DeRadicalisation

in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate

De-radicalisation and Integration Policies and best practices at the European and cross-border level

D.Rad/Policies Report

WP 4.3

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and broader social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) so as to move towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Türkiye, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing, and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction and methodology

The report aims at comparing policies and best practices as emerged among the D.Rad consortium gathered in Work Package 4. In particular, it includes the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Türkiye, Georgia and Austria. The adopted methodology clusters policies by common traits and strategies in tackling radicalisation. This represents a reversed approach in comparison with the methodology adopted in the WP 4 Comparative Report (D4.2). In the latter, the analysis of the legal and policy frameworks of D.Rad countries has shown quite diverse backgrounds and political choices, also due to national contexts and their history of extremist trends and movements.[1] Hence, we relied on general patterns which could allow the clustering of such different backgrounds, instead of selecting specific national experiences. In this report, we have been able to identify two main common approaches guiding domestic policies.

First, national strategies with separate policies against radicalisation with separate strategies against radicalisation. Second, countries with strategies against radicalisation included in counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism policies. This was triangulated with the main actors dealing with de-radicalisation as identified in national reports (D4.1). Thus, in systems with a repressive approach, institutions dealing with de-radicalisation are those involved in national security and their actions are mostly embedded in counter-terrorism strategies. For instance, in countries falling into this category main actors in counter-radicalisation are institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Internal Affair. Consistently, in countries with a mixed legal pattern,[2] the institutional framework depends on repressive and preventive strategies carried out by the abovementioned institutions in collaboration with institutions such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Social Welfare. In some countries, due to national particularities, institutions dealing with religious affairs play a crucial role too, especially as far as integration and pluralism are concerned.[3] In the majority of D.Rad Countries, NGOs and civil society associations' activities are deemed of importance, though the effectiveness of their actions, as well as the space for their support may vary considerably in accordance with the presence or the lack of institutional endorsement and funding. Disengagement per se, as a policy domain is beyond the scope of this report, since the presence of several EU project specifically analysing the topic (*inter alia*, EUTEx focusing on prisons[4]; MIRAD on radicalisation assessment toward disengagement[5]; PREPARE on probation and release[6]).[7]

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[1] For a thorough analysis, please see the D.Rad Comparative Report (D4.2), https://dradproject.com/?publications=d4-2-comparative-report-de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-and-policy-framework.

[2] As for the definition provided in the comparative report D4.2, a mixed legal pattern are "systems [which] combine a legislative framework characterised by a counter-terrorism agenda with preventive measures aimed at balancing securitarian responses", see D4.2, Section 2.3., p. 18.

[3] For instance, in Georgia, the State Agency for Religious Issues and the Councils (under the Prime Minister) of Religions (Public Defender's Office), in Türkiye the Presidency of Religious Affairs, in Iraq, the Sunni, the Shiite and the Christian-Yazidi-Sabian 'Endowements' established at the national governmental level.

[4] Insights on the project are available at: https://www.oiip.ac.at/en/projects/eutex-developing-a-european-framework-for-disengagement-and-reintegration-of-extremist-offenders-and-radicalised-individuals-in-prison-including-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-and-their-familie/.

[5] https://prisonsystems.eu/new-mirad-project-extremists-reintegration/.

[6] Insights on the project are available at: https://efus.eu/topics/radicalisation-polarisation-en/prepare-a-look-at-how-european-countries-prevent-radicalisation-through-probation-and-release/. On the topic, please see T. Bjørgo, (2011), *Dreams and disillusionment: engagement in and disengagement from militant extremist groups*, Crime, Law and Social Change, 55:4.

[7] Other projects on the topic are: -DRIVEDRIVE - Resisting Radicalisation Through Inclusion (driveproject.eu) GREASE Home Page - GREASE (eui.eu) PARTICIPATION The Project | Participation (participation-in.eu) PAVE Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism through Community Resilience | PAVE (pave-project.eu)

Notwithstanding this difference in methodology, between the WP4 Comparative Report on the legal framework (D4.2) and this report, the results seem to converge. As the WP4 Comparative Report on the legal framework (D4.2) showed, and as this report confirms, there is no clear-cut model to be followed in counter-radicalisation.[8] Approaches may merge, similar strategies may diverge and different programs may equally shape effective tools against radicalisation. Thus, this report does not suggest a comprehensive strategy against radicalisation, or a checklist of successful policies, but is rather based on D.Rad best practices and a comparative analysis of policies and best practices among D.Rad countries.

In fact, what 'works' in de-radicalisation, how to assess evidence, how to measure tools' effectiveness, how and whether programs respond to the challenges posed by violent extremism rely on changing paradigms. In this regard, though specifically referred to rehabilitation, the general guidelines framed by the Radicalisation Awareness Network[9] in the Special Overview Paper (24/11/2021) suggest that "(…) in light of changing extremist landscapes and scenes, practitioners and organisations need to stay up to speed. To enable this, programme structures need to be flexible. Further trainings of staff and programme adaptations need to be reflected by the surrounding policy and funding frameworks".[10]

Despite the complexity of radicalisation per se, we clustered national policies gathered in WP4[11] according to 1) having a separate policy against radicalisation or 2) having strategies against radicalisation included as a part of a broader counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism policy. Slovenia represents an exception in the overall D.Rad countries' landscape (para. 2.3). Systemic preventive measures against radicalisation have been neither adopted nor implemented and there are no institutions dealing specifically with de-radicalisation nor best practices and interventions.[12]

First, state-of-art of the domestic solutions implemented by D.Rad Countries based on national reports data were presented, followed by national best practices. In the next section, policies were clustered according to a) the chosen spaces of de-radicalisation (schools, prisons, and online context)[13] and b) the most important institutions in de-radicalisation included in national reports. Table 3 shows the triangulation between the legal framework, as investigated in the WP 4

PREVEX http://www.prevex-balkan-mena.eu/ BRaVE BRaVE (brave-h2020.eu) CONNEKT Homepage - Connekt (h2020connekt.eu) DARE DIALOGUE ABOUT RADICALISATION AND EQUALITY - Home (dare-h2020.org).

[8] See, V. Costa, P. Liberado, G. Esgalhado et al., *One Size Does Not Fit All: Exploring the Characteristics of Exit Prgrammes in Europe*, in *Journal for Deradicalization*, No. 28 (2021):Fall. See also C. Clemmow, S. Schumann, N.L. Salman, P. Gill, (2020), *The Base Rate Study: Developing Base Rates for Risk Factors and Indicators for Engagement in Violent Extremism*, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 65:3.

[9] Founded in 2011, RAN is a network of frontline practitioners who work daily with both those vulnerable to radicalisation and those who have already been radicalised. It is funded by the EU Commission Internal Security Fund.

[10] Special Overview Paper (24/11/2021), RAN activities on Rehabilitation, p. 3. The document is available at: https://homeaffairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202201/special_overview_paper_on_rehabilitation_012022_en.pdf. As far as counteractions in general are concerned, and for some differences between radicalization, extremism and terrorism, please, see also E. Bakker, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies. Comparing Theory and Practice*, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2015; J. Monaghan, A. Molnar, (2016), *Radicalisation theories, policing practices, and "the future of terrorism?"*, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9:3; F. Lösel, S. King, D. Bender, I. Jugl H. Scheithauer, V. Leuschner, N. Böckler, B. Akhgar, H. Nitsch, (2018), *Protective Factors Against Extremism and Violent Radicalisation: A Systematic Review of Research*, International Journal of Developmental Science, 12:1-2; A. P. Schmid, (2004), *Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(2); W. Stephens, S. Sieckelinck, H. Boutellier, (2021), *Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44:4, 346-361.

[11] See Country reports D4.1 Legal and Policy Framework, https://dradproject.com/?page_id=2354.

[12] A thorough explanation of the historical and social causes rendering Slovenia one of the safest countries in the world can be found in paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Slovenia national report (D4.1, available at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-slovenia).

[13] See the WP4 Comparative Report D.4.2., Sections 3.1.1., 3.1.2., 3.1.3.

Comparative Report (D4.2) (repressive, preventive, mixed patterns)[14], the policies strategy, as emerged in the present report (separate policy against radicalisation or strategies against radicalisation included as a part of a broader counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism policy) and the main institutions as indicated in the national reports (D4.1). After the clustering of policies based on the findings, the report contains conclusive remarks to uncover current trends and new developments in de-radicalisation.

