DeRadicalisation
in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate

Report 7.2: D.Rad Labs Report

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Umut Korkut, Nelli Ferenczi, Mihai Varga, Volodymyr Ishchenko, Vania Rolon, Nachita Rosun, Roland Fazekas, Abimbola Amaye, Rachel Ailsa Jones, Amrullah Haleemi

Glasgow Caledonian University

Brunel University London

Freie Universtitat Berlin

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Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: Umut.Korkut@gcu.ac.uk

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and broader social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) to move towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. We intend to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, including a sense of being victimised, being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. Mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts is crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that radicalisation processes often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national justice frameworks. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation is central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary

The D.Rad deliverable D7.2. is a report that illustrates (1) knowledge exchange and (2) public dissemination activities via the D.Rad labs throughout the project. Through the course of the project, each D.Rad partner has organised its academic and dissemination work in relation to the grant agreement with its D.Rad lab in order to achieve utmost knowledge exchange and public dissemination for the project. To illustrate the cumulative impact the project has generated, we have organised this report under two sections including three parts. Overall, the D.Rad labs have served as academic, virtual or physical spaces for the project to translate its technical and research work into more accessible and digestible formats in order to reach non-academic publics as well as students and teachers to achieve knowledge exchange and public dissemination.

Henceforth, the first section of this report is organised in two parts. The first part presents an overview of the D.Rad I-GAP approach, as developed, operationalised, studied and shared by each team on the basis of the findings from the D.Rad survey. This is a section that states with lay terms the knowledge D.Rad has generated in view of its study on the relationship between (I)njustice-(G)rievance-(A)lienation-(P)olarisation and how people move from non-radicalised to radicalised positions. To achieve full knowledge exchange, a revised version of this text will be made public on The Conversation (https://theconversation.com/) after the end of the project. The second part generates a syllabus based on the D.Rad research findings deriving from the D.Rad labs for further knowledge exchange to reach particularly students and teachers of radicalisation and de-radicalisation under 5 lectures. These lectures capture major findings of WPs 3, 5, 6 and 7 for public dissemination purposes, in bitesize and digestible formats. They are titled as follows: *Radicalisation Trends, Cultural drivers of radicalisation, I-GAP and Online radicalisation, De-radicalisation stakeholders and strategies, How to tackle online radicalization*. The aim of the syllabus will be to provide resources (e.g., key sources for each of these WPs which are publicly available where possible) and signposts for further information on I-GAP and D.Rad related radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The lectures will in time support in providing tools to empower individuals in understanding conceptualisations of radicalisation and its manifestations (particularly online) among others. Furthermore, in appendix, we are placing additional supplementary material to support these lectures generated from the relevant D.Rad reports.

Afterwards, the second section shifts the focus of the report to public dissemination and it lists all D.Rad activities involving the publics, students, as well as academics delivered through the D.Rad labs. This section not only includes the activities that took place in situ in D.Rad lab sites but also include other dissemination activities. Overall, this report shows, first, the value of creating a site in each partner institution for thinking about knowledge exchange and public dissemination through a lab format. It foregrounds the knowledge that has been generated in situ and beyond. It facilitates the exchange of such information through summarising the crust of the D.Rad project, that is, the I-GAP approach as well as a syllabus for further teaching of radicalisation and de-radicalisation using the D.Rad "knowledge" generated in each D.Rad site that served as a D.Rad lab. This report ultimately presents the legacy that the D.Rad project has sought to foster towards understanding and learning about radicalisation and de-radicalisation and the cumulative effect that the D.Rad labs has delivered.

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Section 1 - Knowledge Exchange:

1a. D.Rad labs I-GAP findings

How experiences of injustice, grievance, alienation, and polarisation (I-GAP) can help us understand support for extremist beliefs?

We are living through a period in which social life is increasingly impacted by violent attacks on public space, epitomised by events such as the Manchester Arena bombing by Salafi-jihadists in 2017, the violence associated with the growth of the far right, as well as the popularity of violent misogynist Andrew Tate. But how can we explain the public support for such and other acts, usually grouped together under "extremism"? This has been the purpose of D.Rad which examined the building blocks of radicalisation and investigated social inclusion as a tool for prevention. The project has sought to interrogate the way perceived injustices, grievances, and alienation create the conditions for extremist attitudes. We recruited over 4,500 young people aged 18-30 for an online survey in 16 European countries and asked about their worldviews and experiences of social alienation.

To understand support for extremist attitudes, we measured participants' support for sweeping social, cultural, and societal changes, even if such changes threaten peaceful coexistence. For example, we asked to what extent participants believed that those groups that don't support the same ideas about a "good and correct life" should be deprived of their rights. Although we did not measure support for specific extremist groups, many of the questions reflect extremist groups' central tenets.

Our research demonstrated the value of a relational perspective, which considers how individuals construct their social realities through groups. This means, for instance, how individuals perceive their social group relative to other groups. We found that seeing migrants as a threat was associated with endorsing extremism, a particularly relevant finding at a time when over 280 million people are residing in a country outside of their nationality (UN Desa, 2020).

Injustice

Experiences of injustice are not based on absolute assessments of fairness but on people's treatment experiences and mismatch with what they perceive they deserve compared to others (Crosby, 1976). We found that seeing migrants as economically better off than nationals and seeing migrants as a threat to accessing resources, welfare, and political power correlated with support for extremist attitudes. Indeed, seeing one's national group as deprived economically relative to migrants correlates with increased political support for far-right parties (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018).

Grievance

We also found that individuals who perceive group hierarchies as 'natural' or 'organic' (social dominance orientation) were more likely to believe that they were experiencing injustices and to endorse extremist attitudes. Our findings parallel the link between social dominance orientation and justification of and engagement in violence and illegal actions (Lemieux & Asal, 2010). A recent analysis in the US has found that social dominance orientation links white racial identity, ethnic prejudice, and attitudes to migrants to support for far-right groups (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015; Grindal & Haltinner, 2023). We added to this research by measuring extremist attitudes across a spectrum that extends to extremist ideologies such as Incels or extreme misogyny.

Our research confirms that understanding how people view their social situation is key to explaining why they support extremist ideologies. Individuals who perceived their group as superior to other social groups (collective narcissism) were also more likely to endorse extremist attitudes in our sample. Collective narcissism has been linked to increased prejudice and aggression towards outgroups (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson & Jayawickreme, 2009), including migrants.

Alienation

Experiencing social alienation (that is, lack of meaning, powerlessness, and isolation) correlated with increased support for extremist attitudes. Social alienation can capture the frustration of the "human quest for personal significance", one of the basic human needs (Kruglanski, Fernandez, Factor, & Szumowska, 2019, p. 118). The need to "matter" and be respected can underlie goals in extremist behaviour (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Therefore, policies and interventions targeting social alienation should ensure that awakening this basic need is linked with positive outcomes, such as prosocial behaviour rather than extremism (Kruglanski et al., 2013).

Polarisation

People who held a strong online group identity experienced more social alienation, saw their social group as more superior to other groups (collective narcissism), and endorsed more populist ideology. In turn, alienation, collective narcissism, and populism were linked with more support for extremist attitudes. In this way, online group identity was indirectly linked with extremist attitudes, paralleling findings that social networks can function as informational and normative influences for extremist attitudes (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, & Webber, 2018). This pattern of findings adds to the relatively understudied area of *how* online spaces contribute to the emergence of extremist beliefs (see Bastug, Douai, & Akca, 2020; Gaudette, Scrivens, & Venkatesh, 2022; Mølmen & Ravndal, 2023) through highlighting the significance of shared group identities and the scripts that they can provide.

