of the Rippl-Rónai Faculty of Arts, University of Kaposvár,
- artistic director of the Imre Madách International Theater Meeting,
- Director General of the National Theater,
- Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation Maintaining the University of Theater and Film Arts (SZFE).

context, the way the government encompasses culture in Hungary is an important part of our report to identify the cultural and mediated radicalization process currently occurring in the country. We argue that the way the media and the cultural outputs were controlled by the government paves the way towards a representation, circulation, and consumption of justice/injustice claims single-handedly and manipulates the public opinion to cause grievance amongst them against particular population groups. While the government's overarching control of the media landscape could be generally a polarising factor in the eyes of the public, we also establish that the public opinion was manipulated during the so-called refugee crisis mainly due to its one-sided representation by the public broadcast media and the Fidesz owned newspapers. Furthermore, our report also points at the historical roots of justice/injustice claims in Hungary as the wider society faced the Other and their competing claims against Hungarian national myths. We trace cultural legacies entrenched in such interpretations and show that they could as well trigger radicalisation considering their grievance manipulation potential.

5. An analysis of the representation, circulation and consumption of the media object

5.1 Representation



Figure 2 - YouTube videos depicting Petra László in Röszke, 2015 (3 different videos in 3 rows)

In 2015, a video showing the Hungarian camerawoman Petra László “defending” Hungary against an irregular migrant went viral. The Figure 2 shows how Petra László a camerawoman working for and online TV channel N1TV or ‘Nemzeti TV’ (Nationalist TV), which was affiliated at the time with Jobbik, kicking and tripping a refugee crossing the border into Hungary. This video was massively circulated in tradition and social media platforms. It also went viral globally, as the videos and images portraying the camerawoman were filmed by a German reporter, who posted the incident on Twitter. His post reached 9.3 million views. The second row of Figure 2 contains screenshots from the video uploaded to YouTube in which the camerawoman kicks two people, including a young girl running from the police. First and third rows of Figure 2 shows the incident when later she tripped a Syrian refugee carrying his child. We viewed twenty-five videos of this incident on YouTube, and we chose three of them in order to demonstrate the radicalising nature of the incident.

Hence, the issue that we follow as the context for MRR is as follows. A professional woman put herself in the shoes of a guardian of the Hungarian border and showed a reflex to react to a crossing that she thought as an incursion into Hungary. She justified her reaction as her way of assisting the police, who in her mind had to stop the “illegal” migrants crossing into Hungary. The way that she normalised her action and how she took her role for granted as a Hungarian citizen to prevent “illegal” incursion into Hungarian territory is noteworthy. This showed that László while carrying out her job in an everyday situation as a camerawoman can adopt a defender role for the Hungarian territory and express her grievance with its incursion in a violent manner by kicking and tripping a refugee. This ultimately also showed the extent to which the Hungarian government propaganda has affected the public.

Furhermore, another YouTube video titled as ‘László Petra ‘tripping’ offered a mathematic tutorial describing how the migrant man fell over without the camerawoman even touching him with her legs. This video shows angles and exams the footage frame-by-frame in order to establish that Petra László was innocent, and that prosecutors and judges (in both first and second degree) were wrong by convicting her. We will go into the details of the court case and prosecution in relation to this incident below.



Figure 3 - “Osama: Illegal migration, outburst from camp, terrorist organisation -> star, home, job, Ronaldo
 Petra: panic reaction, helps the police -> lynched by the media, blood money, jobless”

Petra Laszlo’s video was also uploaded onto YouTube by several channels, some of them were news portals (Russia Today, Euronews) while others were individuals. A YouTube channel, called *Igazságot László Petrának* (‘Justice for Petra László’) also uploaded this footage with the same title. As Figure 5 shows below, in this particular video the creator compared the camerawoman with the migrant that she tripped over. The subtitle in the video described how Petra László could not have caused the migrant to fall over and the way that her legs moved could not have contributed to the result. The uploader argues that it was indeed a policeman, who initially shoved the person that fell subsequently. The video continues with the picture of Petra László and the subtitle says she helped a police officer while doing her job as a camerawoman. Despite being a law-abiding citizen, she was the one that received hate comments on social media, lost her job, and faced online prosecution while the man from Syria avoided police sanctions even if he arrived at Europe “illegally” by running away. The subtitle also alleged that he was part of a terrorist organisation.