2. National Policies

As far as domestic responses against radicalisation are concerned, consortium's national reports have stressed the most relevant and effective strategies carried out in each country. Notwithstanding the plethora of different solutions regarding the topic, we were able to detect some common traits. First, policies concerning de-radicalisation can be either identified as an autonomous phenomenon, or as a part of a broader policy against extremism, terrorism or trends that threaten national security. These two approaches can merge, and the policies might combine specifically devoted strategies on de-radicalisation with the reliance on a counter-terrorism agenda in addressing de-radicalisation.

2.1. D.Rad Countries with separate policies against radicalisation

Several countries have elaborated, with a sharp acceleration in the recent years, a policy framework explicitly devoted to de-radicalisation. The presence of a dedicated policy framework does not necessarily entail that the framework or strategy is coherent, and even less that it is effective, but simply that the country has identified radicalisation and de-radicalisation as a relevant policy domain. Austria, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Jordan, Kosovo, Serbia, Slovenia, UK fall into this category. In fact, national strategies can involve preventive plans focused on integration and welfare, or rely on repressive actions, as well as providing more or less clearly defined policies at the operational level. Most countries would rely on both – preventive/integrative plus repressive – or combine the three. In this group, some countries have also drafted national plans, strategies or actions against terrorism, *in addition to* de-radicalisation strategies; this is the case for Austria, France, Georgia, Germany, Jordan, Kosovo, Serbia, Slovenia and the UK. Only in Finland the strategy against radicalisation and the de-radicalisation policies rely exclusively on an *ad hoc* policy framework, which is interesting because Finland is the only country whose de-radicalisation legal model is genuinely based on integration.

As illustrated in Table 1, the triangulation of the policy framework with the legal one provides an interesting picture of the countries belonging to this first macro-category: for the large majority of them, the presence of a combination of separate policies against radicalisation with counter-terrorism policies is mirrored in a mixed (preventive and repressive) legal approach, with the exception of Jordan, strongly anchored in the repressive legal model, while Slovenia represents a case on its own and Finland presents separate policies against radicalisation and is characterised by a preventive legal framework.

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[14] Id., Sections 2, 2.1., 2.2., 2.3.

Table 1- Triangulation of the policy framework with the legal framework - countries with separate policies against radicalisation

		Mixed	Preventive	Repressive
Policy Framework	Separate policies against radicalisation & separate counter-terrorism/extremism policies	Austria; France; Georgia; Germany; Kosovo; Serbia; UK		Jordan
	Separate policies against radicalisation		Finland	
	Legal framework			

Leading de-radicalisation institutions vary in this first category. Since several actors and institutions are involved, varying in accordance to each national context, the picture is not static and there is no homogeneity of approaches and responses. This framework can be triangulated with the legal pattern. In Austria, for instance, the mixed legal framework is reflected in the institutional one. The Federal Ministry of Interior, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism, the Ministry of Justice activities are supported by a huge work of awareness-raising, counter-narratives and educational programs carried out by associations, NGOs and local representatives. It is similar in case of other countries with a mixed legal pattern. For example, in France the Ministry of Justice cooperates with the national education system in de-radicalisation, even though the main activities are undertaken by security forces (*inter alia* national intelligence, Ministry of Defence). In Germany the Federal Government consistently collaborates with civil society actors, also locally. Similarly, in Serbia, notwithstanding the pervasive role security actors are vested with (Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor's Office for organised crime), associations and NGOs are deemed essential and their actions indispensable in the general framework against radicalisation.

Moreover, other paradigms of interaction can be detected in Kosovo and in the UK. In the first case, the Ministry of Justice, police, prosecution and probation services, intelligence agencies are involved in de-radicalisation, but a central role is played by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social welfare, and the Community Safety Councils at the peripheral level. In the UK, the security actors' activities are counterbalanced with an active role of the Department of Education, in collaboration with the Home Office, which both engage in a preventive approach via media channels and the drafting of handbooks and guidelines. Furthermore, Jordan confirms the repressive pattern, thus presenting military forces and intelligence as the main institutions respectively. In the Jordanian case specifically, associations and civil society actions are not absent but they are strongly anchored to, and supervised by, a robust governmental control. In Finland too, the institutional framework corroborates the preventive pattern detected at the legal framework level. In fact, in the Finnish case the approach is multidimensional and multiagency in nature: the Ministry of Interior coordinates a constant exchange and interaction between police officers, other ministries (for instance, the Ministry of Justice), immigrant advocacy groups, academics and NGOs. Consistently, the National Institute for Health and Welfare is a central institutional actor in de-radicalisation.

In the following section, we will thus show in detail the policies approach and strategy chosen by each D.Rad country, with some insights about the abovementioned actors involved in de-radicalisation.

The **Austrian** policy framework shows a mixed approach, merging security-oriented responses with preventive strategies, especially as far as integration is concerned. In this regard, immigration and religious associations are at the core of the Austrian governmental concern. The recent Counter-terrorism Act issued in 2020 specifically tackles 'religiously motivated extremist association', in order to challenge Islamic radicalism. Nevertheless, this approach has been deemed biased and discriminatory (*inter alia*, by Amnesty International) and it was already implemented in 2015, through the so-called Islam Law. The latter was issued in the context of the federal Security Strategy which identified Islamist extremist as the major threat for the Austrian internal security. Moreover, in 2017 integration policies addressed to refugees were framed, but through a prohibition approach, banning full-face covering in public spaces and the distribution of radical propaganda materials. Also, in 2019, an action plan against Islamist radicalisation was introduced. Thus, the topic has often been at the core of Austrian debate on integration and governmental policies, with a consequent politicization as well. The latter led to disagreements between the governmental policy and the approach implemented in the City of Vienna, based on an inclusive and pluralist strategy, which became the target of a dedicated action plan shaped by the Immigrant Integration Ministry and the Ministry of Interior. In this context, a Documentation Centre of Political Islam was established, aiming at tackling religious 'segregation' and 'separatism'. This included the publication in 2021 of an Islam map online, listing – as the name properly suggests – and mapping public and private representatives of Islam in Austria, potentially exposing them to right-wing extremism and anti-Muslim targeting. Indeed, right-wing extremism is not beyond the scope of Austrian governmental policies on de-radicalisation. In fact, a National Council resolution issued in 2020 was devoted to preventive actions against ultra-nationalism. To this extent, an interdisciplinary working group of experts and stakeholders, along with institutions, was settled to discuss the topic, which led to the drafting of a bill against hate speech in the same year, especially as far as the on-line context is concerned. According to this framework, the main institutional actors involved in de-radicalisation are the Federal Ministry of the Interior, responsible for borders, immigration, asylum, counter-terrorism and criminal prosecutions. In this context, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism plays a crucial role as a national intelligence agency, articulated in nine Provincial Offices. Working under the Directorate General for Public Security as a part of the Federal Ministry of Interior, it embodies a police authority responsible for the constitutional and democratic order in itself, with the access to database for criminal prosecutions. Beside the security institutional framework, Austria presents preventive policies as well, involving public and private actors, including associations and NGOs. These actions concern awareness-raising and counter-narratives campaigns, as well as educational programs against racism and focused on challenging extremisms in all its facets. They cover the whole national scenario but are mostly active in Vienna. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affair, along with local representatives and civil society actors, run tertiary prevention programs in prisons, in order to detect extremist views or behaviours among inmates.

France has developed plans against terrorism and radicalisation as different, and sometimes intertwined, phenomena. In the span of five years, starting from 2014 to 2019, several actions addressed the topic. First, the 2014 Anti-terrorism Plan aimed at facing new challenges, such as lone actors' actions, along with a pervasive control over terrorist propaganda, also through the empowerment of police and the judiciary, in order to provide them with new tools in counter-terrorism investigations. With an increasing awareness toward the phenomenon, the 2016 Plan specifically was devoted to radicalisation, in addition to actions against terrorism. The Plan for Action against Radicalisation and Terrorism, in fact, through 80 dedicated and operational measures, covered a broader spectrum of activities against extremism, especially targeting its networks, through the monitoring of national and international links. In 2018 the French strategy further improved, eventually a specific plan against radicalisation emerged, especially focused on jihadism. The approach significantly shifted from a security-oriented response towards prevention. The National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation aimed at avoiding the association with extremist groups, in addition to a multiagency strategy involving different actors and widening the subjects responsible for and in de-radicalisation. Furthermore, a specific attention was paid to the analysis of radicalisation

as a multifaceted phenomenon, funding research on the topic, along with trainings carried out by health and social professionals addressed to local actors, in the perspective of an improvement of their activities as well as the development of new strategies, concerning programs for prisoners or reintegration plans for minors.