Implications

Our research indicates that dissatisfaction with the status quo is being targeted and mobilised ideologically as to produce radicalisation. Why then are we not seeing a more concerted attempt to develop policies concerned with increased social cohesion? While everyone theoretically favours this concept, consensus evaporates when examining the causes of social in-cohesion. Most contemporary social policy is made through the lens of individual responsibilities (Liedenburg et al, 2015) and marketplace logic. Policies like this have not only frayed the fabric of civil society and democratic life, but they have created the very conditions for the problems our research outlined. There is the additional concern that while most European states' have initiated national prevention and de-radicalisation programmes to address 'extremism', this term itself can only be defined relationally. For example the UK government recently *redefined* this term to include 'socialism and communism, anti-abortion and anti-fascism' (UK Government, 2024). Yet recently UK's former Conservative Home Secretary Suella Braverman made inflammatory attacks on multiculturalism and refugees which were openly welcomed by radical right and neo-Nazi commentators (HopeNotHate, 2023). This points to a conceptual problem with 'extremism' in a context where 'agents of ideological violence are not isolated 'lone wolves' but are usually interconnected with communities, non-violent agents and legal entities' (Ishchenko & Varga, 2021). Within this context, it is hardly surprising that extremist attitudes and ideologies continue to function as tools for individuals to restore threatened self-significance (Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 2017; Kruglanski, et al., 2014). Our study concludes by calling for policies that address social-economic disparities (injustice) and social and existential motives (grievance and alienation) by focusing on social integration and righting discrimination and economic inequalities for youth, in particular, to mitigate the dangers of extremism (Adam-Troian, Tecmen, & Kaya, 2021). The problems this research outlines are real, but to address them, it is crucial that the approaches we adopt consciously seek to rebuild and safeguard the principles of political democracy.

1b. A syllabus for teaching radicalisation and de-radicalisation for students and teachers

This section presents 5 lectures that are organised to communicate the finding of D.Rad labs to the students and teachers of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. In appendix, we have prepared supplementary material to assist the teaching and learning of these subjects with material from the related D.Rad deliverables. They comprise the following sections.

(1) Introduction - what they will learn,
(2) The main theoretical framework and the findings of the lecture,
(3) Summary of the main findings of the lecture.

Lecture 1 - Radicalisation Trends

Introduction:

- Defining radicalisation
- Diversity of radicalisation trends
- Dynamics of radicalisation

Main Content:

- Radicalisation can stem from a wide range of ideologies, including political extremism (e.g., far-right or far-left ideologies), religious extremism (e.g., Islamist extremism, Christian fundamentalism), ethnonationalism, environmental extremism, and more. Each ideology may attract individuals for different reasons and offer distinct narratives and justifications for radical action.
- Radicalisation is not a uniform process, but manifests differently across contexts. Radical ideologies may develop over long periods, while acts of violence tend to crystalise into events much quicker.
- While some violent attacks may have a significant impact in terms of casualties, others hold symbolic power that resonates beyond the immediate victims. Acts of violence or extremist actions may hold symbolic significance that resonates with certain groups or ideologies.

Summary of the main points of the lecture

- Efforts to prevent radicalisation require a comprehensive understanding of the underlying drivers and pathways of radicalization. This includes addressing systemic issues such as discrimination, inequality, and social exclusion, and promoting critical thinking skills, media literacy, and positive alternatives to extremist narratives.
- Radicalisation exists on a spectrum, ranging from nonviolent forms of activism or protest to more extreme forms of violent extremism or terrorism.

Lecture 2 - Cultural drivers of radicalisation

Introduction:

- To be able to pinpoint the various methods by which radicalization is driven in different countries and by cultures.
- Common factors that drive radicalization in different countries and by cultures.
- How to spot cultural drivers/actors of radicalization.

Main Content:

- *Extremism vs Radicalization:* Radicalization refers to the process of coming to believe in very extreme ideologies, while on the other hand, extremism refers to a state when someone is having such ideas.
- *Religion and Radicalization*: Islamist Extremist Narratives within the UK draw recruits into their realm with religious grievances and identity politics. Like Finland, anti-immigration and nationalistic attitudes are interlinked with the far-right radicalization trend that tends to be expressed from an ethnic and cultural point of view.
- *Gender and Radicalization:* Nationalist narratives feed ethno-nationalist goals by recruiting young males into the extreme organizations that highlight traditional, conventional ideas of masculinity. On this note, women recruited inside the UK and Finland by Islamist extremist organizations also show that women may be drawn into extremist movements looking for empowerment or connection.

Summary of the main points of the lecture

- There are obstacles to be encountered when it comes to addressing long-standing socio-economic disparities and counteracting radical beliefs that propagate hatred and discord.
- Social resilience can lie on prevention from radicalization and exposure of the underlying basic socio-economic grievances, but the actual construction can only be built by the promotion of community solidarity.
- The cultural, social, and political realities of each country require national approaches to research and prevention strategies for radicalisation.

Lecture 3 – The I-GAP approach and online radicalisation

Introduction:

- How to recognise online radicalisation and keep safe from online harm?
- Theoretical framework of online and media radicalisation
- Methodology of radicalisation studies via digital platforms and popular culture

Main Content:

- The way media represents things greatly affects online radicalization, especially through websites like YouTube where images and sounds can powerfully spread radical ideas.
- Online activity tends to focus on feelings of being left out and perceived injustices towards local groups, which are amplified when changes are happening in society or culture.
- Qualitative content analysis is a useful tool to accompany quantitative research.

Summary of the main points of the lecture:

- Visual media, such as memes or videos, to reveal the ways these tools spread extremist ideas and recruit people for political reasons.
- YouTube acts as an interactive ground, where users can comment, like and share content, such a facility helps extreme ideas to scatter swiftly across the platform while also boosting unity among extremist groups on the internet. This interaction is crucial in comprehending how individual dissatisfaction transforms into combined radical action that creates a fertile environment for radical views to grow and turn people into extremists within what seems like a 'protected' echo chamber online.

Lecture 4 - De-radicalisation stakeholders and strategies

Introduction:

- List how demographic, historical, institutional, democratic aspects of each country can wage an impact on de-radicalisation stakeholders and strategies

- Define Repressive and Preventative strategies to de-radicalisation

- Compare and contrast two countries strategies to de-radicalisation

- Explain the need for a new approach to de-radicalisation

Main Content

- Biased approaches, discrimination, and the tension between national security and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of speech, are all challenges that can arise from de-radicalisation efforts.
- Despite these challenges, there is a recognition of three key intervention areas: schools, prisons, and the internet.
- Efforts are directed towards prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration, with a focus on promoting democratic values, intercultural dialogue, and civic counselling.

Summary of the main points of the lecture

- Stakeholders in the context of radicalization refer to individuals, groups, or organizations that have an interest or influence in addressing the phenomenon of radicalization and its associated risks.
- Engaging and mobilizing these stakeholders in coordinated efforts is essential for developing holistic and effective approaches to prevent and counter radicalization, promote community resilience, and protect individuals from the influence of extremist ideologies.
- Addressing these issues requires a shift towards more balanced, inclusive, and multidimensional de-radicalization strategies that prioritize prevention, rehabilitation, and community engagement while upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Lecture 5 - How to tackle online radicalisation?

Introduction

- Understanding online polarisation
- Defining online polarisation and the 'radicalisation pipeline'
- Defining the lone wolf strategy

Main Content:

- The radicalisation pipeline refers to the process through which individuals become radicalized and increasingly committed to extremist ideologies or actions.
- The lone wolf strategy refers to a tactic employed by individuals or small groups who carry out acts of violence or terrorism independently, without direct coordination or support from larger extremist organizations.
- Online radicalisation plays a significant role in the lone wolf strategy by providing individuals with access to extremist ideologies, propaganda, and support networks through the internet. Lone actors can become radicalised by consuming online content that promotes violence, justifies extremist beliefs, and fosters a sense of belonging to a like-minded community.

Summary of the main points

- Recognising and addressing radicalisation online requires a multidimensional approach that integrates features, content analysis, behaviour patterns, network analysis, linguistic analysis, platform analysis, and consideration of contextual factors
- Online radicalisation enables lone actors to self-radicalise at their own pace and in relative anonymity, making it challenging for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify and intervene before an attack occurs.