5.2 Circulation: Release of the video and media interest

The general polarisation in Hungarian media also affected the way Petra László’s case was received by the Hungarian media. On the one hand, the pro-government newspapers treated the news cautiously as their campaign was mostly anti-migration even if Petra László was employed by an opposition (far-right wing) channel affiliated

with Jobbik. On the other hand, the liberal media condemned her actions and reported each news item involving her case. Later, most of the Fidesz media empire came to reflect on this issue calling it merely a defamatory campaign by the international liberal media and 'Brussels' that represent the left-liberal political elite establishment that allegedly seek to enfeeble Hungary.

The Hungarian centrist independent news sites at the time, such as 444, HVG and Index, also circulated the footage, condemned its racist motive while describing the incident as punishable hate crime. Opposition and liberal media saw this as a chance to highlight the issues with Fidesz's anti-migration propaganda which evolved into MRR whereas pro-government media such as Origó, Pesti Srácok and Magyar Hírlap have reported Petra László in a considerably impartial, almost shockingly cautious manner. The political narrative of the different media representations of the footage suggests that the Fidesz-controlled media at the time refrained from subjectively expressing any opinion. Out of the Fidesz media camp, Népszava, a centrist-left newspaper referred to Petra László's past, and suggested she spent years working for different media platforms associated with Jobbik and that her political views were considerably of far-right. Later, in 2018, Pesti Srácok news portal started campaigning for justice for Petra László, right before she was acquitted by the Kúria (Supreme Court of Hungary). By that time, she has already restarted working for them. Pesti Srácok narrative resonated the right-wing conservative comments as we show from the selected YouTube videos below. This narrative presented her action as reactionary as she was apprehended by the hundreds of people trying to run away from police. This implied that she did nothing wrong, she was wrongfully sentenced by courts and that the international media turned her into a scapegoat. They also underlined that she apologised when she said that contrary to the general belief on her actions, she was not a heartless and racist camerawoman in her interview with the conservative newspaper now defunct Magyar Nemzet.

5.3. Consumption: Comments, trial, and acquittal

The provoking video (see above Figure 3) was seen by more than 15,000 viewers. In its comments section, we are presented with polarised remarks. While one of the comment says, "Petra was lynched by international media for no reason", others asked how they could help the now unemployed camerawoman and someone provided a link for a donation site. Comments under the video are rather partial. As an example, several commenters condemned her actions and stated that 'she deserves all the consequences' etc. Replies, for such comments were considerably radical: "Those who bark at László Petra are just stray dogs from no one's house and their opinion is equal to zero! True Hungarians will be on her side, no matter what".

Comments under the Figure 2 were generally one-sided, they all demand justice and restitution for her as follows "Nice work! It is a matter of honour. All my appreciation for you to put energy into this analysis. The matter should be reopened so that Petra could be compensated. This should be taken to an international court. This is

scandalous!”. On the other hand, people expressed their thoughts about those footages that depicts her kicking a child. The comments that condemned her were generally left neglected by other commenters that were in favour of Petra László. We take this as an instrumentalization of the conservative-right narrative to normalise radicalisation by taking it through the spectre of widely shared norms around justice and grievance.

The footage appeared in both national and international newsfeeds in relation to the ongoing trials. On first degree Petra László was convicted for disorderly conduct and she received suspended sentence in 2017. After appeal, on second degree the verdict was upheld, the judgement stated that she did not suffer any unlawful attacks, so her ‘self-defence’ was illegitimate. On second appeal in 2018, the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) found her not guilty for disorderly conduct, only for misdemeanour. However, due to the expiring nature of the smaller offences in Hungary, her case was over the limitation period, and she was acquitted.