For the implementation of this National Plan, an Inter-ministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation was settled, involving 20 ministries and implemented by actors of each tier of government, from the national to the local level, supported by private sectors as well. In this framework, a pivotal role is played by French *Préfectures*. Made up by three units (assessment, monitoring, fight against radical Islamism) and working at the local level, they are in charge to inform of the event of suspected (almost) radicalised persons. Specific consideration is also tributed to policies concerning schools and education, though with a security-oriented approach. In fact, a Directorate of Judicial Protection of Youth works under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, through the local administrations of the national education system. However, in 2018 the National Plan for Prevention of Radicalisation has been merged with another counter-terrorism action plan, which has set up National Anti-terrorist Prosecution Office. The main goal of this new plan is again to target jihadism, which was addressed in the following year by other measures through the project 'Fight against separatism'. This approach appeared biased and too pervasive in detriment of Muslim communities and their religious practices.[15] Main institutions responsible for de-radicalisation in France are public security actors: the National Coordination of Intelligence and the Fight Against Terrorism, the National Counter-terrorism Centre, Ministry of Defence and a Central Office for the Fight Against Crimes Related to Information and Communication Technology, as far as the on-line context and hate speech are concerned.

Georgian policies to counter radicalisation first focuses on social inclusion of cultural and religious minorities, through their promotion, especially as far as political rights are concerned. Thus, the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration from 2015 to 2020 is worth mentioning. Georgia has paid specific attention also to prevention, since the establishment of several institutions aimed at tackling the several drivers of radicalisation. For instance, the State Agency for Religious Issues was set up in 2014 and it is supervised by the Prime Minister directly. The pervasive control by the government has led to criticism of the lack of self-determination of the some of the minorities, since their scarce participation in the institution decision-making process, as well as the absence of their direct representatives in the policy-making about their rights too. In the end, this Agency actually carries out security-oriented approach, notwithstanding its engagement in fostering tolerance, religious freedom, through the arrangement of trainings for at risk groups or media, relating to counter-narratives and inclusive speech, as well as the establishment of a Council for Inter-Religious Issues. Accordingly, already in 2006, a Tolerance Centre was created in the Public Defender Office in order to nurture integration and detect intolerant acts against Georgian minority representatives. The Centre also addresses the Parliament with its plans and programs, and coordinates its activities with the Religious and National Minorities Council. Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Affair in 2018 established a special department with the aim to promote human rights. Notwithstanding the abovementioned initiatives, the overall institutional framework, as highlighted by the Georgian national report,[16] lacks a long-term perspective and specific policies and programs devoted to de-radicalisation picture a quite security-oriented response.

Germany has developed a dedicated three level-strategy against extremism, combined with a mixed approach at the institutional level. German policies are preventive in nature, but implemented by state security authorities through criminal provisions. and according to federal division of responsibilities Thus, unlike France, where the management of radicalisation is highly centralized and similarly to the Italian context, in Germany due to the federal structure of the state each local

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[15] On the topic, see, *inter alia*, M. Hecker, (2021), *Once a jihadist, always a jihadist? A Deradicalisation Program Seen from the Inside*, Focus stratégique, No. 102 bis, February 2021.

[16] See, D 4.1 National Report, available at https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-georgia, p. 16.

community may shape responses according to its needs. Though, Germany boasts a strong officially? coordinated networks between the different levels, as well as decentralized advice and information centres based at the sub-national level, which are funded by the government. The fruitful cooperation between the federal government and the civil society at the local level guides the implementation of projects and programs. The first program 'Action Plan against Aggression and Violence' dates to the nineties. Implemented by the Federal Ministry for Family Affair and civil society advocacy groups, its goal was to challenge the spread of racism among youth from eastern Germany in the aftermath of the reunification.

In 2001, another program followed: 'Youth for Tolerance and democracy, against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and antisemitism' was aimed at tackling right-wing extremism as a structured social phenomenon deserving specific counteractions, due to violent racist events occurred in those years. This goal was supported by two other programs, 'Support of counselling, intervention against right-wing extremism' and 'Diversity feels good. Youth for diversity, tolerance and democracy' in 2007. More recently, the federal program 'Demokratie Lieben' carried out in 2014 and the Federal Governmental Strategy for prevent extremism and promote democracy in 2016 deserve to be mentioned. They are aimed at preventing and tackling extremism in civil society. Counter-terrorism and prevention of extremism, in the broader context of the 'protection' of the Constitution are under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, through the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Moreover, the General Public Prosecutor of the Federal Court of Justice coordinates counter-terrorism investigations, from the state security perspective, while the police is responsible for responding to terrorist threats, as in other countries.

Moreover, the abovementioned threefold strategy against extremism consists of primary, secondary and tertiary preventive actions. As for the first, they include civil education about constitutional and democratic principles, especially among young people and in schools; the second aims to prevent radicalisation already in progress through an integration work mostly carried out by social workers. The third, aims at disengaging people already convicted for terrorist crimes throughout dedicated exit programs, which, naturally, often are carried out in prisons. Despite that a main focus is on right-wing extremism, perceived as the major threat to German democratic framework, federal government interventions gradually addressed left-wing and Islamist radicalism as well. This has been criticized for being a too wide spectrum of action, because extremism could effectively be faced without taking into consideration all its facets. Furthermore, state-led cooperation with civil society actors and their public funding has been deemed a risk for a genuine work in the field of de-radicalisation, as it may prevent the detection of institutional racism or extremism. This approach seems to have changed since 2020. Abandoning a perspective focused on a broad concept of extremism, the governmental measures addressed again right-wing extremism, also settling a Cabinet Committee on Combating Racism and Right-Wing extremism. The Committee produced a list of preventive measures such as, *inter alia*, political education for institutions, media and police, exit programs and the strengthening of the coordinated work between authorities, civil society and stakeholders.

The **Kosovar** radicalisation policies are focused on foreign fighters in the aftermath of the Syrian conflict. This approach began as highly repressive and mainly relying on criminal law provisions, especially from 2015 to 2016. Afterwards, there was a shift due to the awareness about the need for preventive tools as well and the insufficiency of punitive strategies. Consistently, the primary response dealt with terrorism rather than with violent extremism or de-radicalisation per se. The first Strategy against Terrorism was issued in 2009, lasting until 2012 and subsequently renewed in 2012 for five years until 2017. However, in 2015 a Strategy Devoted on the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalisation leading to Terrorism (2015-2020) was implemented.

It aimed at tackling nationalist, religious and political extremisms as the main drivers to be monitored in Kosovo, in which, similarly as other D.Rad countries, a (disproportionate) attention has been given to jihadism as the major national threat. Nonetheless, there are also primary, secondary and tertiary prevention policies. The Handbook for the Prevention of Violent Extremism was drafted by the Ministry of Education in order to provide teachers with the adequate knowledge of the phenomenon, as well as to raise their awareness about new inclusive strategies to effectively

challenge it in coordination with local communities' actors. Also, in the Gjilan municipality a CVE Referral Mechanism was devoted to early detect young people prone to travelling to foreign conflict zones. Additionally, tertiary prevention programs were devoted to rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals with a past affiliation with extremist groups.

Kosovo is also engaged in supranational networks, part of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. For instance, a Joint Action Plan on Counterterrorism for the Western Balkans was signed with the EU in 2019 and the following year a Working Arrangement between Europol and Kosovar Police was established. As far as institutions are concerned, the Minister of Internal Affairs is responsible for the implementation of the National Strategy, and this position was held by the Prime Minister until 2020. Main actors are the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Social Welfare, police, Prosecution Services, Probation Services as well as intelligence agency and the Financial Intelligence Unit. At the local level, the Community Safety Councils were established, but not equally implemented throughout the regions. As in the Italian case, the Kosovar framework demands further coordination among the different institutional levels, in order for decentralized policies to effectively deal with de-radicalisation and overcome asymmetries.