Section 2- Public Dissemination:

The D.Rad Dissemination Table presents public dissemination activities carried out in D.Rad labs during the course of the project. The table below contains the events in line with the dissemination and knowledge exchange plans agreed with the Commission.

	Knowledge exchange	Public Dissemination
FUB	• D.Rad closing academic conference, 21-23.03.2024 • D.Rad Berlin Hub, 25.-26.05.2023, "Right-wing radicalization in the EU & neighbourhood since 'Two Crises'- the pandemic & Russia's invasion of Ukraine."	• Roundtable with de-radicalisation practitioners, D.Rad closing conference, 21.03.2024 • Lecture: "Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: The End of the Post-Soviet Hegemony Crisis?" (V. Ishchenko at Goethe University Frankfurt, 26.04.2023) • Lecture: "Madman's war? Ideology, hegemony crisis, and the dynamics of depoliticization in Russians' support for the invasion of Ukraine" (V. Ishchenko at University of Trier, 3.05.2022) • Lecture: "Repressive civicness: Ukraine's civil society, far right, and maidan eventful revolution" (part of lecture series on far-right politicians, V. Ishchenko at Kassel University, 13.12.2021)
GCU	• Professor Umut Korkut, Glasgow Caledonian University D.Rad Roundtable, 5 October 2023, Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa 'De-radicalization in Poland: responses, challenges and the future' with two Guest Lectures. • IPSA World Congress 2023, Buenos Aires, Politics in the Age of Transnational Crises: Vulnerability and Resilience, D.Rad team	• Open Access article - 2023 Convivial and informal encounters with de-radicalisation, *Sociological Compass* **https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.13180** Doga Atalay, Umut Korkut, and Roland Fazekas • Open Access article - 2023 Radicalisation in competitive authoritarian contexts: visualising refugees with DIY media, *Visual Studies*, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1472586X.2023.2275688 (with Hasret Dikici-Bilgin and Roland Fazekas)

	members attended with papers • D.Rad Conference in Berlin, D.Rad team members attended with papers • Doga Atalay and Umut Korkut presented a paper at the American Anthropological Association Annual Conference. November 9-13, 2022 • Doga Atalay presented a paper at the 5 October 2023, Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa '(De)radicalization in poland: responses, challenges and the future'	• D.Rad Conference in Berlin, Policy Workshop Event • Doga Atalay and Umut Korkut presented a paper at the KCSS roundtable in Kosovo, 08/12/2022 • Umut Korkut, May 18-20, 2023, ASN conference • Umut Korkut, New York, Invited talks, November 2022- CUNY 2 lectures, and Interview • London, 23 October 2023, Drad Documentary Exhibition • Berlin HUB, Right-wing radicalisation in the EU, May 25-26, 2023 • Umut Korkut Drad Policy meeting, 28 May 2023, CUNY, New York • Drad Paris exhibition, 1 April 2023 • Umut Korkut, ITESO presentation, Mexico, 17 February 2023 • Umut Korkut, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, October 2023 • "Islam, Authoritarianism and Underdevelopment" with Professor Ahmet T. Kuru, D.Rad lecture 2/3/2021 • D.Rad Lecture with Professor Joshua Castellino 13/4/2021 • Pizza evening with WP8 participants at the sports club
Sheffield	• Participation/presentation in the following international conferences with a paper/panel on D.Rad themes/research: • Participation/presentation in MeCCSA (Media, Communication and Cultural Studies Association) Conference in	• A special section on visual extremism in *Visual Studies* in January 2024 (Ozge Ozduzen and Umut Korkut) • An editorial introduction to the special section on visual extremism in *Visual Studies* in January 2024 (Ozge Ozduzen and Umut Korkut)

	- Manchester UK in September 2024 (Ozge Ozduzen and Hannah Guy) - Political Studies Conference in Glasgow in March 2024 (Ozge Ozduzen) - Participation/presentation in the D.Rad London Workshop on *Social Mobilisation and Radicalisation* in April 2023 (Ozge Ozduzen and Hannah Guy) - Hepp3 (Helsinki hub on emotions, populism and polarisation) Conference in Helsinki Finland in June 2022 (Ozge Ozduzen and Nelli Ferenczi)	- An open access journal article in a special section on visual extremism in *Visual Studies* entitled 'Let us teach our children': Online racism and everyday far-right ideologies on TikTok' in November 2023 (Ozge Ozduzen, Nelli Ferenczi and Isabel Holmes) - Public presentation with the Windrush Square Engagement Hub in London UK in October 2023 (Henry Staples) - An article entitled "Reclaiming Windrush Square: why urban development projects need to heed local voices" in *the Conversation* in June 2023 (Henry Staples) - Public presentation with the Windrush Square Engagement Hub in London UK in April 2023 (Henry Staples and Ozge Ozduzen) - D.Rad WP5.2 *Mainstreaming, Gender and Communication* public launch event in May 2023 -online- (Hannah Guy and Ozge Ozduzen) - Focus groups with the Windrush Square volunteers in May 2023 (Henry Staples, Ozge Ozduzen and Vania Rolon) - Focus groups with the Windrush Square volunteers in April 2023 (Henry Staples, Ozge Ozduzen and Vania Rolon) - Workshop in *visual radicalisation* in Sheffield UK in April 2023 (Ozge Ozduzen and Hannah Guy) - D.Rad WP5.1 *Cultural Drivers of Radicalisation* public launch event in February 2023 -online- (Ozge Ozduzen)
EURAC	EU-Project Fair, Schlanders/Silandro (IT), 22/23 Sept. 2023	Workshops for secondary schools, Bolzano/Bozen (IT), Jan. 2023

	• ACT&ART Training for Trainers, Kranj (SLO), 20-25 Feb. 2023 • EURAC, Bolzano, Italy – Minority Nationalism Hub July, 2023	• Course on Religious and Political Radicalisation at the University of Graz (AT), 2023/2022 Winter Semester • Workshop for teachers, Bolzano/Bozen (IT), Nov. 2022 • Lecture on Fake news and Radicalisation at the University of Bolzano/Bozen (IT), 24 Apr. 2022 • Workshops for secondary schools, Bolzano/Bozen (IT), Dec. 2021/Jan. 2022 • D.Rad Youth Focus Group, Bolzano/Bozen (IT), May 2023 • D.Rad role-play pilot tests, Bolzano/Bozen (IT), Mar.-May 2023
BGU	• D.Rad Closing Academic Conference, AI Hub • Pissa conference	• D.Rad Chezc press interview Democrat TV
AUP	• Roman Zinigrad, "'Religious Separatism' and Separation of Church and State: Weaponizing Republican Values against Muslims in France, International Conference: Migration, Law and Religion/Culture, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany, 12/2023 • Stephen Sawyer, paper presentation: "Radicalization and laïcité in France", 27th World Congress of IPSA, July 15-19, 2023 • Roman Zinigrad, "'De-radicalizing' children by Radicalizing Society: On the Imposition of Fundamental Values in School Curricula in France and the UK, Symposium: Liberal Democracy and Its	• Paris D.Rad Symposium, 1-3 Apr. 2023 • Guest Lecture: Dr. Jonathan Leader Maynard, Lecturer in International Politics, King's College London, 3 Apr. 2023. • Art Exhibition: "complicating the narrative: In a time of false simplicity", 1-30 Apr. 2023. L'Espace Canopy art gallery • Guest Lecture: Ambassador Muriel Domenach, Permanent Representative of the French Delegation to NATO in Brussels, 28 Jan. 2022. • Stephen Sawyer, Roman Zinigrad: D.Rad Symposium: Trends of Radicalization in Europe and Beyond" with D.Rad Project Consortium. 2 Dec. 2021. • D.Rad Guest Lecture: "The End of the War on Terror?" Marc Hecker, IFRI, 8 Dec. 2021.