After the acquittal, the *Pesti Srácok* announced that Petra started working for them. On the contrary to their initial impartiality, in 2019 the online newspaper distinctively judged the Hungarian Supreme Court for many different reasons, such as back-dating documents and not paying the litigation costs for the acquitted camerawoman. The article also mentioned that Petra László has received a Ministerial Award for a film by her and her husband. While opposition and liberal media condemned the fact that she was given an award, *Pesti Srácok* congratulated their colleague.

5.4 The Polarising Figure of Albert Wass in Contemporary Political Narratives, Social Media and Theatre in Hungary

To continue with our discussion on the role that cultural outputs can portray injustice and grievance and more importantly the manifest roles that historical legacies play to instrumentalise new grievances to voice grievance, we look into the place that the novelist Albert Wass occupies in Hungarian political discourse. We follow the uses of his oeuvre as an example of cultural legacies related radicalisation (CLRR). His poems and novels serve to promote a form of cultural belongingness of Hungarians using the Trianon Treaty⁵, that is considered a historical grievance and used as a political narrative to qualify political events even in contemporary times. The objective of this part of the report is to identify how Wass’s works appear in the mainstream and social media and to explore how he became a polarising voice in Hungary through the resonance he gained in political narratives.

⁵ Signed on the 4th of June 1920 at Paris Peace Conference that ended WWI. The resulting non-negotiable treaty cost Hungary over 70 percent of its territory and one-third of its population.

5.5 The Representation of Albert Wass in Hungarian political and cultural settings



Figure 4 - Members of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guards) paying respect at Albert Wass sculpture

Albert Wass is a polarising author in Hungary. His works are part of the national canon and his novels and poems have found a way to popularity (Korkut, 2015). The reason for his immense popularity is the narrative created in his works, which can be linked with the national grievance over the Trianon Peace Treaty signed in 1920 and resulted in the loss of the two-thirds of historical Hungary. In general, most of Wass' novels romanticise the Székely (Transylvanian) culture and landscape, giving ground to a revisionist culture that longs for the loss of Trianon to be undone. Wass's novels also build upon antisemitism alongside his representation of the Trianon Treaty as unjust. This injustice and grievance by Trianon in his works can be linked to historical and cultural legacy related radicalization. The message of his works can be interpreted as far-right or right-wing political propaganda, given the way that nationalism, national belonging and togetherness are dealt with in his novels (Korkut, 2015). The cultural belongingness associated with the grievance over Trianon is a fierce narrative of the Fidesz government. According to Asavei, Orbán's neo-traditionalism spreads through the governmental cultural policy, which prioritizes conservative, nationalist productions and stimulates patriotic feelings and emotions by prioritizing 'Hungarianness' and shaping the normative of popular culture accordingly (Asavei & Kocian, 2020). It is not a surprise that Orbán refers to Wass frequently in his speeches, presumably, in order to find common narrative with the masses.

There are parallel narratives that have emerged around the Trianon Centenary in 2020. One of them is a revisionist, nationalist narrative that appeals mostly to right-wing Hungarian voters and an "official" stream that emphasises cooperation, shared goals and a Central European identity. Based on this narrative, during the Fidesz

regime, Trianon has become the symbol of belonging and national identity and June 4 was proclaimed to be a national holiday called the Day of National Belonging.

Albert Wass' name is used for several reasons in Hungary. As an example, the Új Magyar Garda (New Hungarian Guards) has a 'battalion' named after him. The nationalist far right extremist group is originated from the Magyar Garda (Hungarian Guards), which was associated with Jobbik right-wing political party during the late 2000s that also quoted Wass regularly and paid tribute to his monument as Figure 6 shows. Albeit, nowadays, Fidesz's communication is the one that references Wass the most while Jobbik's popularity before 2010 contributed to the popularity of Wass's canon within right-wing circles. The fact that Magyar Gárda, a paramilitary-like far-right association that has already been dissolved once by Hungarian courts used the Albert Wass brand can help us to establish that Wass's popularity among nationalist, far-right masses. This popularity serves polarisation between the supporters of the conservative right and the left-liberal political parties. Hence, it offers an excellent case to understand the potential of cultural outputs warped around historical legacies as a tool of radicalisation.