In **Serbia** there are several documents and strategies, and the most important policies were implemented from 2009 to 2017. These have aimed at tackling different issues related to extremism: internal security, defence, (anti-) discrimination, and youth extremism. In this regard, the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy were issued in 2009 which addressed that 'national threats' need to be monitored. Stemming from Serbian history of conflicts, religious, political and national extremisms were deemed as the most dangerous phenomena for the state security. Nevertheless, despite the security-oriented approach, the Serbian strategy did not neglect integrative approach, focusing on minorities and the cooperative role of institutions, churches and religious communities. Both strategies were replicated in 2019 and the new version of the National Security Strategy took into account radicalisation as a separate phenomenon, vis-à-vis religious extremism, refugee crisis, integration, as well as radical Islamism. Serbian approach involves prevention through education as well. Worth mentioning, though implemented in delay, the 2012-2020 Strategy for the Development of Education, dealt with combating stereotypes, fostering tolerance and envisaging an inclusive approach in schools, also as far as raising awareness on respect of diversity is concerned. Additionally, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development implemented a one-year project on national scale regarding the Development of Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education in Secondary Schools for 2019-2020 in collaboration with UNESCO. It is the first Serbian ministerial project devoted to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Beyond education, in 2013 Serbia focused on discrimination through a dedicated Strategy for Prevention and Protection (2013-2018) aimed at combating marginalisation and at promoting effective tools, it is focused on vulnerable groups, stereotypes of Roma people, as well as prejudices and discrimination of LGBT+ communities. As far as policies devoted to youth are concerned, a specific National Strategy was issued in 2015. The document addressed rural areas of Serbia. Beside the aforementioned policy framework, Serbia shows security-oriented strategies too in the context of the national counter-terrorism agenda. In particular, the 2015 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment issued by the Ministry of Interior challenged the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Indeed, the first structured strategy merging terrorism with radicalisation and extremism was envisaged in 2017 through the National Strategy for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism. It encompassed a comprehensive action involving preventive activities, protection, criminal responses and substantive tools in case of terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Strategy strongly relied upon the cooperation between state institutions and civil society actors, though it appears unbalanced against religious extremism. Recently expired in 2020, the Strategy for the Development of the System of Execution of Criminal Sanctions, aimed at de-radicalisation programs for inmates deserves a mention as well. Along with the underlined pivotal role played by associations and NGOs, the involved institutions are those working on repression and sanctioning terrorism, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, the Special Department of the Higher Courts and the Appellate Court in Belgrade, *inter alia*. In addition, crucial activities are carried out by the

Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism of the Ministry of the Interior, in its articulation of the Directorate of Criminal Police.

In the **UK**, a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy was issued in 2018. Based, as in the Finnish case, on a multiagency approach, it involves a network of different actions and the coordination of several activities. Thus, intelligence, police, local authorities, health sector and education personnel all play an essential role. In particular, the local management is highly promoted and supported, in order for communities to actively take part in the implementation of de-radicalisation policy. This represents an interesting mixed approach to the topic, since it sparks local communities' resilience. The policy aims to safeguard vulnerable people and groups and counteract terrorism. Program 'Prevent' is the only state program specifically focusing on radicalisation. It supports vulnerable people before they become radicalised, or helps with the exit. The Secretary of the State for Home Department issued guidelines for it. Additionally, UK presents a preventive approach as well, since the Home Office developed a website (Educate against Hate) together with the Department of Education with a handbook addressed to teachers and parentsIt was observed that the emphasis is on jihadism while far and alt-right extremism is underestimated[17].

The Nordic tradition of welfare model is reflected in the **Finnish** de-radicalisation policies. In Finland, the latter are embedded in a cooperation network between several actors, i.e., public authorities, municipalities, NGOs and civil society organizations. Welfare state and social policies have a central role in preventing the backgrounds which can foster violence and related crimes, also perceived as intrinsic values of Finnish society and not just as responses to extremism. Moreover, as underlined by representatives of the Finnish Ministry of Interior, security is not the only strategy against de-radicalisation, since it is also considered a social issue to be monitored and tackled through education, social and health care sector. The legal preventive approach is thus confirmed as far as policies are concerned. Since prevention and coordinated actions are deemed essential in the Finnish strategy on the topic, the implementation of policies appears 'pragmatic', meaning very thin institutional barriers and scarce bureaucracy. Additionally, Finland has separate policies against radicalisation and the first National Action Plan for the Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism dates to 2012. The latter aimed at detecting all forms of extremism, since the Utøya attack in Norway, and right-wing extremism became central in Finnish policies. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for its implementation, coordinating a multi-dimensional network involving police officers, ministries, immigrant advocacy groups, education personnel, academic, researchers and NGOs. The local level is liaised with the governmental one through specific mechanism and projects envisioning a coordinated action, such as the 'Rajapinta Project' carried out in 2019 and several local 'Anchor teams' working under the supervision of the national 'Anchor work', devoted to preventing radicalisation among the youth and to support exit strategies in de-radicalisation programs. Anchor work in thus concerned with raising awareness on the topic in schools, involving teachers and students as well. In addition, recent preventive projects carried out by the National Institute for Health and Welfare in 2021 and the project 'Facts against hate' involving police and supervised by the Ministry of Justice, as part of the Strategy on Preventive Police work, should be mentioned too.

The **Jordan** strategy against de-radicalisation is established in a national plan against extremism, drafted in 2014, confronting it from an educational, cultural, political, social, economic and religious point of view. Accordingly, a Directorate for Combating Extremism and Terrorism was established. Mostly, the Plan is devoted to challenge religious radicalisation, through the promotion of pluralism, an inclusive and democratic political environment, tolerance and human rights. Moreover, Jordan policies are based on three level of actions and activities. First, a security approach implemented by the military forces, second, the intelligence agencies and their exchanges with the international arena and the cooperation with other countries through bi- and multi-lateral relations, and lastly, the educational strategies against extremist carried out by and for the civil society, mostly through the

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[17] See the UK National Report, (D.Rad D 4.1.) accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?p=2538.

activities of third sector and NGOs. The third sector cooperates with the armed forces as well in order to prevent the spread of extremism among public forces officers and to support a non-violent culture. An example of this cooperation is the Jordanian Centre for Combating Intellectual Extremism within the Armed Forces, an institution doing academic research established in 2017.

2.2. D.Rad Countries with strategies against radicalisation included in counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism policies

The countries falling into the category of countries with strategies against radicalisation included in counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism policies are those providing a general response against terrorism, but at the same time involve radicalisation policies. The assumption is that both of terrorism and radicalisation threaten national security. In this category, radicalisation is included in the counter-terrorism agenda and not perceived as a separate phenomenon. This is one crucial aspect which differentiates the approaches adopted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Poland and Türkiye from those mentioned in the previous paragraph.

As illustrated in Table 2, five out of the eight countries that encompass strategies against radicalisation included in counter-terrorism/ counter-extremism are characterised by a repressive legal approach. This is a rather consistent outcome, and when we take into consideration the leading institutions in the large majority of those countries, the Ministries responsible for national security, Police headquarters and Intelligence services are listed (see Table 3). This is further confirmed by the fact that in this category systems with a mixed legal pattern do not show a clear cooperative strategy between the abovementioned security institutional actors with other ministries in charge of social welfare, education or integration. This is the case for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Poland, whose mixed legal pattern do not shade the mainly counter-terrorism policies strategy in de-radicalisation. Indeed, actions beyond security and national defence are carried out mostly by civil society associations and NGOs, especially working at the local level (as, for instance, in the Bosnia and Herzegovina case).

Table 2- Triangulation of the policy framework with the legal framework - countries with counter extremism/terrorism policies as counter radicalisation

Policy Framework	Counter terrorism	BiH; Poland	Hungary; Iraq; Israel; Italy, Türkiye
Legal framework		Mixed	Repressive

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a pluralist background as far as its Constitution and legal framework are concerned. In particular, one can mention the importance of Law on freedom of religion and the legal position of churches and religious communities in ensuring a peaceful and harmonious coexistence between them. Nevertheless, in Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnicity and religion are mutually tied, thus reflecting a cleavage between 'constitutive people' (Muslim Bosnians, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats) and the 'others'. These separations also affect the policies. First, primary prevention embedded in education policies is strongly anchored to ethno-nationalistic propaganda and narratives, fostering division among the youth also in schools – providing diverse curricula – and aiming at the assimilation of otherness and differences. Education too is regulated by (mono-ethnic)

sub-national entities, cantons and districts. An Action Plan for prevention and Combating terrorism has been issued by the Government of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2020-2025. The Plan is made up of four sections, including preventive activities, mapping risks and resources, shaping social answer against extremism, and a section related to criminal response, i.e. investigation, criminal procedure and imprisonment. The Action funds research in order to advance the knowledge on the topic, strengthens the role of NGOs, and focuses on the online context and its dangers, especially for the youth. Other institutions Involved in de-radicalisation policies are the Ministry of Security, State Investigation and Security Agency, Intelligence Security Agency and local agencies. NGOs are also involved at a local level, carrying out projects and programs, although the support from the government and the national institutions is scarce. Additionally, there are training courses for the police agents and security officers.