		Challenges for Education and for Political Science, AUP CCDS, 06/2023	
		• Roman Zinigrad, "(De)Radicalization in Schools and a Rights-Based Regulatory Framework: Comparative Reflections on Violent Radicalization and Nationalism", ASN World Convention, Columbia University, 05/2023	
		• Roman Zinigrad, "Securitization Reforms in French Education", Invited speaker, CUNY Graduate Center, 05/2023	
		• Roman Zinigrad, "(De)Radicalization in Schools and a Rights-based Regulatory Framework", Faculty Workshop, Unisinos Law School, Porto Alegre, Brazil, 12/2022	
		• Umut Korkut and Roman Zinigrad, "The State as a Stakeholder in Radicalization", CERIS (Community for European Research and Innovation for Security), European Commission, 11/2022	
		• Roman Zinigrad: " Dieudonné: Humor in the Service of Antisemitism in France", Workshop: 'Changing landscapes: From humor and/in politics to humor as politics', Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, 09/2022	
UNIFI	• Participation to the following international conferences with paper/panel on D.Rad:		• 13 October 2022 WP 4 online launch • 13 October 2022 D.Rad Lecture Series- "Jihadism" within the

	• 2023 IMISCOE Spring Conference "Postcolonial migrations-heritages, specificities, mobilizations", Nice 15-17 March 2023 Council of European Studies Annual Conference 2023, Reykjavik 27-29 June 2023 • "Dal pluralismo giuridico allo stato interculturale" [From legal pluralism to intercultural State], Rome, 22-23 September 2023	Italian Prison System: a Critical Review by Prof. G. Anello, University of Parma • 28-29 November 2022 "Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Migration, Gender and Vulnerability" – Guest Lecture and World Cafè workshop" by Professor S. B. Rottmann, Özegin University, Istanbul • 7 November 2023 "Migration and radicalization. A critical approach"- Guest Lecture by Professor U. Korkut, Glasgow Caledonian University • 13-14 November 2023 "Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Migration, Gender and Vulnerability" – Guest Lecture and World Café workshop" by Professor S. B. Rottmann, Özegin University, Istanbul
UH	• ECPR general conference 2023 Prague (paper) • HEPP2 conference May 2021 online and HEPP3 conference June 2022, HEPP4 • D.Rad Mainstreaming Nationalism Hub, 2023	• Several media interviews in national and international media • Two articles in local newspaper (Maunulan Sanomat, 2 March 2023) • Keynote at the Maunula House spring citizens open forum 2023 • Interaction with the officials and CSOs in radicalisation prevention work • Focus groups with D.Rad youth and Maunula House co-governance • Nordic Safe Cities Camp 8-9 November 2023
UC	• Presentation of the project at the Silesian Festival of Science, 21 06 2021 • Seminar about D.Rad project, 13 April 2022, Jan Dlugosz University in which 4 Rectors participated, as	• University social media regularly releases news about D.Rad • Lecture for students 'Radicalisation and political pluralism in the Polish legal system', Jan Dlugosz University, Law Faculty, 27/11/2023

		well as the Dean and Law Faculty body • Talk 'Political radicalization among Polish football fans', at Academic Workshop *Right-wing radicalization in the EU and neighbourhood since the "Two Crises"* - the pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 25-26 May, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität Berlin. • Contacts made with main state actors (FOI filed with information about the project): Internal Security Agency, Military Counterterrorism, Police, General Prosecutor, Ministry of the Interior and Administration, Prison Management Office, National Security Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Commissioner for Human Rights. • Involvement of local NGO 'In dubio pro liberate' in the project • Knowledge exchange with The Institute of Social Safety - main Polish NGO working on de-radicalization • Meeting with the President of Czestochowa to discuss local impact of D.Rad, 13.09.2023 • D.Rad Roundtable, 5 October 2023, Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa 'De-radicalization in Poland: responses, challenges and the future' with two Guest Lectures by Professor U. Korkut, Glasgow Caledonian University, in which the	• Art Project at the sports programme together with 'Wieczny Rakow' association (April 2022) • 2 focus groups with Czestochowa D.Rad Youth (April 2022) • Lecture for students 'De-radicalization in Poland: responses, challenges and the future', Jan Dlugosz University, Law Faculty, 04/11/2023 • Involvement of a local political (city council member) in the project • Involvement of 'Wieczny Rakow' to help to recruit participants for WP 8 • Interview with the local newspaper 'Zycie Częstochowy i Powiatu' - ' Eskalacja konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego – rozmowa z prof. Maria Moulin-Stożek z UJD' about the project.

	Rector, representative of the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland and constitutional law professors attended. • Establishment of the Interdisciplinary Research Centre on De-radicalization at Jan Dlugosz University to continue the knowledge exchange after the project is finished.	
KCSS	• Knowledge exchange with officials from the Probation Service of Kosovo, as part of two-day training in addressing violent extremism-related issues	• Kosovo Peace and Democracy Summit 2024
GIP		• 13 June 2023: D.Rad LAB I - Spatial Aspects of De-radicalisation Processes: Interactive Workshop with experts and practitioners. Tbilisi • 20 June 2023: D.Rad LAB II - Spatial Aspects of De-radicalisation Processes: Interactive Workshop with youth. Tbilisi
OEAW	• Haselbacher, Miriam and Ursula Reeger, 05.07.2023. Public space, diversity, and social inequalities: Insights from Vienna. Presentation at the 20th IMISCOE Annual Conference - Migration and Inequalities: In search of answers and solutions. Warsaw, Poland.	• 27 March 2023: D.Rad LAB I - Spatial Aspects of De-radicalisation Processes: Interactive Workshop with practitioners. Vienna • 22 June 2023: D.Rad LAB II - Spatial Aspects of De-radicalisation Processes: Interactive Workshop with the D.Rad Youth. Vienna
ZA	• ACT&ART Training for Trainers, Kranj (SLO), 20-25 Feb. 2023, 28 youth workers working with refugees and asylum seekers from 5 countries	• Presentation of the D.Rad documentary in London, screening, 23.10.2023 • Production of 53 videos uploaded to D.Rad Youtube channel and Twitter including

	• Round table moderation, Bridging Narratives: The Synergy of Art Meeting Academia, London, 23.10.2023		content upload and video production related to the videos, 2021 - 2024
BILGI	• Roundtable, Reactionary Radicalisation Processes, Turkish Political Science Association Annual Congress, September 24-25, 2022 • Panel convenor, Political Violence and Radicalization in the Age of Transboundary Crisis, 27th World Congress of IPSA, July 15-19, 2023 • Fall 2020-2021, D.Rad topic integrated to the course, IR 482 Class, Religion and Political Change at Istanbul Bilgi University		• Bilgi's official accounts on social media regularly released events • Istanbul Hub for Islamist Radicalisation, April 2024
PRONI	 • OUT OF THE BOX WEEK: YAP! Youth from Another Perspective. • 19th-22nd of September 2023 /Fažana, Istria, Croatia.		• Jasmin was moderating the panel: Panel IV: *"Radicalisation among youth – how to deal with it in different ways?"* and presented D.Rad project to 35 participants, representatives of different CSOs and local governments from different European countries that deals with young people.

	• https://outofthebox-international.org/news/otb-week-yap/	
CFCCS	• Participation at Belgrade Security Forum 2021: ACADEMIC PANEL 3: RESILIENCE AND RADICALIZATION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE • https://www.belgradeforum.org/session/academic-panel-3-resilience-and-radicalization-in-a-comparative-perspective/	• Exhibition: Galerija Kuće legata - D.**Rad**: **Deradikalizacija u Evropi i dalje**: „**Složeni narativ**" (u jednostavno doba). • Radio show U prvih pet! • Five most important events in Belgrade in December: • https://www.rts.rs/lat/radio/radio-beograd-2/5050288/gorcin-stojanovic.html

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Appendix

Radicalisation Trends

Radicalisation as a topic of growing importance as extremist ideologies and acts of violence grow across the world. Radicalization can be understood as the process by which individuals or groups adopt extreme ideologies and beliefs, often leading to a willingness to engage in acts of violence or terrorism to achieve their goals. It involves a significant shift in worldview, often driven by a sense of injustice, grievance, alienation or polarisation.