In the following section, we will explore a YouTube video depicting Albert Wass' works and identify the political or cultural narratives his quotes are generally used for in order to establish that his figure is indeed a means for radicalisation. The fact that Wass' works are being uploaded to YouTube shows the popularity of his legacy and that his message is still manifest in the 21st century.

5.6 Circulation of YouTube video, theatre play and political speeches of Wass

The YouTube video portrays a woman reading Albert Wass' 'Patkányok honfoglalása' (Rats' invasion). The video has around 110,000 views, 2,000 likes and 200 comments. The short-story is about a house, which was eventually conquered by two rats. According to the story, the rats initially found shelter in the basement, but became more and more comfortable in the house and finally chased the man from his home, which became inhabitable due to the rats' destruction. In the comment section, people drew parallel between the rats and those who disliked the video and some of the commenters compared the conquering rats to migrants. Unfortunately, the latter comparison is not far from the original symbolism of the short-story either. Wass depicts the fighting rats as the nations of Hungary and Romania. The rats sought to find shelter in a beautifully depicted, rural house but eventually, they destroyed the home. Several other Wass novels show similar symbolism regarding Trianon, such as the Tizenhárom Almafa, which recently was staged in theatre by the similarly polarising figure as its staging director Attila Vidnyánszky.

The role of Vidnyánszky in Hungarian arts and theatre life was discussed in previous parts of this report. His most recent play contributes to our discussion of CLRR. As he is a government appointed director, his message also aligns with the government narratives and what Gyollai (2021) depicted as government-led radicalisation in

Hungary. The play was premiered in 2020 at the Hungarian National Theatre, it is titled *Tizenhárom Almafa* ('Thirteen Apple Trees'), same as the book by Albert Wass. Both the book and the play depict the loss of Hungary resulted from the Treaty of Trianon. Vidnyánszky's play also presents a 30 minute long monologue, originally presented by Albert Apponyi, a politician and aristocrat that led the Hungarian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference ending the World War I. The book mainly, but also the play, partially depicts the times around the Second Vienna Award in 1940 when the Northern part of Transylvania was re-attached to Hungary taken from Romania. Although, the book specifically suggests that Trianon should not be part of the propaganda and that the Transylvanian people suffered evenly under both Hungarian and Romanian regimes, therefore, the geographical location of the border did not matter to them, Vidnyánszky's play twisted the original message and turned the 3 hours play into revisionist, nationalist propaganda. It portrayed scenes from Wass' book and followed the main events of Trianon from the W.W.1st until modern times in order to depict the grievances of the Hungarian nation and the identity dilemma of belongingness.

We also note one more issue to give a more elaborate view of the way culture was instrumentalised to polarise the Hungarian society. The previous director-general of the Hungarian National Theatre was allegedly fired because of his support for the LGBTQ+ community, which was also actively depicted in his plays. The government-chosen Vidnyánszky portrayed a politically polarised event and a writer, who was often referred as a fascist and anti-Semite that supported the Nazi regime. The fact that Wass' *Tizenhárom Almafa* was introduced by a politically appointed director to the historical National Theatre further polarised the nation but received endorsement from the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.



Figure 4 – Viktor Orbán’s Facebook post in 2019

Wass’ most iconic quotations are frequently used by Fidesz politicians, especially by Viktor Orbán. In 2019, he referred to the poem “Üzenet haza” (A message to home) with its popular line: “Mert elfut a víz és csak a kő marad, de a kő marad” (*Because the water flows away and only the rock remains, but the rock remains*). Newspapers suggested that the Prime Minister, by sharing a YouTube video of this poem on his personal Facebook page, as Figure 7 shows, on the occasion of the national day of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, sent a message to the opposition Mayor of Budapest, who in an earlier interview said that Albert Wass was a “friend of Nazis”. Under the Facebook comments, people also referred to this quarrel. Groups of commenters said Orbán should leave his office, whereas others suggested the same to the Mayor. One commenter even said that Facebook blocked his post in which he shared the same video due to its provocative content. This provides an example of a politically polarised society in which the consumption of the works of novelists such as Wass is used to boost political narratives and to further divide and radicalise the people.