Polish strategy of radicalisation is mostly mixed. The main authority responsible for preventing terrorism and violent extremism is the Internal Security Agency. The Agency is working towards the prevention of terrorism and coordinates the exchange of information among different bodies that have counter-terrorism as one of their tasks. One of the entities of the Internal Security Agency that is specifically devoted to prevention is the Terrorism Prevention Centre of Excellence. The unit currently carries out de-radicalisation programs, but they are focused mostly on coordinating counter-terrorism strategies at the state level. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have special units devoted to counter-terrorism and they are supported by other agencies on a national and local levels promoting social inclusion, antidiscrimination and tolerance.

Hungary represents a particular case in this category since, though its legal repressive approach is evident, the policies framework does not appear structured. In Hungary in fact, the state-led campaign against LGBTQI and Muslim communities, in addition to far-right propaganda makes the government itself one of the main drivers of radicalisation. Not surprisingly, then jihadism is tackled under counter-terrorism and there is not much done in terms of policies to counteract radicalisation. In this context it is particularly worth to mention polarising governmental narratives. The third sector and civil society associations working against radicalisation might be actually ostracized by the government.

Iraqi legal repressive pattern is reflected in the policies framework and the actors involved in de-radicalisation. The misuse of the counter-terrorism legal framework against political opponents, media opposed to the government and civil society organisation has also affected the scarce involvement of the state in managing de-radicalisation through preventive and integrative measures. In fact, one of the most important interventions on the field of de-radicalisation was the National Security Service's strategy, enacted in 2016 that aimed at challenging factors and contexts conducive to radicalisation and violent extremism. Moreover, the National Security Advisory, as well as the other involved ministries, have been responsible for a National Strategy to combat violent radicalisation leading to terrorism. The Counter-terrorism strategy was developed in 2016 as well. In Nasiriya correctional facility (in 2019 until 2020, a rehabilitation program for juvenile inmates, who were ISIS recruits was carried out. The program relied on religious 'moderation' narratives.

The **Israeli** approach mainly focuses on security institutions and policies, with a reliance on religion, ethnicity and nationalism. Additionally, social movements, human rights associations, as well as political parties are fully engaged in the topic of de-radicalisation. Israeli preventive policies mostly deal with religious freedom, especially regarding the protection of and the territorial coexistence between holy places. These actions, implemented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs are aimed at calming tensions, protecting human rights and at ensuring security at the same time. Notwithstanding the punitive perspective in challenging terrorism – both at the internal and international level – military and security institutions are not the sole actors involved in de-radicalisation. During the last few years, Israel is engaging in preventive programs and strategies, with the goal to implement more integrative and inclusion-oriented policies. In fact, primary prevention is carried out by the Ministry of Education, working with local authorities and NGOs running activities in schools, youth

movements and promoting civic awareness in the public space and in the political arena. Through the Education Law, issued in 2000, the Society and Youth Administration was set up in order to foster tolerance and solidarity vis-à-vis violence events between the Arab population and the police, as well as the clashes between the Jews and the Arabs. The first target is to reach school education, providing teachers with tools to counteract radicalisation and to arrange specific trainings, also through a bilingual program in Jewish and in Arabic. Moreover, NGOs have always played a crucial role in preventing extremism, working in different sensitive fields. This contribution has been recognized by the Israeli government, leading to the establishment of round tables within the ministries and between different sectors. Israeli government allocates funds for policies devoted to 'at-risk' youth, especially in the peripheral and central areas, where gaps in health, welfare and infrastructures persist. Locally, professional officers with educational experience are appointed in order to support young people dealing with the lack of family help, violence or identity struggle. Also, the action started by the former President Rivlin 'Israeli Hope' deserves a mention. Dealing with Jewish terrorism and devoted to tackle ethno-religious racism against Arabs and minorities, it aimed at fostering social inclusion through opposing segregation between the Jewish majority and the minorities. This idea of tolerance has been institutionalised in several fields, such as sport, education, labour market, becoming a program implemented all over the country.

However, the counter-terrorism agenda remains crucial in the Israeli policies framework. It is led by the Ministry of Defence in collaboration with the Ministry of Homeland and Security as well as intelligence units. In this context, two new institutions were created in the past ten years: the National Security Council, advising and supporting the Prime Minister and the National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing. The latter, with intelligence operational tools, envisages a firm control over financial infrastructures, manages seizures and fosters inter-ministerial coordination on these matters. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence, which yearly publishes a list of terrorist organizations to be tackled, the Israeli Security Authority shapes the responses from an operational point of view.

In **Italy**, the policies framework lacks a specific focus on extremism and de-radicalisation. The repressive approach of the legal framework is reflected on the institutional actors involved. Partially, this scenario is mitigated by the important work of the third sector, which mostly carry out activities depending on the local specificities and needs. Beyond the counter-terrorism agenda, however, some efforts have been put to framing guidelines and advice on the topic of radicalisation, de-radicalisation and anti-discrimination through a multiagency strategy developed by dedicated working groups. These groups have been established at different institutional levels: governmental commissions, parliamentary commissions, or experts' tables at the administrative level. For example, a Government Commission on Jihadism in 2016 analysed the Italian policies through a multi-disciplinary perspective, hosting sociologists, political scientists, legal scholars and counter-terrorism experts. The aim was to suggest new perspectives on the topic, refocus on prevention, rather than exercising a repressive response. The first bill on de-radicalisation and specifically devoted to jihadism was drafted in the following year, but it was not approved. Other drafts were afterwards discussed, but none of them in the end was enacted. Similarly, a Parliamentary Committee on intolerance, xenophobia, racism and hate phenomena (named the Jo Cox Committee in remembrance of the British MP murdered in June 2016) was established in 2016.

The Committee specifically worked on several levels of hate speech and discrimination, from those suffered by the LGBT+ communities, to those affecting Roma people, migrants and not last women. These suggestions were taken into consideration by another bill, specifically dedicated to hate speech and violent acts against LGBT+ people, providing new aggravating circumstances. Neither this draft was approved by the Parliament, additionally triggering a strong debate among the several political parties. In the end, the so-called States General on the Execution of Criminal Sentences (May 2016-April 2017) is worth mentioning. This meeting was aimed at discussing and developing strategies already implemented by the Penitentiary Administration Departments. A specific panel was devoted to foreigners and criminal procedures, encouraging the support from educators, social workers, counsellors, transcultural therapists to the ordinary repressive apparatus led by security officers. The Penitentiary Administration Department has also signed an agreement with the Union of Islamic Communities in Italy, promoting the expertise of duly trained imams.

Additionally, a National Plan for an Italian Islam was sealed in 2017 between the Ministry of the Interior Council for Relations with Italian Islam - representatives of Islamic associations in Italy. So far, the Italian government seems more focused on radical Islamism, as current debates on new bill and policies drafts testify.

The policy framework in **Türkiye**, similarly to the legal one, is embedded in a security approach. Additionally, it is affected by a majoritarian perspective, leading to the underestimation of the crimes against minorities and the tendency to assimilate religious and ethnic diversity, rather than to promote social integration. The mismanagement of the pluralist Turkish framework, and authoritarian governments' attitudes *inter alia* brought to the targeting of minorities, especially non-Muslims and led to punitive policies against Kurds and political parties who fought for the Kurdish cause. Indeed, some actions to reconcile with Kurds, run through the so-called Peace Process have been implemented in 2012 until 2015, but they failed. Türkiye as well puts almost all its effort in de-radicalisation against jihadism, whereas right-wing and left-wing extremism are beyond governmental concerns. In fact, programs are envisaged in prisons through the coordinated actions between the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Justice in its General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses. Police holds classes in schools in order to raise awareness and to tackle at-risk situations, with the involvement of student's families as well. Also, the Counterterrorism and Operations Department, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, plays a crucial role in running projects funded by the EU. However, because of problems with freedom of expression advocacy groups and NGOs are less active in implementing projects.

2.3. Slovenia: the outlier

As far as Slovenia is concerned, the country's history[18] has strongly affected the policies and institutional frameworks. Perceived as a rather safe country, in fact, Slovenia lacks structured strategies or plans to counteract de-radicalisation. This is also reflected on the institutional framework, since neither specific actors, nor dedicated bodies can be tackled in the Slovenian case. Thus, it can be highlighted as a case on its own, with different features and approaches in comparison with both the outlined categories. Even though punitive legislation is provided in the Slovenian framework, as well some kind of attention is paid to the prison system as at-risk place for radicalisation, there are no policies (and no provisions) specifically tackling radicalisation or promoting de-radicalisation. This is due to the lack of such incidents and wider interest so far. Notwithstanding, from the legal framework perspective, the Slovenian pattern is rather repressive, since prevention per se is not at the core of the national strategy. Thus, a National Strategy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism and the Resolution on the National Security Strategy deserve a mention as the fundamental framework addressing the security-oriented Slovenian response.