This lecture covers the broad definition of radicalisation before revealing the diversity of radicalisation and dynamics of radicalisation, illustrated with examples from D.Rad Project Work Packages 3 and 4.

1. Defining Radicalisation

Radicalisation is a complex and multifaceted process that involves the adoption of extreme beliefs, ideologies, or behaviours that deviate significantly from mainstream societal norms. It often leads individuals or groups to pursue drastic and sometimes violent actions to achieve their goals. While there is no single definition of radicalisation, it is commonly understood as a process of ideological transformation wherein individuals or groups become increasingly committed to ideas or causes that challenge prevailing social, political, or religious structures. At its core, radicalisation involves a shift in worldview, often fuelled by feelings of marginalisation, grievance, or disillusionment with the status quo. Individuals undergoing radicalisation may come to perceive themselves as part of a marginalised or oppressed group, leading them to seek out alternative narratives or ideologies that promise empowerment or liberation. These ideologies may offer a sense of belonging, identity, or purpose lacking in mainstream society.

The process of radicalisation is dynamic and nonlinear, influenced by a variety of personal, social, economic, and political factors. These may include experiences of discrimination or injustice, exposure to extremist propaganda or ideologies, social networks or peer pressure, economic disenfranchisement, political instability, or a desire for social status or recognition. Radicalization can occur both offline and online, with social media and the internet playing an increasingly significant role in amplifying extremist narratives and facilitating radicalisation pathways. It is important to recognize that not all individuals who hold radical beliefs or espouse extremist ideologies will engage in violence. Radicalisation exists on a spectrum, ranging from nonviolent forms of activism or protest to more extreme forms of violent extremism or terrorism. Additionally, individuals may move in and out of radicalized states over time, and the factors driving radicalisation may vary depending on the context. Efforts to prevent or counter radicalization require a comprehensive understanding of the underlying drivers and pathways of radicalization. This includes addressing systemic issues such as

discrimination, inequality, and social exclusion, and promoting critical thinking skills, media literacy, and positive alternatives to extremist narratives. It also involves engaging with communities at risk of radicalization, building resilience to extremist ideologies, and providing support and interventions for individuals vulnerable to radicalization.

2. Diversity of radicalisation trends

The diversity of radicalisation trends reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of the radicalisation process, which can manifest in various forms across different contexts, ideologies, and individuals. Radicalisation can stem from a wide range of ideologies, including political extremism (e.g., far-right or far-left ideologies), religious extremism (e.g., Islamist extremism, Christian fundamentalism), ethnonationalism, environmental extremism, and more. Each ideology may attract individuals for different reasons and offer distinct narratives and justifications for radical action. Radicalisation occurs in diverse geographic locations around the world, influenced by local socio-political dynamics, historical legacies, and cultural factors. Hotspots of radicalisation can emerge in urban areas, rural communities, or online spaces, with variations in the drivers and manifestations of radicalisation across regions.

Radicalization affects individuals from diverse backgrounds, including differences in age, gender, socioeconomic status, education level, and cultural or religious identity. While some individuals may be drawn to radical ideologies as a form of rebellion or empowerment, others may become radicalized in response to experiences of marginalization, discrimination, or trauma.

Radicalisation pathways can vary in terms of the methods and tactics used to radicalise individuals. Some may be influenced through face-to-face interactions with radicalized peers or recruiters, while others may be radicalized through exposure to extremist propaganda online or through social media platforms. Radicalisation can also occur through formal indoctrination in extremist groups or informal social networks.

Radicalisation trends evolve over time, with shifts in ideology, tactics, and targets reflecting changing social, political, and technological landscapes. Historical events, such as wars, economic crises, or political upheavals, can shape the trajectory of radicalisation movements, as can advances in communication technologies and the proliferation of online spaces for radicalisation.

Radicalisation trends often intersect with other forms of social and political extremism, creating complex dynamics of overlap and influence. For example, individuals may be radicalised simultaneously by religious and political ideologies, or by ideologies that combine elements of racism, misogyny, and xenophobia.

Responses to radicalization vary widely across different contexts and actors, including government agencies, law enforcement, civil society organizations, religious institutions, and community leaders. Strategies for prevention, intervention, and counter-radicalization may differ based on cultural norms, legal frameworks, and available resources

3. Dynamics of Radicalisation

Radicalisation is not a uniform process but manifests differently across contexts. Radical ideologies may develop over long periods, while acts of violence tend to crystalise into events much quicker. Understanding the lifespan of radical ideologies is crucial for designing effective de-radicalisation programs. For example, the activities of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Germany's most infamous far-right organisation, operated over nearly a decade, illustrating a long-term temporal horizon in the development of radical ideology. The NSU eventually committed a series of racially motivated murders and bombings targeting immigrants and minorities but these were not isolated incidents, but rather the culmination of a prolonged process of radicalisation which likely involved years of indoctrination, recruitment and planning (Sawyer & Zinigrad, 2022:19)

While some violent attacks may have a significant impact in terms of casualties, others hold symbolic power that resonates beyond the immediate victims. Acts of violence or extremist actions may hold symbolic significance that resonates with certain groups or ideologies. For example, an attack on a particular target, such as a religious institution or government building, can serve to galvanise support for a radical movement. Further, symbols or actions may carry meaning derived from historical or cultural narratives that can evoke strong emotions or reactions related to a sense of identity and belonging and then used to rally support or justify violent actions, symbols could include references to past conflicts or historical grievances. Further, symbolic events and actions often received significant media attention that only amplifies their impact and reach meaning media coverage can contribute to the spread of extremist narratives and ideologies, ultimately attracting new recruits or legitimising radical viewpoints. An example, in the case of religious violence targeting the LGBTQ+ community in Georgia and Israel, the selection of victims carries symbolic significance. The Orthodox Church in Georgia, operating on behalf of the state, targeted the LGBTQ+ community, reflecting the alignment between religious and state interests. Similarly, in Israel, where there is strong religious alignment with the state, violence targeting the LGBTQ+ community also carries symbolic weight, reflecting societal attitudes and religious beliefs (Sawyer & Zinigrad, 2022 :18). De-radicalisation efforts must address both the tangible impact and the symbolic significance of hotspots.

Cultural drivers of radicalisation

1. What are 'cultural drivers' of radicalization

The increasing level of radicalism in the current linked society represents significant problems for countries around the world. Understanding the cultural factors that lead to radicalization and its many manifestations in various nations is necessary for the successful development of preventative and intervention tactics. This paper will evaluate the cultural factors which lead to radicalization, the many facades of radicalization, the potential of prevention, and the opportunities and hindrances of the pursuit of de-radicalisation within Germany, Serbia, the UK, and Finland.

Radicalization in immigrant populations in Germany is inflamed by traditional frustration and economic inequality. While Turkish immigrants and their offspring remain firmly at the margins, there are those among them who were feeling angry and confused—and flocked, indeed, to groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (Anon, 2023). Far-right extremists also recruit from these and other groups concerned not only about demographic change but aspects of cultural dilution that have been stoked by the surge of migrants and refugees.