In both YouTube and Facebook comments under Orbán’s post and the short-story, people showed their appreciation for Albert Wass and condemned those who do not

read his works. This irredentism links people to the conservative, right wing political views and presumably provides voters for the Fidesz. It is common perception in Hungary that Wass is mostly read by right-wing sympathisers, while liberals and those with left-wing values condemn his works as fascist and anti-Semitic. His narrative is generally used for political purposes by both sides. As public media broadcast in Hungary is under the control of the government and Fidesz media empire suppresses opposition media, the name of Albert Wass does not appear in regular media. On the other hand, his works appear in social media, video-sharing sites and political speeches.

Conclusion

The discussion in this report identified the migration and cultural legacy related radicalisation via media outlets. As WP3.1 on Hungary (Gyollai, 2021) identified the Fidesz as the main stakeholder in radicalisation in the Hungarian cultural and political scene, we showed how their anti-migrant nationalist narrative became resonant in both social and traditional media. With more than 90 per cent of the media outlets owned or controlled by the government, the freedom of press in Hungary is at serious risk. This informed the mainstream political narrative during the refugee crisis and contributed to the scaremongering of the people, creating a fear of 'the other', which led to polarisation and radicalisation. We discussed the social media appearance of Petra László, a camerawoman and the comments under YouTube videos portraying her kicking and tripping over refugees at the Röszke border in 2015. It could be concluded that the perception of her case further polarised the nation, mainly due to the anti-migration political narrative by the Fidesz, which was portrayed on billboards across the country, public media news coverage and newspapers. The xenophobic incitement created an audience by building up fear among the nation based on historical grievances such as Trianon and Hungary's part in defending the borders of Europe during the previous millennium. We also identified cultural legacies related radicalisation through the works of Albert Wass and established his polarising nature in Hungary. We concluded that his works are often used by the right-wing political community in order to reach a wider audience. The report showed how theatre autonomy is fragile in the country and how the Fidesz took control over universities and culture in Hungary.

What our report shows in terms of the remit of WP5 is as follows. Instrumentalization of mediated events, cultural outputs, historical legacies and even court cases can play a distinct role in permeating issues of injustice and grievance within the general public. This serves the purposes of political forces especially when media freedom lacks in a country. The government control in the media not only makes its own political narrative dominant by controlling circulation but also controls consumption even in opposition media spaces as well as social media. Earlier Korkut (2020) noted the lack of much alternative discourse to the predominant government narratives

over migration even in opposition-controlled media outlets in Hungary. This report presents that even social media cannot maintain a space for alternative discourses at the face of rampant radical interpretations of mediatised events and in/justice and grievance connotations that social media users associate with such events. In the case of MRR, while there was at first wide-scale polarisation over the role that the camerawoman played in “defending” Hungary against an irregular migrant, as her case evolved into a court case much of the criticism disappeared when she was acquitted. Therefore, what we take as a radical action, that is kicking and tripping a migrant, lost its polarising resonance as the camerawoman became vindictive in the public sphere also thanks to alternative interpretations of her actions via social media commentary. Her case alienated those critical of her at the first instance and silenced them, but eventually opened the I-GAP spectrum between her defenders and critiques even further.