The several actors involved, as well as security officers, do not work in a coordinated way and institutions seem to lack awareness on the multi-stakeholder approach demands. Notwithstanding the focus on security and criminal law response, some efforts are being put in place to follow EU legal framework[19] and implement proactive strategies to integrate the repressive background, especially at the local communities' level. Stressing the need for harmonized policies on de-radicalisation, Slovenian scholars have contributed to the debate on a domestic model of RAN programmes[20], called RADCEPRO. It paved the way to a new institutional approach and response at the state level – from repressive to integrative. As far as de-radicalisation network is concerned, Slovenia has led police coordinated efforts in the context of the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism

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[18] This issue is extensively addressed in the Slovenian legal and policy report (D4.1), especially in paragraph 2 and paragraph 6, accessible at https://dradproject.com/?p=2485.

[19] For instance, *inter alia*, European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 14469/4/05 EUCTS, (2014). Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, EUSCRRT, Directive EU 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism, EUDCT.

[20] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-05/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf.

Initiative already in 2011, with the aim of exchanging information and sharing effective practices in the management of de-radicalisation. The police is highly involved in the process. It relies on standardized procedures, which not always appear to be the best solution to deal with all the facets of de-radicalisation, and are responsible for the drafting of Risk Assessment reports. Also, the Department of Terrorism and Extreme Violence and the Criminal Police Directorate are established to specifically counteract de-radicalisation within the police. Actually, the fundamental focus on terrorism and radicalisation is not perceived as an issue on its own. In fact, Slovenian intelligence services work in a counter-terrorism perspective, not monitoring radicalism or extremism per se. The lack of preventive strategies is further confirmed by the absence of educational, social welfare policies, as well as by the mismanagement of religious pluralism. Indeed, the National Education Institute has drafted some guidelines to face violent behaviours among students, but no legal basis can be found in the radicalisation monitoring. On the contrary, as in other D.Rad countries, radicalisation tendencies are supervised in prison setting and prison personnel cooperates with other institutions and the RAN network stakeholders, but no specific de-radicalisation programs are envisaged. In the end, like in Serbia and in Poland football scene seems attentive to the topic of radicalisation, which is visible via coordinating awareness-raising campaigns with engagement with the police. As in other cases, there is no one central body specifically devoted to de-radicalisation.

3. The European policies framework and interventions

The most important fields of interventions at the European Union level were set in 2004, after the Madrid terrorist incidents.[21] The main counteractions were embedded in a counter-terrorism agenda, especially focusing on security issues and strategies. The European Council enacted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism in March 2004[22], also set up several strategic objectives: the strengthening of international cooperation, intelligence networks, borders defence and tools for restorative justice and support for victims. The Annex I of the Declaration aimed at investigating causes and factors able to foster terrorist networks and recruitment for terrorist purposes. Attention was given also to the interactions between extremist religious and political ideologies, not neglecting cross-cultural and interreligious strategies at the same time as preventive and integrative activities for de-radicalisation[23].

Progressively, the focus on European interventions has been shifting toward radicalisation per se. [24] In particular, member states were encouraged to draft programs for youth in order to raise their awareness and knowledge on cultural diversity, to foster pluralism in state-religion relationships and equal access for people with different backgrounds in the recruitment for law enforcement[25]. Beyond these 'soft' strategies, hard measures were suggested as well. For instance, *inter alia*, the monitoring of Islamophobic and racist incidents, the collection of migrants' data, as well as tackling online terrorist propaganda[26]. In 2016 the European Commission broadened the areas of support to member states, through seven fields of interventions: research, funding and networking on

[21] For a general overview, please see O. Bures, S. Bätz, (2021), *European Union and the fight against terrorism: a differentiated integration theory perspective*, Asia Europe Journal, 19(1), p. 75-104.

[22] 10010/3/04 REV 3, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79637.pdf.

[23] Cf. Strategic orientations on a coordinated EU approach to prevention of radicalisation for 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-02/2021_strategic_orientations_on_a_coordinated_eu_approach_to_prevention_of_radicalisation.pdf.

[24] A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0795&from=EN.

[25] See Prevent Strategies of Member States, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/prevent-strategies-member-states_en.

[26] See also 'Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism' https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0379 about skills of practitioners in exit work.

radicalisation, the address of terrorist and hate speech propaganda on the internet, prison settings[27], inclusive education, the building up of a resilient society, but still the security and the international (cooperation) has not been neglected. The Council of EU urged member states to focus on prisons, inmates' rehabilitation and integration[28], and disengagement[29]. In 2016 the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation, whose functions are now expired, issued recommendations focusing on dissemination of good practices, the involvement of all actors through a multi-agency approach, expanding the role of education and culture in counteracting radicalisation.

Beyond the abovementioned institutions, other bodies involved in de-radicalisations are EUROPOL, EUROJUST, the very well-known RAN network[30], combining institutional and civil society associations and the Steering Board for Union Action on Preventing and Countering Radicalisation, supporting and advising the European Commission strategic plans and actions. All these policies and actions, however, are neither binding nor mandatory for member states, what affects their implementation, as well as their effectiveness in each national framework.

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[27] In particular see Management of exit programmes https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-04/ran-exit_practical_guideline_frankfurt_17-18_01_2019_en.pdf.

[28] See RAN activities on Rehabilitation, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2022-01/special_overview_paper_on_rehabilitation_012022_en.pdf.

[29] E.g. Outline: deradicalisation interventions for violent extremism, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_exit-ex_post_paper_london_15-16032016_en.pdf.

[30] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-05/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf.

4. Best practices in de-radicalisation

In the following section, a selection of best practices identified by national teams in school, prison, and the online setting will be presented, as well as experiences of public administration awareness programs. As for the D.Rad countries' national reports, school, prison and online forums are considered some of the important spaces for challenging radicalisation. **Schools** are places where marginalisation and grievance can be detected at a very early stage, where programmes addressing radicalisation can be effectively designed and implemented.[31] Especially in countries that rely on a repressive approach, **prisons** have been important in preventing radicalisation.[32] The **online context** is the 'virtual' public arena in which polarised narratives and hate speech may grow uncontrolled. Additionally, its transnational and acephalous network can reach many targets, therefore it is important to prevent radicalisation also online.[33] The **role of public institutions** as strategic *loci* for contrasting radicalisation both directly and indirectly, for reducing real or perceived social adversity by communities and people at risk of radicalisation, is widely recognized[34], therefore experiences by D.Rad Countries in this field are particularly interesting.

Schools

In the large majority of D.Rad Countries, education is considered crucial for an effective primary prevention. This may be explained by the fact that teachers and education personnel may play a pivotal role in detecting at-risk situation among the youth at an early stage, also being able to equip students (and their families) with an appropriate knowledge of radicalisation, of the danger of violent ideologies, such as *inter alia* fascism or racism. Additionally, schools are privileged places in which to raise historical awareness about human rights crimes, foster inter-cultural discourses and narratives, as well as promote the importance of minorities' rights, pluralism and the culture of rule of law. In this regard, best practices can be detected in Austria and in Georgia.

At the national level, in Austria, the best practice 'Lectures at Schools', held by the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance[35] embodies a worth-mentioning strategy carried out in schools. It has a wide scope, ranging from trainings for teachers and political education for students on sensitive topics such as racism, antisemitism, or pathological group interactions among adolescences. Austria does not neglect religion (and religious discrimination) as recognized drivers of grievance and marginalization among the youth. Thus, at the regional level the integrative and educational project called 'Not in God's name'[36] can be mentioned, funded by the Federal Chancellery and other public actors. Not addressed solely to school education, its broader educational strategy encompasses the involvement of migrant children through sport activities, streetwork and social campaigns.

Equal access to education has been a priority in Georgia as well. Through the national strategy for Civic Equality and Integration (2015-2020)[37], the Georgian government has aimed at increasing the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the national education system, also via the knowledge of Georgian

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[31] On the topic, see V. Bernelius, H. Huilla, I. Ramos Lobato, (2021), *'Notorious Schools' in 'Notorious Places'? Exploring the Connectedness of Urban and Educational Segregation*, Social Inclusion, 9(2), pp. 154–165.

[32] On the topic, see *inter alia*, D. Ronco, A. Sbraccia, G. Torrente, (2019), *Prison De-Radicalisation Strategies, Programmes and Risk Assessment Tools in Europe*, European Prison Observatory; L. Vidino, B. Clifford, *A Review of Transatlantic Best Practices for Countering Radicalisation in Prisons and Terrorist Recidivism*, Europol Public Information, 2019.