It is happening in Serbia, with the ethno-nationalist narratives providing another ground for growth, while the Yugoslav Wars brought an impact added to this factor. The clash of nationalistic feeling and unsolved problems, especially in territories where one can observe fierce internal confrontations, like in Kosovo and Vojvodina, are only a fuel for many radical groups like Nacionalni Stroj and Obraz. The ethnic conflicts and unsolved disputes remaining after the collapse of Yugoslavia have turned out to be very easy for radical organisations who are recruiting people anew, not to mention also keeping them apart and divided. Radicalism within the UK has been influenced by factors such as culture and geopolitics. The radicalization of people has mainly happened because extremist rhetoric or propaganda is in a position to spread through cyberspace, as can be seen with the precedents of the London Bridge radicals and their associates (Home Office, 2021). Minorities get easily radicalized due to instances of discrimination as well as their marginal status.

Far-right extremism surges in Finland due to disillusioned youth combined with contemporary influences from indoctrination over the internet. Groups like the Nordic Resistance Movement specifically use an avenue to such nationalist fervour and anti-immigrant sentiments as crutches to draw support from disillusioned voters. Their extremist fables proffer easy solutions to convoluted issues of social malaise, such as economic disparity and anxiety about losing one's national identity.

2. Forms of radicalization

To be able to pinpoint the various methods by which radicalization is driven in different.

Extremism vs Radicalization: Radicalization refers to the process of coming to believe in very extreme ideologies, while on the other hand, extremism refers to a state when someone is having such ideas. For example, most Germans are violent or sensitive towards terrorist groups when they are shoved by feelings of alienation or injustice, which might make them radicalise toward Islamist extremism. In turn, nationalist furore and anti-immigrant emotions play in the hands of far-right extremists, who feed on people worrying about cultural erosion and social change.

Gender and Radicalization: Where radicalization comes into play, gender relations are always a big deal. Nationalist narratives feed ethno-nationalist goals by recruiting young males into the extreme organizations that highlight traditional, conventional ideas of masculinity (Anon). On this note, women recruited inside the UK and Finland by Islamist extremist organizations expose that women may be drawn into extremist movements looking for empowerment or connection.

Religion and Radicalization: Islamist Extremist Narratives within the UK draw recruits into their realm with religious grievances and identity politics. Like Finland, anti-immigration and nationalistic attitudes are interlinked with the far-right radicalization trend that tends to be expressed from an ethnic and cultural point of view. Such becomes a key example of the interrelation between religion, culture, and radicalization, insofar as religious and cultural identity is wielded in defence of extreme views.

3. Curtailing radicalization: is it possible?

Community involvement, projects of social integration, and intervention schemes aimed at the real issues of concern are some of those meant to be in use by Germany in trying to combat extremism. This includes preventive initiatives such as the preventive network of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees as part of counternarratives geared at building resilience in vulnerable populations.

Still, there are obstacles to be encountered when it comes to addressing long-standing socio-economic disparities and counteracting radical beliefs that propagate hatred and discord. That does not vary very much from Serbia, so the fight to radicalization should include abolition of ethno-nationalist myths and construction of the bridges of understanding by means of discourses and education (D8.1 – All Countries Report – D.Rad Project). And in pursuing this objective of preventing extremism in favour of societal unity, in fact, many groups in civil society accentuated the diversity and tolerance essential. In order to remove obstacles that political tensions and past grudges give to reconciliation initiatives, ongoing communication and participation are important.

One such initiative in the United Kingdom that is an antidote to radicalization, is the Prevent Program which identifies and supports people it considers potential recruits to violent radical groups. Critics argue that the show has a stereotypical target of Muslim populations and securitizes them; the same also sheds light on the poor line, security, and civil freedoms. In addition, encouraging social cohesion and countering radicalization requires the elimination of socioeconomic disparities while advocating for policies of inclusiveness.

Social inclusion, internet counter-propaganda, and community resilience building are all a part of fighting radicalization in Finland. The Finish Security Intelligence Service works together with civic organizations and municipal authorities to monitor such movements and assist people susceptible to radicalisation. A place, however, that is difficult to still while always on the move, to promote inter-cultural discussion; one cannot deal with problems from which extremism stems.

4. De-radicalisation

The Hayat hotline and other de-radicalization programs for individuals in Germany support and help the ones who want to abandon radical ideology. Such are programs aimed at rehabilitation of ex-extremists, often implemented together with assistance in vocational training for militants and for the work of a psychiatrist and reintegration. In view of stigmatization and social exclusion, reintegration gets even more complicated, thus community understanding and support is considered critical.

Education and grassroots form the fulcrum of Serbia's de-radicalization efforts to inspire youth with civic ideals, criticism, and tolerance. One of them is an organization called "Initiative of Youth for Human Rights," which aims to push violent narratives away from youngsters and prepare them for saying no to the given thing (European Parliament., 2016). However, its success is caused by the political divergence and post-conflict consequences, so it needs to be further financed with programs aiming at peace-building. And while those in the UK at risk of radicalization can get one-to-one support, with de-radicalisation programs such as Channel offering mentors, counselling, and supplementary education to help ease them away from an extremist ideology. In this accordance, not only continuous evaluation is needed but the efficiency of such programmes is questioned. Anyway, social resilience can lie on prevention from radicalization and exposure of the underlying basic socio-economic grievances, but the actual construction can only be built by the promotion of community solidarity.

Programs in Finland also include participation from families and communities for an all-inclusive approach in helping those needing de-radicalisation. Projects like Exit Finland offer therapy and other services aimed at the rehabilitation of ex-extremists with further return to society (Anon). However, reduction of radicalization from its root and realization of cohesion among cosmopolitan communities is not without challenges.

5. Conclusion

Finally, the cultural, social, and political realities of each country require national approaches to research and prevention strategies for radicalization. They must become capable of reducing the impacts of radicalization and hence assist more in both the development of an inclusive society against root causes and ensuring means of deepening social harmony, so that people can say no to violence and extremism. Of particular importance are the de-radicalisation programs since they talk about techniques of prevention, intervention, and reintegration into society as a method with which to fight this tendency towards extremism, giving people hope for rehabilitation and facilitation for reconciliation.

IGAP Survey and Online radicalisation

How to recognise radicalisation online and keep safe?

1. Introduction

The D.Rad project as an initiative to understand and investigates how radical elements utilize online visuals to attract and influence worldwide audiences. This study looks into visual media, such as memes or videos, to reveal the ways these tools spread extremist ideas and recruit people for political reasons. According to Ling et al. (2021) and Crawford et al. (2021), there is a strong visual similarity among different types of radical content that finds resonance in online far-right networks, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of these phenomena.

It is very important to understand how radicalization works online so that we can develop good counterstrategies to stop it. As time goes on, radical groups are getting better at using social media and other platforms on the internet to spread their messages to more people, identifying and mitigating these influences is paramount. This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the visual methods used by radical groups and evaluate their impact on public perception and behaviour. This involves investigating how images and visual stories can make radical movements seem more real and easier to understand for those who might sympathize with them.

2. Theoretical Framework

The way media represents things greatly affects online radicalization, especially through websites like YouTube where images and sounds can powerfully spread radical ideas (Hoskins et al., 2011). The Finnish context, explained in the report about media roles in radicalization, shows how these platforms are not just tools for spreading extreme content but also help to create and strengthen communities that are extreme, by using emotional involvement and polarizing stories (Horsmanheimo et al., 2021).

In Finland, studying right-wing radicalism and its online forms reveals a problematic interest in aggressive nationalist language, which often leads to discussing topics like xenophobia and exclusion. Online activity tends to focus on feelings of being left out and perceived injustices towards local groups, which are amplified when changes are happening in society or culture like more people immigrating (SUPO, 2021). The Finnish far-right uses YouTube as a way to expand their influence beyond regular extremist factions, targeting broader audiences by using complex media storylines that touch on patriotic and anti-immigration emotions (Lounela et al., 2021).

YouTube acts as an interactive ground, where users can comment, like and share content, such a facility helps extreme ideas to scatter swiftly across the platform while also boosting unity among extremist groups on the internet. This interaction is crucial in comprehending how individual dissatisfaction transforms into combined radical action that creates a fertile

environment for radical views to grow and turn people into extremists within what seems like a 'protected' echo chamber online (Laaksonen et al., 2020).