The case of CLRR is a bit more complex as it relates to the dominance of the Fidesz government in Hungarian cultural life and education and the way this has affected the interpretation of historical events through the spectre of cultural outputs such as the staging of a theatre play. Hereby, we elaborated on the issue by looking at the polarising role that Albert Wass occupies in Hungarian public philosophy with the way his canon was used to interpret the Trianon Treaty – a historically very crucial event that still affects the way Hungarians discuss in/justice and express grievance. Furthermore, the way Wass’s canon has been utilised to serve the political aims of the government, in general, and the occupation of the cultural scene by controlling SZEFG and appointing Vidnyánszky to replace a homosexual theatre director, in particular, further polarises the population between the proponents of conservative right and the left-liberal ideologies. As the alienation continues between these two poles, the government finds space to radicalise its supporters as against the proponents of alternative politics. This proves the importance of cultural outputs and mediatised events originating from them in view of radicalisation.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Media objects

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for the Report – Figure 1 <i>Multiplicity’ of the Hungarian media</i>
Narrative in representation	This collage represents the one-sided government media. Regional, daily newspapers seen in Figure 1 are all owned by KESMA (Central European Press and Media Foundation) and follow the Fidesz propaganda. As shown by the collage, the newspapers use the same title and picture on their covers as leading articles. This issue was highlighted during the refugee crisis as the political narrative of the Fidesz was represented in newspapers which were not used for propaganda purposes before.

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for the Report – Figure 2 <i>YouTube videos depicting Petra László in Rösztke, 2015</i>
Narrative in representation	Figure 2 represents the circulation of the original footage of Petra László in different YouTube videos. As the pictures show, most uploaders (rows 1 and 3) dealt with the ‘second’ incident, when the camerawoman tripped a refugee carrying his child. These videos are in favour of Petra and are uploaded in order to ‘clean’ her name. The uploaders often comment the incident and analyse the original footage frame-by-frame so that they can show the audience that Petra’s leg was not the reason the man and his child fell. Row 2 of the collage is from another video, which shows picture of the original footage including the one in which Petra repeatedly kick the leg of a running girl. This part of the footage is usually not included in those videos which support the actions of the camerawoman.

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for the Report – Figure 3 <i>“Osama: Illegal migration, outburst from camp, terrorist organisation -> star, home, job, Ronaldo</i> <i>Petra: panic reaction, helps the police -> lynched by the media, blood money, jobless”</i>
Narrative in representation	This screenshot is from an analysed YouTube video comparing Petra László with Osama, who was carrying his child while the camerawoman tripped them with a kick of her leg. The video shows that the refugee made money and career out of his ‘fame’ of being on television while Petra lost her job and received death threats for her actions. The captions used in the video often distorts the facts and depicts Osama as a horrible person deliberately fell over in front of a camera in order to frame Petra. Also, the uploader falsely claims that Osama was involved with any terrorist organisation.

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for the Report – Figure 4 <i>“Members of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guards) paying respect at Albert Wass sculpture”</i>
Narrative in representation	This picture represents a link between Albert Wass and Hungarian Guards. The fact that the members of this banned, far-right association pays its tributes to the writer shows that Wass’ works are mostly popular among those with right-wing ideology.

Key Aspect of the Media Text and Context	Areas of Interest for the Report – Figure 4 <i>“Viktor Orbán’s Facebook post in 2019”</i>
Narrative in representation	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Facebook post from 2019 represents the connection with right-wing ideology and Albert Wass. The post was shared on his Facebook page and generated polarised audience responses in the comment section.

Source	Link	Audience reactions
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Justice for Laszlo Petra: "Igazságot László Petrának"	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQGmYNATLIE&t=3s	15,000 views and 42 comments under the video.
RT: "Hungarian journalist Petra Laszlo fired after kicking kid, tripping up fleeing refugees"	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArQmFlp7xC8&t=1s	1.1 M views and more than 2,000 comments under the video
Hungary 1920-44: "A "gáncsolás" koordinátái, matek tutorial 1/2 - ügyészeknek"	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6o-d9w4uoQ&t=611s	2.500 views and 25 comments under the video.
László Andrea: "Wass Albert - Patkányok honfoglalása - László Andrea"	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r1FbCRXm8w	114,000 views and 200 comments under the video.

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