[33] For an insight, please, see T. Gaudette, (2020*), The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from Former Right-Wing Extremists*, Terrorism and Political Violence.

[34] See, inter alia, W. Stephens, S. Sieckelinck, H. Boutellier (2021) *Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44:4, 346-361

[35] https://www.doew.at/english.

[36] https://nign.eu/.

[37] https://smr.gov.ge/uploads/prev/esen_5 5b90432.pdf.

language. As far as the promotion of pluralism and equality is concerned, the policy carried out at the local level by the Georgian Ministry of Education is worth noting too. For example, there was an increase of quotas for students at Pankisi George to foster the civic integration of marginalised and at-risk Pankisi youth[38].

Prisons

Almost all D.Rad teams have underlined the central role of tertiary interventions, especially in those countries embracing a repressive approach, both at the legal and policies framework[39]. Indeed prisons have been target of interventions throughout the D.Rad Countries. In Serbia, the Ministry of Justice, along with the Penitentiary and probation services developed tools of programs for rehabilitation and treatment, in addition to trainings for prison and probation staff. Tools and instruments to detect the risk of radicalisation among inmates have been developed[40]. Furthermore, at the local level, the Penal Correctional Institution in Niš with the local NGO 'Human Rights Centre' organized workshops about anger management as a part of the broader interventions of psychosocial support in prisons. Its main aim is to reduce recidivism and to train inmates to teach others inmates.[41]

In Finland, a specific focus is dedicated to exit work, implemented through a collaboration among institutions and civil society actors. As the Finnish report underlined[42], this long cooperation has nurtured a strong base to design, develop, improve and enhance new practices and trajectories in de-radicalisation. The National Bureau of Investigation consistently coordinates exit works in prisons with people that can be considered already radicalised and involved in serious crimes. Whereas the Deaconess Foundation[43] (HDL, a third-sector organisation) has implemented a worth mentioning exit program in 2020-2021 in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior, though HDL exit program was not designed specifically for prison setting but for socially marginalised people. Additionally, there are neither age limits, nor a selection of specific violent-ideology backgrounds. Austria, again, provides one best practice: DERAD – Prevention of Extremism, Dialogue and Democracy[44], which aims to support inmates, by dedicated follow-ups after release.

Online context

The Austrian and the Serbian experiences are useful blueprints on how to shape effective policies for the online context, especially but not solely among the youth.[45] Austrian best practices in particular, are represented by an intervention carried out through a multi-agency strategy - the 'Decount' project[46], that involves the Ministry of the Interior, the Austrian Institute for International Affairs and the Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology, *inter alia*. Its aim is to prevent radicalisation among teenagers and youth at large, through information on radicalisation and extremism. This project utilizes e.g. video game that re-enacts the process of radicalisation, and can

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[38] An English version of the document is not available.

[39] For an overview on RAN activities on rehabilitation, see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2022-01/special_overview_paper_on_rehabilitation_012022_en.pdf, and for Minimum methodological requirements for exit interventions see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_exit-ex_post_paper_london_15-16032016_en.pdf.

[40] On desistance and radicalisation *see* e.g. David Gadd, "The role of recognition in the desistance process: a case analysis of a former far-right activist," *Theoretical Criminology, 10* (2), 2006, 179–202.

[41] https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/en/vest/30896/first-online-workshop-for-convicted-persons-in-serbia-.php.

[42] See the Legal and Policy National Report for Finland (D.Rad D 4.1) accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-finland

[43] https://www. hdl.fi/exit/.

[44] https://www.derad.at/.

[45] On the topic, we have already mentioned the experience carried out by the program 'Jamal al-Khatib' as a case study worth of circulation in the section 3.1.3, p. 27 of the Comparative Report, D.4.2.

[46] https://www.ex- tremismus.info/.

be used by teachers in schools or in youth centres. Additionally, the NGO 'Zara' – 'Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work' gathers data on online racist incidents, hate speech and cyber-bullying[47].

In Serbia, the Ministry of Youth and Sports has launched the campaign 'Say no to hate speech on the Internet', as part of the Council of Europe's 'No Hate Speech Movement'[48]. The aim of this intervention is to raise awareness and to educate youth in recognising online (and offline) hate speech. Furthermore, the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunication ran 'Smart and Safe' project that focused on digital security and reporting of hate speech incidents.[49]

It is crucial that media is involved in preventing the spread of hate narratives or incitement to hatred, discrimination, racist and sexist speech, anti-minority propaganda, as well as fake news and conspiracy theories. Media professionalism and self-regulation when dealing with sensitive topics is an important tool to prevent misuse of the online networks. In Serbia, for instance, the association of Novi Sad School of Journalism, in collaboration with the Peace Institute and the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Lubljiana and the Center for Peace Studies implemented the 'Behave-See Beyond Hate: Learning and Acing to Counter Hate Speech Online in South East Europe' project.[50] One of the main aims of this project was to nurture critical thinking as well as addressing hate narratives in media, and enabling the dissemination of good practices between Croatia and Slovenia. This project was addressed to high school teachers in order to improve their knowledge on this topic.

Public institutions

D.Rad Countries have stressed the importance of enhancing public institutions' knowledge when dealing with extremism or radicalisation. For instance, in Germany, the 2020 Cabinet Committee on Combating Racism and Right-Wing Extremism specifically addressed this issue throughout its 89 measures catalogue. Fostering political education among public institutions' employees and professionally active adults, including the police and journalists were an essential part of the Cabinet's preventive strategy.[51] Similarly, in Finland in 2021, the National Institute for Health and Welfare started a project aimed at preventing radicalisation in the social and health care sector ('Radik').[52] As the Finnish report stressed, social and health workers, for instance, have been reluctant to accept their role as actors of the broader national security framework; police and other security officers correspondingly lacked the awareness of being part of the inclusive and integrative framework. Thus, this testifies to the difficulties de-radicalisation poses even in countries with a robust and structured background on this issue.

5. Fields of interventions and the institutional framework

In some countries criminal law classifies violent and non-violent radicalism in the same category.[53] This may happen also as far as policies are concerned. Additionally, most policies related to de-

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[47] https://www.zara. or.at/de/beratung/ melden.

[48] https://www.mos.gov.rs/vest/reci-ne-govoru-mrznje-na-internetu?lang=lat#.

[49] https://pametnoibezbedno.gov.rs/prijava-nelegalnog-sadrzaja/.

[50] https://novinarska-skola.org.rs/sr/en/behave-see-beyond-hate-learning-and-acting-to-counter-hate-speech-online-in-south-east-europe/. For an impact assessment see https://novinarska-skola.org.rs/sr/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Behave_summaryENG_20-09-24.pdf.

[51] See the Legal and Policy National Report for Germany, (D.Rad D 4.1, Section 2, p. 11 and Section 5, p. 22), accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-germany.

[52] See the Legal and Policy National Report for Finland (D.Rad D 4.1, Section 5, p. 19 and Section 6.2, p. 23), accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-finland.

[53] D.Rad D 4.2, accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=d4-2-comparative-report-de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-and-policy-framework. See, *inter alia*, J. Bartlett, C. Miller, (2012), *The*

radicalisation target jihadism as the major threat, and equal importance is not given to political extremism and drivers of radicalisation linked to identitarian stances, as indicated in Serbia and in Georgia (e.g., alt- and far-right movements, multi-ethnic contexts or white nationalism). Up to now, jihadism seems to be the most important institutional concern (and policy domain) when dealing with radicalisation, what sometimes may even lead to discrimination and state-led Islamophobia.[54] Further knowledge about xenophobia, racism and hate crimes should be developed at the institutional level as well.

As illustrated in Figure 1, there are policy domains that attract more attention and are perceived by policy-makers as the most relevant radicalisation drivers. First and foremost, religion, which mainly applies to Islam. In the large majority of D.Rad countries de-radicalisation policies target jihadism and therefore tend to focus on Muslims. This has a number of consequences in terms of discrimination, freedom of religion, social inclusion, but also policy effectiveness.

Figure 1- Fields of policy intervention

- Religion
  Austria; France; Georgia; Germany; Jordan; Kosovo; Iraq, Israel; Italy; Serbia; Turkey; the UK

- Far right and political extremism
  Austria; Finland; Germany; Kosovo; Serbia, Israel

- National minorities
  Georgia; Kosovo; Israel; Serbia, Turkey

- Immigration
  Austria; Finland; Germany; Poland

Institutional actors may vary considerably, depending on the legal framework typology, and the governmental commitment in prioritizing either repression or integrative and social inclusion measures. The Ministry of Interior seems to be the most important institutional actor responsible for and involved in both the fight against radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies and initiatives. In most of the countries, it is flanked by the Ministry of Justice, especially when it comes to de-radicalisation actions in prisons and places of detentions. Where radicalisation is, or is perceived to be, a very serious threat to the national security, the Ministry of Defence and/or the Armed forces are also involved. This is the case of Israel, Jordan, Iraq (all characterised by a repressive legal framework), but also France and Poland, that belong to the mixed (preventive/repressive) legal framework.

Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24 (1).

[54] See, for instance, T. Abbas, *Islamophobia and Radicalisation: A Vicious Cycle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

The Ministry of Education is directly involved in de-radicalisation policy-making in Finland, Serbia, Slovenia and in the UK, even if schools remain a favourite terrain for deradicalisation in all D.Rad countries. Interestingly, in Türkiye the Ministry of Religious Affairs cooperates in de-radicalisation policy and strategy-designing, to highlight the centrality of religious radicalism in the country (whether it is a real or perceived centrality is not so relevant in this context), whereas the Ministry of Welfare is also involved in Finland, Kosovo and in the UK.

Along Ministries, a number of specialised agencies (at Ministerial level) are responsible for policy-making and coordination activities. It is the case of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre in France; of the Special Counter-Terrorism Departments in Italy; of the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime in Serbia; and of the Department of Terrorism and Extreme Violence in Slovenia. All of them targeting terrorism and organized crime, and not exclusively radicalism.

No matter the specific public institutions' design of D.Rad Countries, all national contexts are characterised by horizontal subsidiarity, that is by the direct involvement of civil society actors in de-radicalisation. The level of involvement (from participating in policy-making to simply implementing) varies cross-countries, but in no country public authorities can do without civil society actors.

Also, the federal or regional composition of the state, on the one hand, affects the institutional influences between the central and the sub-national (as well as local) entities. On the other hand, this may have an impact on the policies implementation, because of the varied ways of coordination and collaboration between different tiers of government. This depends again from the national context and forms of decentralization. For instance, the German report[55] highlighted how the federal authorities are responsible for security, national defence, protection of the constitutional order, whereas sub-national entities and bodies are in charge of developing integrative and social welfare policies. Often, then, policies can vary because of local needs and responses. In Italy, on the contrary, the specifics of existing decentralization structure have led to a lack of coordination in de-radicalisation, and a lack of a central framework, both at the institutional and policies level. Thus, in each region, activities are carried out unevenly.

In France, in the UK, in Finland and in Serbia, a system of coordination and collaboration between institutions and tiers of government have been clearly defined, also enabling the independence of local communities in carrying de-radicalisation activities. However, in Serbia, de-radicalisation policies framed by local communities often lack a regular and timely implementation and reporting. In this scenario, third sector does an important work in the field of de-radicalisation. Thus, stable funding for the it, and for civil society actors in general might be enhanced, as well as an independent and free environment for their activities, as also stressed by several D.Rad countries' recommendations.

6. Conclusive remarks

This collection of policies and best practices shows that a long path still needs to be paved to fully understand de-radicalisation policies. A priority for an effective de-radicalisation strategy seems to be to raise awareness as well as to conduct legal and policy interventions to better include de-radicalisation in the national frameworks. Different country reports reiterated the need for a multiagency approach, and that policies should also consider establishing an effective national institutional network to guide and support all the actors involved in de-radicalisation, that is transparent and stable. Building such a network would help to encompass specific and local needs.

The results of the comparison conducted in this report are triangulated with the legal pattern (preventive, repressive, mixed) as identified in WP4 Comparative Report (D4.2) and the outcomes confirm the links between the legal pattern, the policies typology and the institutional framework. In fact, what is obvious, firstly, many countries falling into the repressive legal pattern strongly rely on counter-terrorism policies and counter-terrorism apparatus in dealing with de-radicalisation. Main actors for those countries are institutions involved in national security and defence, though activities

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[55] See the Legal and Policy National Report for Finland (D.Rad D 4.1), accessible at: https://dradproject.com/?publications=de-radicalisation-and-integration-legal-policy-framework-in-finland.

are carried out also by civil society associations. Secondly, the mixed legal pattern detected in several D.Rad Countries is reflected by the overlapping activities carried out though a social and integrative perspective in addition to the national security level. In this pattern, counter-terrorism policies are present in addition to separate policies specifically addressing radicalisation – main actors are both institutions and the third sector. Finland is an exception with its 'pure' preventive legal pattern, showing a long history of cooperation between ministries, public institutions, national institutes, academic institutions, advocacy groups, professionals, and civil society associations. Thus, de- radicalisation is preventive and embedded in a multi-agency network.

Huge gaps are still present among the D.Rad Countries with some being advanced in framing policies, envisaging holistic and multi-agency policies (e.g. Austria, Serbia, Finland), while others do not show such advanced policy framework (e.g. Slovenia, Hungary). Due to the lack of binding nature of the European policies and interventions on this topic, the supranational framework is not able to overcome these asymmetries and heterogeneity among (at least) the member states. There are, however, tools and guidelines that can advise each national strategy.

De-radicalisation demands a holistic approach, and is investigated through multiple lenses, perspectives and disciplines. The complexity of the phenomenon of radicalisation is additionally testified by the multisector interventions. Nonetheless, as Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier argued[56] in this multifaceted phenomenon[57], a common ground can be traced through one key concept, at least in prevention, i.e. 'resilience'. As the authors suggest, resilience in the wider frame of extremism and radicalisation, should be embedded in a social-ecological structure, taking into consideration backgrounds, social interactions as well as political framework at large, in which individual and individuals move and act. This can take a form of 'resilient community', which might coexist with 'community engagement', meant as "the strengthening of relationships between citizens and the institutions of the state".[58]

In this context it is important to recognise that the victims and survivors of terrorism and radicalisation should not be neglected. Restorative justice and institutional support must be considered in the construction of resilient civil communities, and as a tool to strengthen mutual trust between them and public forces and institutions, as one of the main pillars of prevention.

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[56] W. Stephens, S. Sieckelinck, H. Boutellier (2021) *Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44:4, 346-361.

[57] The authors observe: "four recurring themes emerged that cut across the literature: (1) the "resilient individual," (2) identity, (3) dialogue and action, and (4) connected or resilient communities. Each of these themes capture recurring ideas that emerge across the disciplines, which are articulated in a variety of ways but seem to share underlying perspectives on what is required to prevent radicalisation", *Id.*, p. 348.

[58] *Id.*, p. 353.

Table 3. Data Triangulation

Country	Legal pattern[59]	Policies typology[60]	Most relevant institutions/actors[61]
Austria	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, civil society actors
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mixed	Counter-terrorism	Ministry of Security, State Investigation and Security Agency, Intelligence Security Agency and local policies agencies, civil society actors
Finland	Preventive	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter terrorism	Ministries, police, education personnel, civil society actors and academics
France	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, National Counter-terrorism Centre, civil society actors
Georgia	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	State Security Service of Georgia, Ministry of Internal Affair, Public Defender Office, civil society actors s
Germany	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	State security authorities and civil society actors
Hungary	Repressive	Counter-terrorism	Counter Terrorism Centre, Minister of the Interior, civil society actors
Iraq	Repressive	Counter-terrorism	National Security Apparatus, National Security Advisory, Ministry of Justice, civil society actors
Israel	Repressive	Counter-terrorism	Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Homeland and Security, Intelligence, civil society actors
Italy	Repressive	Counter-terrorism	Ministry of Interior, Intelligence, Police, Special Counter-terrorism Departments
Jordan	Repressive	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Military forces, civil society actors
Kosovo	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Minister of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Social Welfare, Police, Prosecution services, Probation Services, intelligence
Poland	Mixed	Counter-terrorism	Internal Security Agency, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Armed Forces, National Security Bureau

[59] For methodology, definitions and the theoretical framework of legal patterns (repressive, preventive, mixed), see WP4 Comparative Report (D4.2), Section 2.

[60] Policies typology involves information how the policies tackle de-radicalisation – if strategy against radicalisation is a separate policy, or if it is included as a part of a broader strategy against terrorism or extremism.

[61] As identified by the national reports WP 4.1.

Serbia	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education, Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, Special Departments of the Higher Courts and of the Appellate Court in Belgrad, Directorate of Criminal Police, civil society actors
Slovenia	Repressive		Department of Terrorism and Extreme Violence, Criminal Police Directorate, National Education Institution
Turkey	Repressive	Counter-terrorism	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Religious Affairs, General Directorate of Prisons, civil society actors
UK	Mixed	Separate de-radicalisation policies & counter-terrorism	Home Office, Department of Education, intelligence, police, health sector

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