Therefore, the difficulty of online radicalization needs a careful method that takes into account different aspects like how people consume media and the cultural settings where these patterns occur. It is crucial to create counter-strategies that encourage people to learn about media and engage with it critically so that they can identify and combat manipulative extreme stories. Moreover, regulatory measures and community-driven initiatives should focus on disrupting the digital environments that foster radicalization, promoting a media landscape that supports democratic values and cultural inclusivity (Horsmanheimo et al., 2021).

3. Methodology

For the study about radicalization via digital platforms and popular culture, the main methodology used was qualitative content analysis. This method was selected for its effectiveness in dissecting the nuanced ways in which various media contents can both reflect and shape political and social realities.

The study looked at different kinds of media production, like campaign materials for elections, posts on social media, and online videos from radical or far-right parties and movements existing in each country. The choice of these materials was made by considering their connection to themes related to radicalization along with antisemitism, and anti-immigration feelings topics that are visible within the national conversations.

Country-based Findings:

Austria:

The study's findings of Austria focus on analysing the representation, mobilization, circulation, and consumption of media content from right-wing extremist groups, specifically the FPÖ and Generation Identity.

Representation and Mobilization: Videos from the FPÖ and Generation Identity on YouTube show methods of spreading radical thoughts. The FPÖ's content mobilizes support using anti-COVID-19 demonstrations to attract far-right supporters, AND Generation Identity's actions are for strengthening their ideological foundation (Benson, 2017; Mattoni, 2017).

Circulation and Consumption: The use of YouTube comments in the FPÖ video to involve viewers shows an efficient utilization of digital platforms for radical mobilization. On the other hand, Generation Identity depends on old media methods for spreading its message - particularly when it is de-platformed, hinting at strategic media usage to keep influence (Conway, 2017).

Public and Political Response: The difference between how people see extremism and the real number of right-wing events happening shows possible difficulties in efforts to counter radicalization (Haselbacher, Mattes, and Reeger, 2021).

France:

The report's main focus on radicalization in France is Dieudonné M'Bala M'Bala, a French comedian who has caused significant impact through his controversial performances and social media presence that promote antisemitic ideologies. Dieudonné, famous for mixing humor with clear political messages, has successfully made radical viewpoints part of mainstream French popular culture by using both conventional and digital communication methods. The report uses critical discourse analysis to show how the blending of humor and explicit political messaging by Dieudonné has turned extreme antisemitism into a common part of French society.

Dieudonné uses different media platforms to spread his antisemitic opinions widely, making them seem normal or acceptable for many people, including minorities (Marlière, 2022). The wide acceptance shows how hard it can be to fight against these ideas in French media's cultural system.

The fact that Dieudonné, after being hit by legal penalties and getting blocked from key digital platforms still has influence, illustrating the limitations of current regulatory measures against hate speech (Turcan, 2020). The way Dieudonné uses digital platforms is a very subtle method that shows how radical thoughts can enter into public awareness. He uses comedy and takes advantage of political dissatisfaction which attracts many people, causing the process of radicalization to become more hidden and widespread (Amadori, 2016).

Germany:

In Germany, the study looks into the effect of Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and its contribution in making far-right radicalization worse, this is done by presenting immigration as a danger to society. The AfD's method includes increasing this mistrust and positioning itself as an essential extreme option that can safeguard Germany from what it sees as dangers caused by immigrants (Sadeghi, 2018; Vorländer et al., 2018).

The study explains that AfD's media strategies to increase polarization work because they resonate with existing fears and biases among voters. This can be seen in their election campaign materials, which spread false information about immigration risks and picture the party as only protector of German interests from a bad and foreign political group (Koliska & Assmann, 2019; Statista a, 2021).

The reactions of audiences to AfD's campaign spots on platforms like Facebook show a strong connection with the message of the party. The comments not only align with AfD's depiction of immigration as a danger, but they also express general dissatisfaction with the political establishment that underlines how the party is successfully utilizing digital platforms for spreading its agenda and contributing to common radicalization in public discussions (Brodnik et al., 2019).

These findings suggest that to counteract this trend, it is essential to recognize and address the underlying social and political grievances that the AfD exploits. This involves improving trust in democratic institutions and actively countering the misinformation spread by radical

parties through informed public discourse and media literacy initiatives (Häusler, 2018; Schwarz, 2020).

Conclusion

The study underscores the significant role visual media play in the process of radicalization, pointing out platforms such as YouTube as powerful ways to spread extreme ideas. Online platforms play a central role in helping radical groups to spread their ideas, find a wider audience and promote narratives that could lead to radicalization. The study mentions that media has a two-fold part - it can either help to stop radicalization, or sometimes even cause it. It highlights how some specific types of media outputs, such as fringe media, might unintentionally encourage the spread of extremist beliefs. There is a heavy focus on the need for better understanding about media. It's very important that people are taught to think critically and understand media content, so as to stop the growth and acceptance of radical ideas from spreading through this platform.

The effectiveness of current regulatory measures against radical content, such as banning individuals and groups from platforms, is discussed. The study suggests that while these measures are necessary, they are not entirely sufficient and must be part of a broader strategy.

The study suggests large-scale approaches that include initiatives driven by communities, more strict rules and the encouragement of a media environment that backs democratic principles and cultural.

De-radicalisation stakeholders and strategies

1. Who is involved in counter-radicalisation efforts?

Stakeholders in the context of radicalization refer to individuals, groups, or organizations that have an interest or influence in addressing the phenomenon of radicalization and its associated risks. These stakeholders often play diverse roles in prevention, intervention, and response efforts aimed at countering radicalization and promoting community resilience. Key stakeholders may include:

- Government Agencies: National and local government agencies responsible for security, law enforcement, intelligence, education, social services, and community engagement play a crucial role in developing policies, strategies, and initiatives to prevent and counter radicalization.
- Law Enforcement: Police and security agencies are involved in identifying, monitoring, and disrupting extremist activities, as well as investigating and prosecuting individuals involved in radicalization or extremist violence.
- Community Organizations: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based groups, religious institutions, and civil society organizations often work directly with communities to provide support, promote social cohesion, and address underlying grievances that may contribute to radicalization.
- Educational Institutions: Schools, universities, and educational stakeholders are important partners in promoting critical thinking, resilience, and social inclusion among students, as well as identifying and addressing signs of radicalization within educational settings.
- Religious Leaders: Religious leaders and institutions can play a significant role in countering extremist narratives, promoting tolerance, and offering positive alternatives to radical ideologies within religious communities.
- Media and Online Platforms: Media organizations, social media platforms, and online communities have a responsibility to counter extremist propaganda, prevent the spread of radicalizing content, and promote digital literacy and responsible online behaviour.
- International Partners: Collaboration with international partners, including other governments, multilateral organizations, and regional initiatives, is essential for sharing information, coordinating efforts, and addressing transnational aspects of radicalization and terrorism.
- Lawmakers and Policy Experts: Policymakers, legislators, researchers, and subject matter experts contribute to shaping policies, laws, and strategies related to countering radicalization, as well as conducting research and analysis to better understand the drivers and dynamics of radicalization.
- Role of Technology and AI: More recently the role of technology, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), in addressing radicalization has come into discussion. It is suggested that AI could assist in detecting, tracing, and analysing radicalization trends and threats

within online spaces. However, there is a need for more human resources and funding to implement AI tools effectively.

Engaging and mobilizing these stakeholders in coordinated efforts is essential for developing holistic and effective approaches to prevent and counter radicalization, promote community resilience, and protect individuals from the influence of extremist ideologies.

2. Approaches to de-radicalisation

Preventative Approach

This approach prioritised integrative measures focusing on social inclusion and anti-discrimination policies to inhibit marginalisation and alienation, which are drivers of radicalisation. The emphasis is placed on social 'safety' rather than security, with a focus on promoting inclusiveness, open discussion, and critical thinking in schools. Preventative measures primary target young people, and collaboration between government policies and civil society is emphasised.

- Case Study – The Netherlands' Approach to Preventing Radicalisation

The Netherlands has implemented a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalization and extremism, focusing on early intervention, community engagement, and social cohesion. The country has faced challenges with radicalization particularly among marginalized communities, although has prioritised proactive measures to address the root causes and prevent individuals from being drawn into extremist ideologies. The Dutch government collaborates closely with local communities, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and educational institutions to identify and address radicalization risks. Community-based approaches emphasize building trust, fostering dialogue, and empowering local stakeholders to play an active role in prevention efforts.

Repressive Approach

Repressive approach focuses on identifying and apprehending individuals involved in extremist activities through law enforcement efforts. It relies on the criminal justice system to prosecute and punish offenders, with an emphasis on deterrence and incapacitation. Security-focused approaches involve surveillance, monitoring, and intelligence gathering to detect and disrupt extremist networks and activities. This may include measures such as increased police presence in vulnerable communities, enhanced border security, and counterterrorism operations.

- Case Study – France's counterterrorism efforts

France has experienced several high-profile terrorist attacks, including the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015 and the Paris attacks in the same year, as well as subsequent incidents.

These events have heightened concerns about radicalization within French society and the need for robust counterterrorism measures. Frances has implemented a range of 'repressive measures' including providing law enforcement with expanded powers for surveillance and investigation; allowing for the prosecution and imprisonment of individuals associated with organizations deemed terrorist; and measures to deport and expel foreign nationals involved in extremist activity. These repressive measures have been criticized for potential human rights violations, including concerns about racial profiling, excessive surveillance and the impact on civil liberties and privacy rights.

Mixed Approach

Some de-radicalisation programs adopt a mixed approach that combines elements of both repressive and integrative strategies. This may involve a comprehensive approach that includes preventive measures, law enforcement actions, social interventions, and rehabilitation efforts tailored to the specific needs of individuals and communities. Mixed approaches often require collaboration and coordination among various stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies, government institutions, community organizations, religious leaders, and mental health professionals, to address the complex factors driving radicalization effectively.

3. Current issues with de-radicalisation strategies

Many countries rely heavily on repressive measures, such as law enforcement, security operations, and criminal justice, to counter radicalization. While important, this approach may overshadow prevention, rehabilitation, and addressing root causes of radicalization. There is a need for more comprehensive and holistic approaches that address social, economic, political, and psychological factors contributing to radicalization. Integrative strategies, including community engagement, social integration, and education, are essential but may be underutilized.

Many de-radicalisation efforts primarily focus on Islamist extremism and jihadism, potentially neglecting other forms of extremism, such as right-wing extremism. This narrow focus may lead to biases and inadequate responses to emerging threats. Some countries adopt double standards and selectively apply legislative provisions, resulting in discriminatory treatment of individuals based on ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation. This undermines trust in the justice system and may exacerbate grievances.

Several countries struggle with hate speech, discrimination, and stigmatization targeting minority groups, including Muslims, LGBTQI+ individuals, and Roma people. Government propaganda and discriminatory policies contribute to social tensions and may fuel radicalization. While some countries have de-radicalisation programs in place, there are concerns about insufficient funding, staffing, and support for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. This includes inadequate staff training, limited access to mental health services, and challenges in engaging with at-risk individuals.

Trends of dissent towards government policies, such as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, have led to the rise of new extremist attitudes and actions. Anti-establishment propaganda and opposition to vaccination campaigns highlight the need for adaptive and proactive de-radicalisation strategies.

Overall, addressing these issues requires a shift towards more balanced, inclusive, and multidimensional de-radicalisation strategies that prioritize prevention, rehabilitation, and community engagement while upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.

How to tackle online radicalization?

1. 'Radicalisation pipeline'

The radicalisation pipeline refers to the process through which individuals become radicalised and increasingly committed to extremist ideologies or actions. It's often depicted as a series of stages or steps that individuals may go through as they become more deeply involved in extremist beliefs or activities. The process can vary depending on the context and ideology involved.

2. 'The Lone Wolf Strategy'

The lone wolf strategy refers to a tactic employed by individuals or small groups who carry out acts of violence or terrorism independently, without direct coordination or support from larger extremist organizations. These individuals are often self-radicalised and act alone, making it challenging for authorities to detect and prevent their activities. Lone wolves typically operate under their own initiative, motivated by personal grievances, ideological beliefs, or a desire for notoriety. They may draw inspiration from extremist ideologies espoused online or by other like-minded individuals but do not necessarily have direct contact with organized extremist groups. The term "lone wolf" is commonly used in the context of terrorism, where individuals or small cells carry out attacks with minimal or no assistance from a broader network. Due to their decentralized nature and lack of formal connections to extremist organizations, lone wolves may be harder to identify and intercept before they carry out their attacks.

Preventing lone wolf attacks poses significant challenges for law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies, as traditional surveillance methods may be less effective against individuals who operate independently. Strategies for countering lone wolf terrorism often involve enhanced intelligence gathering, community engagement, and efforts to address the underlying grievances and radicalisation pathways that lead individuals to embrace extremist ideologies and violence.

3. Online radicalisation

Online radicalisation plays a significant role in the lone wolf strategy by providing individuals with access to extremist ideologies, propaganda, and support networks through the internet. Lone actors can become radicalised by consuming online content that promotes violence, justifies extremist beliefs, and fosters a sense of belonging to a like-minded community.

Through online platforms such as social media, forums, and encrypted messaging apps, lone wolves can find ideological reinforcement, connect with other extremists, and access practical information on planning and executing attacks. They may also use the internet to research tactics, acquire weapons, and seek validation for their actions.

Moreover, online radicalisation enables lone actors to self-radicalise at their own pace and in relative anonymity, making it challenging for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify and intervene before an attack occurs. The internet provides a virtual breeding ground for radicalisation, where individuals can become increasingly isolated from mainstream society while immersing themselves in extremist ideologies.

Examples of radicalisation online that has resulted in violent acts:

- Hotspots in Germany, including Munich, Halle, Wolfhagen (near Kassel), and Hanau, where a series of armed, 'lone wolf'-type attacks were committed by individual perpetrators. These incidents resulted in the deaths of twenty-one people. The online medium played a significant role in these attacks, with perpetrators being embedded in online networks and intentionally spreading hate and fear with support obtained from digital spaces.
- The case of the murder of a French schoolteacher in 2020 illustrates a hotspot of radicalisation in France. The perpetrator was highly active on social media for months before the attack, showing clear signs of rapid and extreme radicalization. His digital activity was predominantly focused on jihadist ideology and promoting the actions of Russian-speaking fighters who died as 'martyrs' in conflicts abroad.
- A hotspot in Finland related to a school shooting incident in Jokela, where the perpetrator acted alone but was connected to national and global online communities interested in school shootings. The shooter wrote manifestos in both English and Finnish and posted them online before the attack, indicating a deep involvement in online radicalisation networks.

4. How to tackle online radicalisation

Recognising and addressing radicalisation online requires a multidimensional approach that integrates features, content analysis, behaviour patterns, network analysis, linguistic analysis, platform analysis, and consideration of contextual factors (Gal, Ravid & Salomon, 2022). By understanding the role of the internet in lone wolf radicalisation, stakeholders can develop more effective strategies to prevent and mitigate the threat posed by violent extremists operating online. This multifaceted approach encompasses various dimensions, including examining the technical features of online platforms, analysing the content shared on them, studying behaviour patterns, mapping social networks, scrutinising linguistic aspects, assessing platform characteristics, and considering broader socio-political and cultural factors. By integrating these diverse analytical approaches, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners can develop more nuanced and effective strategies for preventing and countering radicalisation online. This approach enables a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics at play in online radicalisation processes and informs targeted interventions that address specific vulnerabilities and risk factors.